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Abstract
We present three interesting applications of stochastic control in finance. The first
is a real option model that considers the optimal entry into and subsequent operation
of a biofuel production facility. We derive the associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
(HJB) equation for the entry and operating decisions along with the econometric
analysis of the stochastic price inputs. We follow with a Monte Carlo analysis of
the risk profile for the facility. The second application expands on the analysis of
the biofuel facility to account for the associated regulatory and taxation uncertainty
experienced by players in the renewables and energy industries. A federal biofuel
production subsidy per gallon has been available to producers for many years but the
subsidy price level has changed repeatedly. We model this uncertain price as a jump
process. We present and solve the HJB equations for the associated multidimensional
jump diffusion problem which also addresses the model uncertainty pervasive in real
option problems such as these. The novel real option framework we present has
many applications for industry practitioners and policy makers dealing with country
risk or regulatory uncertainty—which is a very real problem in our current global
environment. Our final application (which, although apparently different from the
first two applications, uses the same tools) addresses the problem of producing reliable
bid-ask spreads for derivatives in illiquid markets. We focus on the hedging of over
the counter (OTC) equity derivatives where the underlying assets realistically have
transaction costs and possible illiquidity which standard finance models such as Black-
Scholes neglect. We present a model for hedging under market impact (such as bid-ask
spreads, order book depth, liquidity) using temporary and permanent equity price
impact functions and derive the associated HJB equations for the problem. This
model transitions from continuous to impulse trading (control) with the introduction
of fixed trading costs. We then price and hedge via the economically sound framework
of utility indifference pricing. The problem of hedging under liquidity impact is an
on-going concern of market makers following the Global Financial Crisis.
Keywords: Stochastic control, Financial mathematics, Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
equations, Ethanol, Real options, Policy, Crush spread, Optimal switching, Optimal
stopping, Renewable energy, Regulatory uncertainty, Country risk, Jump diffusions,
Partial integro differential equations, Quasivariational inequalities, Numerical meth-
ods, Finite differences, Market impact, Illiquidity, Derivatives, Transaction costs,
Utility indifference, Market Incompleteness
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three distinct but related applications of modeling real world
problems of decision making under uncertainty, and seeking solutions and the related
optimal decision strategies for those problems using optimal control. The models
considered here use stochastic processes to model future uncertainty. This chap-
ter begins with some motivating problems from engineering and finance for which
stochastic control may provide some insights and solutions. We follow with a very
intuitive introduction to the topic of stochastic optimal control and review of stochas-
tic processes. The chapter concludes by introducing the three papers which together
comprise the novel contribution of this thesis, and explaining how they relate to
stochastic control and each other.
1.1 Optimal Control: A Motivation
Consider the example of a plant manager operating a facility that produces electricity
from natural gas. The manager is tasked with maximizing her expected profit. The
price of electricity and natural gas may be known today, but their future prices are
uncertain and subject to price volatility. She knows the fixed running costs associated
both with operating the plant at capacity or with idling. The profits over the day
while operating can be characterized as
profit = volume produced× (electricity price− natural gas and fixed running costs).
The problem becomes more complicated by the fact there is a large fixed cost asso-
ciated with changing operating status from on/off to off/on. Given uncertain future
price outcomes, she must decide whether to incur the cost of turning production off if
the plant is running at a loss today. Will the prices bounce back favourably tomorrow
2or are the expected future losses enough to overcome the cost of changing the plant’s
production state?
Phrased mathematically, we are given some known operating costs while running
in regime α, and the prices of electricity and gas Xt, Yt. Since prices are uncertain
we will model them with stochastic processes. Her instantaneous profit rate is given
by f(Xt, Yt, α, t)dt and is a function of price, cost and whichever operating regime
she chooses for the plant (e.g. on, off, half capacity). The income over the life of the
plant is J
J(Xt, Yt, t) =
∫ T
t
f(Xs, Ys, α, s)ds−
∑
switching costs.
The manager may seek a control α that maximizes her expected earnings over the
life of the plant V while minimizing the accrued switching costs.
Another example is a fund manager who wishes to liquidate his position in a
certain stock. If his position were sufficiently large that selling his entire inventory at
once would cause a significant drop in price due to market impact, the manager might
seek an optimal selling rate α to minimize the expected losses from the liquidation.
Since stock prices are challenging to predict and appear random, we model the price
as a stochastic process St. The optimal rate α may be a function of the stock price,
his inventory level and target position, and the time remaining until the trade must
be closed out T . When buying or selling, there is a temporary market impact on the
price because of the bid-ask spread1
realized execution price = bid-ask impact× stock price.
This is because market makers offer a lower price to traders seeking to sell stocks and
vice versa. In other words, the
bid impact ≤ 1 and the ask impact ≥ 1.
There may additionally be a fixed brokerage cost associated with executing any trade.
The problem becomes more complicated when the liquidation rate also has a per-
manent impact on the stock price. This may occur in especially illiquid markets
(i.e. markets with little trading activity).
1The ask is the price one might expect to pay for a stock, whereas the bid is the price one might
expect to receive for selling a stock.
3The total income J from liquidating is given by
realized income = bid factor× stock price× volume sold
or mathematically, if f(St, α, t)dt is the instantaneous revenue
J(St, t) =
∫ T
t
f(Ss, α, s)ds.
Similar to the plant manager, the trader may seek a liquidation strategy that maxi-
mizes his expected income.
In both cases, we can write the total optimal value V realized over the lifetime of
the plant (or trade) as a functional
V (Xt, t) = max
α
E[J(Xt, t)].
In some cases, simply seeking a strategy that maximizes the expected payoffs may
result in too much potential risk. For example, the trader seeking to liquidate his
portfolio by strictly minimizing his market impact may trade too slowly and expose
himself to excess market risk. He should then seek a balance between minimizing
his market impact costs and market exposure over time. The trade-off between mar-
ket impact and market risk can be modeled using a penalty term for example that
penalizes excess risk.
In the following section, we aim to find a method of maximizing or minimizing the
functional above, which we will accomplish by using dynamic programming to find
the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the maximum.
1.1.1 Real Options versus Financial Options
The application of Ito calculus and arbitrage free pricing of financial options was
pioneered by [4, 15], both published in 1973, and later codified in terms of martingale
pricing in [12]. In the years following, many papers and books have been published
in the field of financial mathematics. Financial derivatives are written on market
underlyings such as stocks, bonds, rates, indexes and the like. Examples include
equity call options, interest rate swaps, commodity futures and many other exotic
derivative contracts traded on financial exchanges or over the counter.
Later the same mathematical tools developed in the study of financial options
were applied to “real” or more tangible assets such as mines, lumber fields, energy
4plants, and other areas. Since the assets and problems considered were more “real,”
the framework is called “real options” in contrast with financial options written on
intangibles such as rates or stocks.
This real options method of modeling resource project management decisions was
introduced in the 1980s by [6] in a seminal paper which considered the problem
of optimally starting and stopping production to maximize the profits of a natural
resource project. The optimal entry and exit from investment projects was also
considered by [8] in another influential real options paper. A classical text on real
options was introduced in [9]. Typically the early applications were limited to natural
resource and energy projects as the projects were still contingent upon underlyings
that may trade in financial markets (e.g. oil futures). Later applications, however,
can be found on a wide variety of topics ranging from capital budgeting, corporate
strategic planning and competition [20], patents, pharmaceuticals, and R&D project
and portfolio management [14, 19, 22], and in a much darker application, suicide [11].
To see how real options relate to financial options, we consider an analogy between
an oil field and a call option. A call option allows the holder the right but not the
obligation to purchase a stock in the future for some predetermined amount called
the strike. If the stock price is worth more than the strike price at the expiry date of
the financial contract, the holder may exercise it for a profit. If the stock price is less
than the strike, the holder would allow it to expire unexercised as the stock could be
had for less on the exchange. Thus the payoff is
call option payoff = max(stock price− strike price, 0).
Now consider a firm that holds an undeveloped oil field with some known oil reserves.
The firm has the option but not the obligation to develop the field by drilling a well
and building a rig. The cost to develop the field is known, and is analogous to the
strike price. The value of the oil reserves in terms of reserve volume and price today
is known. Its future price, however, is uncertain like the stock price in the call option
example. The value of the option to expand and develop the oil field has a payoff
very similar to the call option. The real option payoff is
real option payoff = max(reserve volume× oil price− development costs, 0).
Using the same financial mathematics tools from option pricing, it is possible to value
an oil field.
Real options along with financial options are complicated by market incomplete-
5ness. In fact, examining real options often requires the issue of market incompleteness
to be confronted head on. Incompleteness is the case when not all the underlying
sources of risk can be traded or adequately hedged (e.g. electricity, trading restric-
tions or blackouts, etc.). Incompleteness may also follow from model uncertainty,
transaction costs, or basis risk (say, we have an ethanol biofuel plant and can trade
gasoline futures but not ethanol biofuel; gasoline is a similar asset but not a perfect
substitute for hedging ethanol price risk). In this case, there is no unique no arbi-
trage price or hedging strategy for the option. We treat market incompleteness in
later chapters (primarily 3 and 4).
1.2 Deterministic Optimal Control
To introduce the ideas of stochastic control in a simpler setting, we begin by con-
sidering a deterministic optimal control problem. We seek to maximize a functional
J of a dynamical system xt via a control function α(xt, t). We may drop the argu-
ments from α for notational simplicity and occasionally refer to its output as simply
αt = α(xt, t). If the profit function is f(xt, α, t) and the value of the system in its end
state is g(xT , T ), the total profit from the system is
J(x0, α, 0) =
∫ T
0
f(xt, αt, t)dt+ g(xT , T )
where α is any admissible control and the dynamics of xt are governed by
x˙t = F (xt, αt)
given some initial condition x0.
If the optimum is defined as V (xt, t) = supα J(xt, α, t), then
V (x0, 0) = sup
α
{∫ T
0
f(xt, αt, t)dt+ g(xT , T )
}
. (1.1)
A powerful method of deriving a PDE for the evolution of V (xt, t) is to use the
dynamic programming principle (DPP) and Bellman’s principle of optimality. The
dynamic programming method takes this problem on [0, T ] and breaks it down into
smaller subproblems, each defined on a subinterval of [0, T ].
6Bellman’s Principle of Optimality:
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state
and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an
optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision
[2].
By Bellman’s principle of optimality splitting V from time t to t+ dt yields
V (xt, t) = sup
αt
{f(xt, αt, t)dt+ V (xt+dt, t+ dt)} . (1.2)
This is a dynamic algorithm because we have broken the problem down into two
smaller subproblems on the subintervals [t, t+dt) and [t+dt, T ]. Intuitively, assuming
we know the optimum function V at some time t+ dt and for all time into the future
to T , we only need to solve the optimal αt at an instant (xt, t) to complete the solution
for all [t, T ]. Since the end state V (xT , T ) = g(xT , T ) is known, the equation is then
solved backward in time to t = 0 (i.e. V (xT , T )→ V (xT−dt, T −dt)→ ...→ V (x0, 0)).
The Taylor expansion of V (xt+dt, t+ dt) is
V (xt+dt, t+ dt) = V (xt, t) +
∂V
∂t
dt+∇V · x˙tdt+O(dt2)
where ∇ denotes the gradient operator with respect to xt. By combining the two
equations above and taking the limit as dt→ 0, we obtain the HJB equation for V ,
∂V
∂t
+ sup
αt
{∇V · F (xt, αt, t) + f(xt, αt, t)} = 0, (1.3)
subject to the final condition V (xT , T ) = g(xT , T ). If we solve over the entire state
space, xt, and all admissible controls α(xt, t) we obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for the maximum [3].
For example, if J is some energy functional, then this becomes similar to the
Hamiltonian and action of the dynamical system, which could then potentially be
solved using variational calculus [1]. The resulting first variation and associated non-
linear PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi equation or a statement of the principle of mini-
mum energy. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (1.3) is in essence an extension
of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
In the next section we investigate the topic of stochastic optimal control, but see a
similar structure to Equation 1.3, albeit with the addition of a Laplacian term which
accounts for the randomness.
71.3 Stochastic Optimal Control
We now consider the problem of deriving an optimal control strategy in a stochastic
setting. An excellent reference on stochastic control can be found in [18]. Say the
state process xt evolves stochastically. We rename xt as Xt to conform to the typical
convention for denoting a stochastic process. The dynamics of Xt are governed by
the stochastic differential equations (SDE)
dXt = µ(Xt, αt, t)dt+ σ(Xt, αt, t)dWt (1.4)
X0 = x, (1.5)
for which there exists a solution where Wt is a Brownian motion defined on a fil-
tered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) satisfying the usual conditions [16]. In
other words, every singular outcome or possible collection of events has an associated
probability and the process history is known. (See [16] for a review of stochastic
differential equations.) Our control αt is progressively measurable with respect to
our filtration and is in the set of all admissible controls A. That is, we know αt at
time t and it only depends on the information up until t. In particular, we assume
αt is non-anticipating and Markovian (i.e. a function of only the information at time
t, αt = α(Xt, t)).
Ito’s Lemma
Ito’s lemma is one of the main tools used in stochastic analysis and control [16]. It
gives the evolution of a function u(Xt, t) of an SDE Xt through time. It follows from
a Taylor expansion and the finite quadratic variation of Brownian motion. Then for
the SDE of Equation 1.52
u(XT , T )− u(x, 0) =
∫ T
0
(
∂u
∂t
+ µ(Xt, αt, t)
∂u
∂X
+
1
2
σ2(Xt, αt, t)
∂2u
∂X2
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(Xt, αt, t)
∂u
∂X
dWt. (1.6)
2For an n-dimensional SDE with d-dimensional Brownian motion, the generator is of the form
du =
(
∂u
∂t + µ
T∇u+ 12TrσσT∇2u
)
dt+∇uTσdWt where ∇ is the gradient with respect to Xt, ∇2 is
the Hessian, Tr denotes the matrix trace and superscript T is the matrix transpose.
8Taking expectations of both sides with respect to t = 0, X0 = x yields
E[u(XT , T )]− u(x, 0) = E
[∫ T
0
(
∂u
∂t
+ µ(Xt, αt, t)
∂u
∂X
+
1
2
σ2(Xt, αt, t)
∂2u
∂X2
)
dt
]
(1.7)
since E[u(x, 0)] = u(x, 0) is known and the expectation of the Ito integral of a smooth
function h(·) is zero E[∫ T
0
hdWt] = 0 (specifically h need only be square integrable).
Moreover, if this PDE is satisfied
∂u
∂t
+ µ(Xt, αt, t)
∂u
∂X
+
1
2
σ2(Xt, αt, t)
∂2u
∂X2
= 0 (1.8)
with final condition
u(XT , T ) = g(XT ) (1.9)
then its solution is
u(x, 0) = E[u(XT , T )] = E[g(XT )]. (1.10)
This result is known as the Feynman-Kac theorem and can be considered as an
application of Green’s function methods to solving the PDE equations 1.8–1.9.
The Stochastic Optimization Problem
Assume our running payoff function f(Xt, αt, t) and our final condition g(XT ) satisfy
some mild growth conditions and g is also bounded below. Then our total expected
controlled payoff or profit is
J(x, α, 0) = E
[∫ T
0
f(Xt, αt, t)dt+ g(XT )
]
(1.11)
where E is the expectation given the information today X0. Now we seek to find an
optimal control and associated value function V
V (x, 0) = sup
α
J(x, α, 0). (1.12)
Hence if J(x, α∗, 0) = V (x, 0), we say that the function α∗ is an optimal control.
Example controlled diffusion
To build some intuition, we briefly investigate a simple example of a controlled dif-
fusion. Consider a stochastic dynamical process Xt that one wishes to steer to some
final end target B at time T . If XT 6= B, some penalty function is applied g(XT , B).
9Figure 1.1: The controlled (α = 1) contrasted with the uncontrolled diffusion (α = 0).
The target is B = 1 and the other parameters are X0 = 0, T = 1, σ = 0.5. The solid
blue lines are different possible walks while the thick solid black line is the expected
value E[Xt]. The black dashed lines are the 90% confidence limits.
We consider a possible drift control α that steers the walk Xt to some target B
dXt = −αt(Xt −B)dt+ σdWt (1.13)
X0 = 0. (1.14)
When αt = 0, this becomes an uncontrolled diffusion which freely evolves as a contin-
uous random walk. When αt > 0, depending on the intensity of αt, the walk targets
B and any deviation from B is always corrected by the drift; the larger the deviation,
the stronger the correction. See Figure 1.1 for an illustration.
Say a cost is incurred by correcting the drift f(Xt, αt), then we may seek a control
strategy function αt = α(Xt, B, t) that minimizes our total cost V given our current
state, target and time remaining
V (X0, 0) = inf
α
E
[∫ T
0
f(Xt, αt)dt+ g(XT , B)
]
. (1.15)
Not every stochastic optimization problem necessarily has diffusion parameters
that can themselves be controlled. In Chapter 2, we consider a stochastic control
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problem where an agent seeks to maximize his profit by switching production on
and off given a stochastic price processes in his operating revenues. The decisions
have no effect on the price diffusion parameters. Chapter 3 includes an example
where the diffusion parameters are “controlled” in the sense that the operator of the
facility of Chapter 2 assumes the econometric parameter estimates come from some
worst case distribution. The parameters for the stochastic profit process are still not
affected by the decisions. Finally we consider a situation in Chapter 4 where the
price process parameters are adversely affected by the agent’s decision making. The
agent of Chapter 4 is a trader trying to hedge his portfolio position but every buy/sell
pushes the price up/down (generally adversely) for the trader.
1.3.1 The Dynamic Programming Principle
As with its deterministic counterpart, the fundamental tool of stochastic optimal
control is the DPP and Bellman optimality. The DPP can be stated in a stochastic
setting as
V (x, 0) = sup
α∈A
E
[∫ θ
0
f(Xt, αt, t)dt+ V (Xθ, θ)
]
(1.16)
where θ ∈ (0, T ) is any stopping time. As we are now considering stochastic un-
certain quantities, we use expectations to arrive at a result otherwise similar to the
deterministic Bellman statement Equation 1.2.
As in the previous section, we can intuitively interpret the stochastic DPP as
follows: Divide the problem into two subintervals (hence it is “dynamic”), [0, θ) and
[θ, T ]. Provided we have already solved for the optimal control from time T working
back to θ, we need only to optimize the controls over the region [0, θ). We begin at
the known end condition t = T and then incrementally work back in time to t = 0.
1.3.2 The HJB Equation in Stochastic Control
Consider if we start from an initial condition X0 = x and take θ = ∆t and αt = a
where a is any constant (possibly suboptimal) control in A. Then by the DPP (1.16),
V (x, 0) ≥ E
[∫ ∆t
0
f(Xt, a, t)dt+ V (X∆t,∆t)
]
(1.17)
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since, again, a may be a suboptimal control. If V is C1,2 continuous, we may apply
Ito’s lemma (1.7) through ∆t and cancel both V (x, 0) and V (X∆t,∆t) to obtain
0 ≥ E
[∫ ∆t
0
f(Xt, a, t)dt+
∫ ∆t
0
(
∂V
∂t
+ La[V (Xt, t)]
)
dt
]
. (1.18)
where La is the generator associated with the controlled diffusion Xt with αt = a
La[V (x, t)] = µ(x, a)∂V
∂x
+
1
2
σ2(x, a)
∂2V
∂x2
. (1.19)
Then if we divide by ∆t and let ∆t→ 0, we arrive at the inequality
∂V
∂t
+ La[V (Xt, t)] + f(Xt, a, t) ≤ 0 (1.20)
using the mean value theorem. Further, assume now that a = α∗t , the local optimal
control, then by comparing the above inequality with the DPP (1.17), it is intuitively
reasonable that there must be equality
∂V
∂t
+ Lα∗t [V (X∗t , t)] + f(X∗t , α∗t , t) = 0. (1.21)
Comparing the PDE (1.21) with the Bellman statement (1.16), we claim that
∂V
∂t
+ sup
αt
{Lαt [V (Xt, t)] + f(Xt, αt, t)} = 0. (1.22)
This is the associated HJB equation for the stochastic control problem which must
be solved for all Xt, t to recover the globally optimal control function α where αt =
α(Xt, t). Thus if we can find a supremum function α(x, t) = α
∗(x, t) as defined in
Equation 1.22, then by the Feynman-Kac theorem
V (x, 0) = E
[∫ T
0
f(X∗t , α
∗
t , t)dt+ g(X
∗
T )
∣∣∣∣X0 = x] (1.23)
where X∗t is the solution to the controlled diffusion using the optimal control α
∗.
This simplifies the problem of finding the global optimal control and associated
value function V . One must find the local maximizing argument αt of Equation 1.22
and solve the associated PDE at this argument. The PDE then yields the value
function and the optimal control.
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Verification Theorem
The verification theorem states that a smooth solution to the HJB equation coincides
with the value function. The version we state below is taken from [18]. Suppose
that u is a sufficiently smooth function that satisfies certain conditions and suppose
further that
∂u
∂t
+ sup
αt∈A
{Lαt [u(x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)} ≤ 0 (1.24)
and that u(x, T ) ≥ g(x). Then u ≥ V of Equation 1.22 ∀ (x, t). To illustrate why
this is true, consider if we were to rearrange the above and apply a time reversal
transformation, τ = T − t,
∂u
∂τ
≥ sup
αt∈A
{Lαt [u(x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)} . (1.25)
Hence, as we work back in time ∂u
∂τ
≥ ∂V
∂τ
due to the inequality above and, if u(x, T ) ≥
g(x), the result u ≥ V is guaranteed.
Assume now that u(x, T ) = g(x) and we can find a measurable function α∗(x, t)
such that
∂u
∂t
+ sup
αt∈A
{Lαt [u(x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)} =
∂u
∂t
+ Lα∗t [u(x, t)] + f(x, α∗t , t) = 0. (1.26)
Then by uniqueness u = V and α∗ is an optimal control.
1.4 Stochastic Control and Optimal Switching
Consider a situation where the diffusion and running profit function can be controlled
by switching states or regimes via an impulse. Suppose there are m possible states
denoted as Im = {1, 2, . . . ,m} where 1 < m < ∞. The control then consists of a
sequence of stopping times α = (τn, in) with n ≥ 0. Here, 0 ≤ τn ≤ T denotes an
increasing sequence of stopping times (when to switch) with corresponding states in
(where to switch).
Each regime is characterized by its own running payoff function fi(Xt, t) (which
is assumed to satisfy some mild growth conditions [18]) and the cost to switch from
regime i to j, Dij. A “triangular” cost inequality is required that Dij ≥ 0 and
Diq +Dqj > Dij to ensure that no strategies instantaneously switch via intermediate
states. The triangular inequality ensures that trying to reach state j from i via state
q is more costly than simply going directly from i to j. This also ensures that the
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continuation regions are non-empty and the switching boundaries are “regular” which
are conditions required for existence of impulse control solutions [16]. The diffusion
satisfies
dXt = µ(Xt, It, t)dt+ σ(Xt, It, t)dWt (1.27)
X0 = x (1.28)
where It =
∑
0≤k≤n ik1{τk≤t<τk+1} given τ0 = 0 and i0 = i.
The gain functional is then
Ji(x, 0, α) = E
[∫ T
0
fIt(Xt, t)dt+
n∑
k=1
Dik−1,ik
]
(1.29)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the initial state x, i at t = 0. Hence,
the value function follows from the optimal control
Vi(x, 0) = sup
α
Ji(x, 0, α). (1.30)
For simplicity, we assume here that g(x) = 0 and hence Vi(x, T ) = 0 (although we
later relax this assumption to include more general forms of g(·) in our articles).
1.4.1 Dynamic Programming Principle and Variational In-
equalities
In the optimal switching case, the dynamic programming principle leads to a system
of free boundary problem PDEs with interconnected obstacles or quasi-variational
inequalities [18]. Then following the DPP
Vi(x, 0) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ
0
fi(Xt, t)dt+ max
j∈Im
{Vj(Xτ , τ)−Dij} 1{τ<T}
]
(1.31)
with Vi(x, T ) = 0 and j 6= i.
As an intuitive derivation, consider the evolution of V from 0 to ∆t with reference
to Equation 1.31.
Vi(x, 0) = E
[∫ ∆t
0
fIt(Xt, t)dt+ VI∆t(X∆t,∆t)
]
. (1.32)
If it is optimal not to switch over 0 ≤ t < ∆t (i.e. τ 6∈ [0,∆t)), then by Ito’s lemma
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(1.7) and canceling Vi on both sides
0 = E
[∫ ∆t
0
fi(Xt, t)dt+
∫ ∆t
0
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(Xt, t)]dt
]
. (1.33)
By dividing by ∆t, letting ∆t go to zero, and having noted that the expectation of
an Ito integral is zero, we see that Vi(Xt, t) satisfies the PDE
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(Xt, t)] + fi(Xt, t) = 0. (1.34)
The implication, given that it is not optimal to switch, is that
Vi(Xt, t) > Vj(Xt, t)−Dij ∀ j 6= i. (1.35)
On the other hand, in the limit that ∆t → 0 and if τ ∈ [0,∆t), then the integral
vanishes and
Vi(x, t) = E
[∫ τ
0
fi(Xt, t)dt+ max
j∈Im
{Vj(Xτ , τ)−Dij}
]
= Vj(x, t)−Dij, j 6= i. (1.36)
Given that it is optimal to switch and τ ∈ [0,∆t), then the strategy of continuing in
the current state (It = i) is suboptimal and using (1.32) we obtain
Vi(x, 0) > E
[∫ ∆t
0
fi(Xt, t)dt+ VI∆t(X∆t,∆t)
]
.
Hence it must be that
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(Xt, t)] + fi(Xt, t) < 0 (1.37)
when it is optimal to switch.
Thus the problem can be restated as a system of variational inequalities
max
{
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(Xt, t)] + fi(Xt, t), max
j∈Im
[(Vj(Xt, t)−Dij)]− Vi(Xt, t)
}
= 0
(1.38)
for i = {1, . . . ,m} and j 6= i where Li is the infinitesimal generator associated with
regime i.
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1.4.2 Switching Regions
The variational inequality yields a set of regions in space. We define the continuation
region Ci where it is both optimal to continue (i.e. not to switch) and the PDE is
satisfied. Hence,
Ci =
{
x, t :
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(x, t)] + fi(x, t) = 0
}
(1.39)
= {x, t : Vi(x, t) > Vj(x, t)−Dij ∀ j} . (1.40)
Similarly, the switching region from i to j, Sij is
Sij = {x, t : Vi(x, t) = Vj(x, t)−Dij} . (1.41)
Further, we can say that:
• Si, the general switching region from i to any alternative state is Si = ∪i 6=jSij.
• Sij ⊆ Cj (following from “triangle” inequality).
• Ci = Sci , that is Si is the complement of Ci; Si∪Ci = [0, T ]×Rn; and Si∩Ci = ∅.
Continuity of Classical Solutions
Classical solutions Vi are C
1,2 continuous on Ci and C
1,1 continuous along the switch-
ing boundary ∂Si [16, 18]. For a solution of the above obstacle problem to be optimal,
the so-called “smooth pasting” or “high contact” [15] condition must hold along the
exercise (switching) boundary ∂Sij
∇Vi(x, t) = ∇Vj(x, t). (1.42)
For example, see [5, 21].
Intuitively, the smooth-pasting condition is just the first order optimality condi-
tion. As a simpler example, consider an American put option written on a stock St
struck at K expiring at time T . We follow an exercise strategy αt = α(t) where we
exercise the put when St = αt. Thus we seek an optimal exercise price boundary α
∗
that maximizes the put option’s value. The payoff g is
g(St) = K − St
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The expected value function v following any exercise strategy α(t) is
v(S0, α0) = E[g(Sτ )].
where τ = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : St = αt} upon exercise St = αt, v(St, αt) = g(St). The
smooth pasting principle can be verified by differentiating with respect to αt at St = αt
d
dαt
v(St = αt, αt) =
d
dαt
g(St = αt)
∂v
∂St
+
∂v
∂αt
=
∂g
∂St
since dSt
dαt
= 1 at St = αt. If αt = α
∗
t is the optimum, then by the first order optimality
condition
∂v
∂αt
∣∣∣∣
α∗t
= 0
and thus the smooth pasting condition holds
∂v
∂St
∣∣∣∣
α∗t
=
∂g
∂St
∣∣∣∣
α∗t
.
This is a special case of the switching case above.
1.5 The Mixed Case
In two of the articles, we present a stochastic control model with a mixed case where
the controlled diffusion is subject to both impulse and stopping controls. Consider a
value function with optimal control
V (x, 0) = sup
α,τ
E
[∫ τ
0
f(Xt, αt, t)dt+ h(Xτ , τ)1{τ<T}
]
. (1.43)
Following the DPP and the pattern before, the associated HJB variational inequality
is
max
{
∂V
∂t
+ sup
αt
(Lαt [V (x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)), h(x, t)− V (x, t)
}
= 0. (1.44)
We briefly note that in many cases, the HJB equation does not have smooth classical
solutions [10]. In these cases, we must interpret the solutions in a viscosity sense [7].
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Viscosity Solutions
For the highly nonlinear partial integro differential variational inequalities (HJB equa-
tions) considered in the chapters that follow, classical smooth solutions may not exist.
This begs the question of how to interpret nonsmooth solutions to differential equa-
tions that may not be differentiable everywhere. Crandall and Lions [7] provide an
insightful way to interpret weak solutions to these HJB equations called “viscosity”
solutions. The definition of viscosity solutions presented here below follows [17].
We say that V is a viscosity supersolution of
max
{
∂V
∂t
+ sup
αt
(Lαt [V (x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)), h(x, t)− V (x, t)
}
= 0 (1.45)
V (x, T ) = g(x) (1.46)
if for every test function φ ∈ C2,1 and any (x∗, t∗) such that V (x, t) ≤ φ(x, t) ∀ (x, t)
and V (x∗, t∗) = φ(x∗, t∗) (so V − φ achieves its maximum, zero, at (x∗, t∗)), the
condition holds
max
{
∂φ
∂t
+ sup
αt
(Lαt [φ(x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)), h(x, t)− V (x, t)
}
≤ 0. (1.47)
Note that the differential operator L should satisfy an ellipticity condition (i.e. non-
negative volatility).
Similarly we say that V is a viscosity subsolution of 1.45 if V satisfies the terminal
condition g and for every test function φ ∈ C2,1 and any (x∗, t∗) such that φ ≥ V and
V (x∗, t∗) = φ(x∗, t∗), the condition is satisfied
max
{
∂φ
∂t
+ sup
αt
(Lαt [φ(x, t)] + f(x, αt, t)), h(x, t)− V (x, t)
}
≥ 0. (1.48)
If V is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution, then we say V is a viscosity
solution of 1.45–1.46.
Loosely speaking, if we cannot differentiate the optimal solution V itself, we can
see it as a limiting sequence of a sufficiently differentiable family of (possibly subop-
timal) test functions at (x∗, t∗). Its limit is the optimal control solution to the HJB
equation which was verified by derivation
V (x, t) = sup
α,τ
E
[∫ τ
t
f(Xs)ds+ h(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g(XT )1{τ 6<T}
∣∣∣∣Xt = x] .
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(Of course, this definition does not require V to belong to this or any family of test
functions or to be differentiable at all. It need only satisfy the conditions above.) For
additional reading and resources on stochastic control, see [10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 23].
Discounting
When the model includes discounted cash flows, a reaction term is added to the
parabolic PDEs. For example, with continuously compounded discounting at rate r
in the switching problem, the DPP statement is
Vi(x, 0) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtfi(Xt, t)dt+ max
j∈Im
e−rτ {Vj(Xτ , τ)−Dij} 1{τ<T}
]
, (1.49)
and the variational inequalities become
max
{
∂Vi
∂t
+ Li[Vi(x, t)] + fi(x, t)− rVi(x, t), max
j∈Im
[(Vj(x, t)−Dij)]− Vi(x, t)
}
= 0
(1.50)
where i 6= j.
1.6 The Relationship Among the Three Integrated
Articles
All three articles presented herein are applications of stochastic control. In Chapter
2, we first consider the example of a biofuel production plant which produces ethanol
from corn. Both commodities are traded on financial markets and are subject to spot
price uncertainty, hence we model both as stochastic processes. The plant manager
has several layered exercise decisions: She may build the biofuel plant given its ex-
pected future income (optimal starting—a variant of optimal stopping) and second,
given the price and profitability conditions, the manager may switch production on
or off (optimal switching).
Our second (Chapter 3) article considers the same biofuel plant but with some
added complexity in addition to the optimal operating (switching) problem. First,
an additional stochastic factor is introduced by means of a jump process representing
the biofuel subsidy offered to the producer. This increases the dimensionality of
the problem. Further, the parameters of that jump process are uncertain. The
manager assumes a worst case pricing scenario and adjusts the parameters accordingly
(controlled jump diffusion).
19
The final application in Chapter 4 is related to the first two in that the numerical
tools and associated HJB equations are very similar. We consider a market maker
attempting to hedge his equity derivative position in the presence of market impact
and transaction costs. His rate of trading affects the stock price (controlled diffusion)
and if fixed costs are associated with every trade, he must make finite block trades
(impulse control).
All three applications utilize the DPP, stochastic optimal control and similar nu-
merical methods via finite differences to obtain solutions.
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Chapter 2
Using Real Option Analysis to
Quantify Ethanol Policy Impact on
the Firm’s Entry into and Optimal
Operation of Corn Ethanol
Facilities
Chapter Summary:
Ethanol crush spreads are used to model the value of a facility which produces
ethanol from corn. A real option analysis is used to investigate the effects of
model parameters on the related managerial decisions of (i) how to operate the
facility through optimal switching from idled to operational status and (ii) the
decision to enter into the project given its expected real option net present value.
We present evidence of increased correlation between corn and ethanol prices,
perhaps as a result of government policy which has induced more players to enter
into the market. This paper investigates the subsequent negative effects on firms.
Further, this paper illustrates the impact of an abrupt change in government
policy, as happened in January 2012, on a firm’s decision to enter the business.
Published: Christian Maxwell and Matt Davison, Using real option analysis to
quantify ethanol policy impact on the firm’s entry into and optimal operation of corn
ethanol facilities, Energy Economics, Volume 42, March 2014, Pages 140–151.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, efforts to promote US energy independence from foreign oil [24, 50]
and initiatives to obtain more fuel from environmentally friendly sources have led to
increased subsidies to the production of ethanol from corn. These projects have been
subsidized via policies such as the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit provided to
domestic ethanol biofuel blenders and the small ethanol producer tax credit. The
amount of subsidy for blenders has changed from $0.40/gallon in 1978 (Energy Tax
Act) to $0.60/gallon at its peak in 1984 (Tax Reform Act) [35]. With the introduction
of the 2008 Farm Bill, the subsidy was reduced to $0.45/gallon and many subsidies
expired at the beginning of 2012. Before its December 2011 expiry, the small ethanol
producer tax credit was $0.10/gallon. This credit applied to the first 15 million gallons
of annual production for a producer whose capacity did not exceed 60 million gallons
[34].
The corn ethanol process has been criticized on several grounds. Environmental
critics claim that the process is energy negative in that more carbon-based energy
is used to grow and convert the corn into ethanol than is produced through the
process [47, 45]. Public choice critics claim that the ethanol subsidies may be a result
of seeking rents and lobbying [51, 55] or that production must receive subsidies to
become sufficiently economically attractive (a point discussed in this paper). Other
critics claim that diverting corn from food or feed consumption has caused an increase
in food prices and price variability [36, 39, 40] and that ethanol subsidies have other
effects on social welfare [31]. A year following the lapse of these subsidies, about
one quarter of Nebraska’s ethanol plants were in idle status [42]. It is possible that
reduction in ethanol policy was a contributing factor.
In this paper, real option analysis is used to assess the optimal operating strategy
for an ethanol production facility from management’s perspective. In addition, the
firm’s decision of when to optimally enter the business of ethanol production is also
analyzed. The model aims to realistically capture the flexibility inherent in the full
life of the project through the ability to switch production on and off. There is a cost
associated with switching production which means management faces a “wait and
see” period before making a decision to change production. This resulting decision is
non-trivial and must be modelled as a stochastic optimal control problem.
This real option method of modelling resource project management decisions was
introduced by [28] in a seminal paper which considered the problem of optimally
starting and stopping production to maximize the profits of a natural resource project.
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The optimal entry and exit from investment projects was also considered by [32] in
another classical real option paper.
Our paper also investigates the effects of increased price correlation between
ethanol and corn resulting from the diversion of corn from feedstock to fuel [36, 39, 40].
Investigating correlation is expedient because it follows from straightforward economic
arguments reducible to a single parameter. Earlier work in this area has focused on
changes in correlation over time. [37] suggest it may have increased; [49] present ev-
idence it may have decreased. In either scenario, investigating its impact on pricing
and operating decisions is important. Further, the effects of policy subsidy on project
value are also investigated.
This paper represents a direct extension of the analysis in [37] and uses similar
methods to those presented in [49]. [37] use a bootstrap Monte Carlo analysis to
estimate the value of an ethanol production facility modeled as a strip of exchange
options. Our paper expands the analysis in [37] to capture the rational operator’s
optimal strategy which hinges on the “wait and see” phenomenon. [49] investigate the
effects of ethanol policy on prices and the firm’s decision to enter into and divest itself
from the business on an infinite time horizon. This paper adds to their analysis by
(1) using a finite time horizon for entry into the project in keeping with for instance a
private equity firm’s finite investment horizon requirements; and (2) investigating its
subsequent optimal operation once initiated. The effect of ethanol policies on prices
are investigated using increases in a simple ethanol-corn correlation metric designed
to capture the increased linkage between the two markets.
Section 2.2 assembles a framework including price models, parameters for man-
agement flexibility and rules for optimal operation. Section 2.3 illustrates concepts
and heuristic results from similar closed-form models while Section 2.4 contains the
numerical results from the full analysis. Finally, Section 2.5 presents insights and
conclusions from the investigation.
2.2 Assembling the Model
Firms have the flexibility to begin or defer projects given current economic and price
environments, a flexibility not captured by net present value (NPV) or discounted
cash flow (DCF) analyses, as described in [33].
After entering into an ethanol project, management has the ability to pause and
resume production given price conditions and their profits. This enables management
to capitalize on the upside profits while mitigating the downside losses. Again a simple
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NPV DCF analysis would fail to capture the true value of flexibility given uncertain
(stochastic) future prices.
The goal of this paper is to examine how ethanol policy affects producers busi-
ness entry and subsequent facility operation decisions given price conditions, subsidy
expectations, and the remaining facility life.
To develop a model, the following inputs are required:
1. Equations representing the plant economics including capitalized costs to con-
struct the facility, costs to pause and resume production, and instantaneous
profit as a function of ethanol and corn prices; and
2. A stochastic model for corn and ethanol prices including econometric analysis
of the relevant parameters.
Throughout this paper, all currency units are United States dollars (USD); all
liquid volume units are gallons (1 US gal = 3.785 L); all solid volume units are
bushels (1 US bushel = 0.0352 m3); all weight units are in tons (1 short ton =
2000 pounds = 907.185 kg); and all interest rates are percent per year and appropriate
to USD deposits.
2.2.1 A Model for the Plant
The plant produces ethanol (priced in USD/gallon) from corn (priced in USD/bushel).
Reaction models and instantaneous running profits
The running profit from the corn-ethanol crush spread is developed on a per bushel
per year ($/bushel-year). Our analysis uses the standard reaction from [26] for the
popular dry grind process of producing ethanol
corn→ ethanol + byproducts, (2.1)
which implies the profit function
f(Lt, Ct) = κ(Lt −K) + ωAt − Ct, (2.2)
The net running cost K may further be decomposed into the fixed running cost p less
any government volumetric subsidy s,
K = p− s. (2.3)
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Ct is the price of corn per bushel; Lt is the price of ethanol per gallon; and At is the
price of byproduct distillers dried grains in dollars per ton. The process produces
17 lbs of distillers dried grains per bushel of corn and consequently ω = 17/2000.1
The conversion factor, κ = 2.8, represents how many gallons of ethanol are pro-
duced per bushel of corn; taken from [26] and is consistent with the CME Group’s
references on ethanol crush spreads [29]. A subsidy of $0.10/gallon was used along
with a fixed running cost of $0.68/gallon for facilities with nameplate capacities of
40, 000, 000 gallons/year [48].
The analysis is simplified by considering two stochastic factors, ethanol and corn,
independently; while accounting for each additional factor with affine terms. This
yields a simple instantaneous running profit function
f1(Lt, Ct) = κ(Lt −K1)− Ct (2.4)
on a per bushel consumed per year basis. Average distillers dried grains, A¯t, is one
constituent of the parameter K1
K1 = p− ω
κ
A¯t − s. (2.5)
While production is idle, [48] estimated that fixed running costs are roughly 1%
of capitalized cost per gallon of capacity, B, or roughly 20% of fixed running cost
while in production. Our analysis takes the average of these two fixed running cost
estimates. While production is halted there is no subsidy since no ethanol is being
produced. The profit function while off is
f0(Lt, Ct) = −κK0 (2.6)
where
K0 =
(
0.20p+ 0.01B
2
)
(2.7)
is the midpoint of the two possible estimates of K0.
Switching and Capitalized Construction Costs
For a medium-sized facility (40, 000, 000 gallons/year) [49] estimated a capitalized cost
of $1.40/gallon is required to construct a turn-key facility from a green field (while
maintenance costs are included in the fixed running costs K). The medium-sized
1There are 2000 lbs in a ton and distillers dried grain prices are quoted in USD/ton
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Figure 2.1: Historical ethanol-corn price series from Jan/02-Dec/11.
facility is taken as the representative model which also qualifies for the small ethanol
producer subsidy being less than 60, 000, 000 gallons in capacity. Costs to resume
production from an idle state are estimated by [48] to be 10% of capitalized cost per
gallon of capacity; costs to pause production from an active state are estimated to
be 5% of capitalized cost; finally the liquidation value at the end of facility life is
estimated to be 10% of capitalized cost.
2.2.2 Models of the Prices
Ethanol and corn prices are modeled as stochastic geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
processes in this analysis. Despite some well-known drawbacks, GBM is very popular
in mathematical finance and financial economics due to its simplicity and desirable
properties for modeling financial time series (e.g. nonnegativity, volatility proportional
to price level, etc.). The historical price series from Dec/02–Jan/11 is shown in Figure
2.1.
A GBM random process Xt follows the stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt,
where µ is its drift (average rate of continuously compounded growth) and σ is its
volatility. The differential increment of Brownian motion dWt corresponding to the
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interval between t and t+dt is drawn from the normal random variable with zero mean
and variance dt, independent of other such draws on non-overlapping time intervals.
Although intuitively one might expect commodity prices to be mean-reverting to
some equilibrium price, it is generally hard to observe statistically. Accordingly, our
model choice is reasonable since statistical tests on the time series in [37] rejected
mean-reversion and seasonality. It was found however that the data exhibit serial
autocorrelation. The effects of autocorrelation in the drift of the lagged process was
found to be statistically zero in [49] and hence serial correlation is ignored in our
paper’s analysis; the time series were also subjected to augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
which found weak evidence against the presence of unit roots and hence the time
series can be treated as stationary. This also allows the use of well-developed theory
of Markov processes and Ito calculus in the analysis that follows.
The logarithm of a GBM process lnXt follows an even simpler constant volatility
arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) process
d lnXt =
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
dt+ σdWt.
The econometric parameters are estimated by ordinary least-squares regression.
The differenced ABM series ∆ lnXt = ln
Xt
Xt−1
has representation
∆ lnXt =
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
∆t+ σ
√
∆tξ.
where ∆t = ti − ti−1 and ξ ∼ N(0, 1). Thus the parameters may now be estimated
via
∆ lnXt = β0 + ξ,
where the constant term is the drift of the series and the volatility is read directly
from the root mean squared error of the innovation ξ
β0 =
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
∆t,
RMSE =
√
 =
√
∆tσ.
Estimates of the correlation, ρ, between two time series are obtained via the
sample correlation of the residuals.
Prices for the no. 2 Omaha, Nebraska yellow corn used to underpin the stan-
dard CME contract were obtained from the US department of agriculture feed grains
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Parameter estimate Value t-test
µˆ 0 P
(
µˆ−µ
s.e.
> |t|∣∣µ = 0) = 0.409
σˆ 0.156 -
aˆ 0 P
(
aˆ−a
s.e.
> |t|∣∣ a = 0) = 0.202
bˆ 0.123 -
ρˆ 0.105 -
Table 2.1: Parameter estimation results.
database [52]. Average rack price freight on board Ethanol prices were obtained from
the Nebraska Energy Office [43]. Nebraska data was selected to reflect the size of Ne-
braska in US corn and ethanol markets and to be reflective of national prices [41]. To
be consistent with [37], 10 years of monthly historical price data was used spanning
the period between Jan/02–Dec/11.
For simplicity, the relatively small inflation adjustment for prices over this 10 year
period were ignored. Note that inflation enters into the price dynamics via the drift,
the specification of which does not affect the estimates for volatility and correlation.
Ethanol and corn are modeled by correlated GBMs with SDEs
dLt = µLtdt+ σLtdW1t, (2.8)
dCt = aCtdt+ bCtdW2t, (2.9)
Corr[W1t,W2t] = ρ. (2.10)
The drifts of both ethanol and corn did not reject the null hypothesis of zero drift
at the 95% confidence interval. The annualized results are summarized in Table 2.1.
The estimate for the average distillers dried grains price A¯t was estimated by
regressing the time series against a constant. The result was ˆ¯At = 115.6 with a
standard error of the estimator (s.e.) of 3.6. At the 95% student-t percentile with 119
degrees of freedom, t0.975,119 = 1.9801, the confidence interval is A¯t ∈ [108.4, 122.8].
2.2.3 The Real Option Model
Now a model is developed for the optimal operating strategy and expected earnings
of the plant. All earnings are discounted using an annualized interest rate of r = 8%
which aims to capture the credit risk associated with ethanol projects [48]. We note
that it is possible to “hedge” this real option with futures contracts in which case r
should be set to the risk free rate. There may be incentives to hedge or in fact not
to hedge at all depending on the market dynamics and management’s risk appetite.
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Variable Description Value Source
B Capitalized cost of construc-
tion
$1.40/gallon [48, 49]
Q Liquidation value at end of
life
0.1B = $0.14/gallon [48]
D01 Cost to switch production on 0.1B = $0.14/gallon [48]
D10 Cost to switch production off 0.05B = $0.07/gallon [48]
r Discount rate 8% per annum [49]
p Fixed running cost $0.68/gallon [48]
s Subsidy $0.10/gallon [35]
A¯t Average price of distiller’s
dried grains per ton
$115.58/ton [52]
κ Gallons of ethanol produced
per bushel of corn
2.8 gallons/bushel [26]
ω Tons of distillers dried grains
produced per bushel of corn
17
2000
tons/bushel [26]
K1 Net running costs while in
production
0.23/gallon [48]
K0 Net running costs while idle 0.07/gallon [48]
f1(Lt, Ct) Running profits while in pro-
duction
κ(Lt − K1) − Ct = 2.8(Lt +
0.12)− Ct/bushel-year
f0(Lt, Ct) Running profits (losses) while
production is idle
−K0 = −0.07/bushel-year
Table 2.2: Real option model parameters.
We discuss this briefly in the appendix.
The plant has two operating modes or states: 1, denoting “on” or in production,
and 0, denoting “off” or production temporarily suspended. The instantaneous run-
ning profit while on is given by f1; while off by f0. The cost of switching production
back on after being temporarily suspended is D01 and the cost of switching production
off from an active state is D10.
The capitalized cost of construction of the facility is given by B and its liquidation
value at the end of its normal useful life is Q. All parameter and function values are
listed in Table 2.2.
The total expected earnings over the life of the project is given by the value
function Vi where i = {1, 0}
Vi(l, c, t) = sup
τ,u
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ls, Cs)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk
∣∣∣∣∣ (Lt, Ct, u0) = (l, c, i)
]
.
(2.11)
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The pair (τ, u) is the control that the manager has over the facility in his ability to
toggle production on and off. It consists of a set of switching times τk and states to be
switched into uk with It = uk, t ∈ [τk, τk+1). Thus τk is an increasing set of switching
times with τk ∈ [t, T ] and τk < τk+1.
From the dynamic programming principle, it is known that
Vi(l, c, t) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)fi(Ls, Cs)ds+ e−r(τ−t) {Vj(Lτ , Cτ , τ)−Dij}
∣∣∣∣ (Lt, Ct) = (l, c)] .
(2.12)
where τ is the optimal time switch production on from off (0 → 1) or off from on
(1→ 0).
This problem can be reduced to a question of finding the optimal price boundaries
for ethanol and corn (Lt, Ct) at which to switch production. Now the problem is to
solve for the sets of prices at which the operator should:
• continue production if production is currently on, H1;
• pause production if the state is currently on, S10;
• keep production halted if the state is currently idle, H0; and
• resume production if the state is currently idle, S01.
Thus given the production is in state i at time t only one of two decisions is possible.
(1) If it is optimal to keep production in its current state, then by Ito’s lemma the
value function evolves by the partial differential equation (PDE) on Hi
∂Vi
∂t
+ L[Vi] + fi(l, c, t)− rVi = 0, (2.13)
where L is the generator of the joint processes (Lt, Ct)
L = µl ∂
∂l
+ ac
∂
∂c
+
1
2
σ2l2
∂2
∂l2
+ ρσblc
∂2
∂l∂c
+
1
2
b2c2
∂2
∂c2
. (2.14)
Similarly (2) if it is optimal to switch (if the value of the i-state were to fall below
the j-state less switching costs Vi(l, c, t) ≤ Vj(l, c, t)−Dij) then immediately
Vi(l, c, t) = Vj(l, c, t)−Dij (2.15)
on Sij and the operator switches to receive the profits in state j, fj.
This leads to the set of free boundary PDEs for the optimal switching problem.
The free boundary ∂Hi gives the optimal set of prices at which to toggle production.
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In order to solve the PDE, the moving free boundary must be determined; it is not
known a priori. Along the free boundary, there is continuity of the value functions
and its first spatial derivatives, the so-called “high contact” principle [27]. By writing
the free boundary problem in complementary form below (noting that either the
PDE holds or the constraint is saturated), it is no longer necessary to track the free
boundary as the equation is extended to the whole space.
max
[
∂V1
∂t
+ L[V1] + f1(l, c, t)− rV1, (V0 −D10)− V1
]
= 0, (2.16)
max
[
∂V0
∂t
+ L[V0] + f0(l, c, t)− rV0, (V1 −D01)− V0
]
= 0 (2.17)
with final conditions V1(l, c, T ) = V0(l, c, T ) = Q.
These equations may be solved numerically using methods similar to those de-
scribed in [54]. The PDE is solved using standard centred finite differences for accu-
racy along with an implicit Crank-Nicholson time stepping discretization. With the
parameters considered (i.e. ρ  1), this leads to a stable monotone scheme. How-
ever, as ρ becomes larger, care must be taken with the cross derivative difference to
ensure the M -matrix property is conserved in order for the scheme to be stable. The
complimentarity condition for the optimal switching is enforced using a fixed point
value iteration method. Conceptually, the technique is similar to projected successive
over-relaxation [30] and can be accelerated with multigrid or Krylov methods. Each
system V1, V2 is iterated simultaneously until convergence. For additional information
on optimal switching problems and stochastic calculus, see [25, 27, 46, 44].
Suppose the firm has a lease over a finite time horizon on the green field site
on which they plan to build the production facility. If prices are particularly un-
favourable, it would be naive to immediately enter into the project. A rational in-
vestor that seeks to maximize his expected earnings P should wait at least until the
expected earnings of the optimally managed facility exceed the capital cost of invest-
ment. This is analogous to an American call option on the facility struck at B with
payoff (max[V1(l, c, t), V0(l, c, t)]−B)+ over the remaining horizon T − t. (Note that
X+ = max(X, 0)). The free boundary problem for this option (following a similar
dynamic programming optimal stopping argument) is
max
[
∂P
∂t
+ L[P ]− rP, (max{V1(l, c, t), V0(l, c, t)} −B)− P
]
= 0 (2.18)
with final condition P (l, c, T ) = max[0, max{V1(l, c, T ), V0(l, c, T )}−B]. Again, this
32
is reduced to finding a set on which it is optimal to wait, H, and set at which it
is optimal to enter into the investment, S. The free boundary between these two
sets is the set of prices at which it is optimal to make the decision. See [53] for
additional details. Generally, one would not build the plant if it was expected to
be idled immediately after construction and so we can drop V0 in Equation 2.18
(e.g. P (l, c, T ) = max[0, V1(l, c, t) − B]). This model assumes that the construction
is immediate. In realty, there is some delay between when the project is initiated
and the facility is complete and ready for operation. To model this, accurately an
extra time variable would be needed in the PDE to track the time to completion of
the facility resulting in an “ultraparabolic” 4-dimensional PDE (l, c, t and time to
completion).
As the green field project is quite expensive to initiate relative to its salvage
value upon abandonment, the option to abandon adds little value and for financially
reasonable parameters does not materially alter the decision to enter the investment.
A thorough argument is presented in 2.6.
2.3 Lessons from Exchange Options
In this section, two simplifications of the above model are presented to predict the
effects of increased correlation on the complete model.
2.3.1 A Running Margrabe Exchange Option
Assume that switching costs and fixed running costs are both zero. This makes
it possible to find an analytic solution for the expected earnings of the facility. If
switching costs are zero, the problem reduces to the simple PDE
∂V
∂t
+ L[V ] + (κl − c)+ − rV = 0, (2.19)
where V1 = V0 = V . This is the running payoff analogue of the classical Margrabe
European exchange option [38].
The solution to this problem follows from the Feynman-Kac representation theo-
rem
V (l, c, t) = E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) (κLs − Cs)+ ds
∣∣∣∣ (Lt, Ct) = (l, c)] . (2.20)
After some reflection, it is apparent Equation 2.20 is similar to a running Margrabe
exchange option or a Black-Scholes call on ethanol struck at the corn price. Following
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Figure 2.2: V/Vref as a function of Ct is approximately semilinear. All parameters
are as in Table 2.2 except K = 0, D01 = D10 = 0, and κ = 1.
the Black-Scholes analogy, Equation 2.20 is reduced to
V (l, c, t) =
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
[
κleµ(s−t)Φ(d+)− cea(s−t)Φ(d−)
]
ds (2.21)
where
ν2 = σ2 − 2ρσb+ b2, (2.22)
d+ =
ln κle
µ(s−t)
cea(s−t)
ν
√
s− t +
1
2
ν
√
s− t, (2.23)
d− =
ln κle
µ(s−t)
cea(s−t)
ν
√
s− t −
1
2
ν
√
s− t. (2.24)
From (2.21) to (2.24) above, it apparent that ν is decreasing in ρ. Since this is
akin to a Black-Scholes option, its value is accordingly decreasing in ρ. Similarly it is
approximately semilinear in c, the operating cost, deep into or out of the money. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.2 for a generic-parameter option in the risk neutral measure
(where κ = 1, Lt = 1). Therefore, as a rough approximation, V can be considered
almost semilinear and decreasing in K.
The value of the facility is also strongly linked to its achievable yield of ethanol
per bushel of corn. As before, the value is almost linear in κ.
Figure 2.3 shows the percent decrease in V at the money as a function of increasing
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Figure 2.3: V/Vref as a function of ρ is decreasing. Parameters are as in Table 2.2
except K = 0, D01 = D10 = 0.
ρ normalized by the reference value Vref = V (ρ = 0).
2.3.2 An Infinite Horizon Model
Using a clever dimensional reduction to obtain coupled differential equations, [49] were
able to solve an infinite time horizon problem in closed form. Changing notation to
that used in the current paper, their solution can be represented as the system of
nonlinear equations
v0(z) = Az
λ− , (2.25)
v1(z) = Bz
λ+ +
z
r − µ −
1
r − a, (2.26)
λ± =
(
1
2
− µ− a
ν2
)
±
√(
µ− a
ν2
− 1
2
)2
+
2(r − a)
ν2
, (2.27)
where V (l, c) = cv
(
l
c
)
= cv(z), f0(l, c) = 0 and f1(l, c) = l − c.
The remaining four unknowns A and B, and z01 and z10—which represent the z at
which production should be switched on or off respectively—derive from continuity of
the value functions and the smooth-pasting optimality condition (i.e. 1st derivatives)
at the switching boundary which constitutes a system of four nonlinear equations in
four unknowns.
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Figure 2.4: Baseline results for v0 and v1. Note the value is increasing in l/c and the
presence of a hysteresis zone in the value functions. Parameters are as in Table 2.2
except T =∞.
The value function for the parameters calculated is shown in Figure 2.4. The
switching boundaries z01, z10 as a function of ρ are shown in Figure 2.5.
As can be seen from the figures, the effect of increasing ρ tightens the “wait-
and-see” gap resulting in shorter periods of operation before making the decision to
switch. In particular, the plant manager is less optimistic about prices rebounding
in making the decision to switch production off. This is accompanied by decreased
value and potentially riskier cash flows since production is started and stopped more
often.
A technical term describing this gap phenomenon is hysteresis. It represents a
“sticky” region where it is not definitively optimal to be in either state (on or off)
but rather to remain operating as is. Once prices reach the switching boundaries S01
and S10, it is definitively optimal to be in either the on or off state respectively and
switching occurs as required. Stated precisely, the hysteresis zone is given by the set
H0 ∩H1 which is also equivalent to H1 \ S10 = H0 \ S01.
2.4 Numerical Results
The analysis begins with a retrospective look at the profits that would have been
realized by the model facility given historical prices from Jan/02 to Dec/11. As a
baseline, 10 year model values at the Jan/02 price of Lt = $0.94/gallon for ethanol
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Figure 2.5: Switching boundaries z01 and z10 as a function of ρ where z = l/c. Note
that as ρ increases, the boundaries at which production is started z01 and stopped
z10 converge indicating reduced “optimism” in prices rebounding. Parameters are as
in Table 2.2 except T =∞.
Baseline result Description Value
V1(0.94, 1.90, 0) Model income value started “on” $2.10/bushel-year
V0(0.94, 1.90, 0) Model income value started “off” $1.77/bushel-year
P (0.94, 1.90, 0) Model plant value after construction $0.84/bushel-year
V1|realized time series Retrospective realized income $10.73/bushel-year
V0|realized time series Retrospective realized income $10.27/bushel-year
Table 2.3: Expected income value as Jan/02 and retrospective historical realized
income during the period Jan/02 through Dec/11.
and Ct = $1.90/bushel for corn are listed in Table 2.3 ignoring the value of liquidating
the plant at the end of its life (i.e. Q = 0). As before, Vi(l, c, t) refers to the expected
value of income generated by the facility from time t, given production begins in state
i, with Lt = l and Ct = c.
The actual profits given the past 10 year time series from Jan/02–Dec/11 realized
from optimal operation are also recorded in Table 2.3, noted as Vi|realized time series.
The higher than expected realized profits do not reflect negatively on the model’s va-
lidity but rather represent one of many possible realized outcomes from the stochastic
model.
The retrospective plant operating status from Jan/02-Dec/11 as determined by
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Figure 2.6: Baseline income valuation results for V1 (solid) and V0 (dashed) for given
levels of l. Note that l and c are the initial ethanol and corn prices given the 10 year
period respectively. The y-axis is the income value. Parameters are as in Table 2.2.
following the optimal operating scheme indicates that the facility should always be
in production regardless of price conditions (see Figure 2.1). The results suggest that
the ethanol subsidy policy may be higher than necessary to ensure NPV positivity
and may in fact be reduced with minimal effects on producers.
2.4.1 Baseline Value
The baseline valuation results are shown in Figures 2.6 which include the liquidation
value at the end of facility life on a per bushel basis.
The baseline switching (S01, S10) and continuation sets (H0, H1) are shown in
Figure 2.7.
2.4.2 Effects of Increased Correlation on Value
As expected from the Margrabe option results presented in Section 2.3, increasing
correlation significantly reduces option value. There is evidence for increased correla-
tion in recent years. Figure 2.8 shows the rolling correlation over the previous 3 year
period on the price series data from Jan/02–Dec/11 calculated using the correlation
of the log monthly returns.
Figure 2.9 shows the percent loss in income value as the correlation ρ increases,
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Figure 2.7: Baseline switching, Sij, and continuation sets, Cij. Parameters are as in
Table 2.2.
Figure 2.8: The 3 year rolling correlation, ρ, over the 7 year period Jan/04–Dec/11
from the 10 year monthly price data, Jan/02–Dec/11. There is evidence of increased
correlation in recent years which may be related to increased production and demand
in corn ethanol.
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Figure 2.9: V1(l, c)/V1,ref and V0(l, c)/V0,ref versus ρ. The initial ethanol l and corn
c prices are (l, c) = (0.94, 1.90) and the reference value Vi,ref is taken at ρ = 0. The
value is decreasing in ρ. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
shown for 10 years of income without liquidation given the Jan/02 average monthly
prices of (l, c) = (0.94, 1.90) with Vi,ref = Vi(ρ = 0). It is no coincidence that V0
appears more sensitive to changes in ρ at the chosen reference point: The point is
close to ∂S10 and therefore more sensitive to the decision to “turn on” (0→ 1) rather
than “stay on” (1→ 1).
Pushing ρ away from zero correlation results in changes in ±50% of income option
value. The concavity of the graph indicates that the option is very sensitive to ρ.
Figure 2.10 shows ∂V1
∂ρ
evaluated at the estimated value of ρ = 0.105 along with
the switching boundaries overlayed on the plot. (The result for ∂V0
∂ρ
is very similar.)
The effects of increasing ρ are strongest near the switching regions (i.e. in the
hysteresis zone). The most significant losses in the hysteresis zone are near −0.50.
Thus in these price regions for a 10% increase in ρ, there is a loss of nearly $0.05 of
value following the Taylor approximation, V (ρ0 + ∆ρ) = V (ρ0) +
dV
dρ
∆ρ + O(∆ρ2).
Outside the hysteresis zone, all partials become equal since Vi = Vj −Dij only differs
by an additive constant. The hysteresis zone is the result of uncertainty as to which
decision or operating status is optimal. Intuitively, the option value would be most
sensitive to changes in variance (via correlation) in this uncertainty or hysteresis zone
which is observed in Figure 2.10.
The loss in value associated with increasing ρ becomes more persistent and pro-
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Figure 2.10: The sensitivity ∂V1
∂ρ
as a contour plot. Note that V1 is most sensitive to
changes in ρ near the hysteresis zone. All parameters are as in Table 2.2.
nounced as T − t increases. This is a financially intuitive result since there is more
time for the losses related to ρ accrue. But more importantly, the longer increased
correlation persists the more damaging the effect becomes. To illustrate, Figure 2.11
shows the relevant option “Greek,” ∂
2V1
∂t∂ρ
, taken at Jan/02 price levels (0.94, 1.90) (note
that similar results hold for V0).
2.4.3 Effects of Subsidy Policy on Value
The loss in value from removing the subsidy is shown in Figure 2.12. As the subsidy
s is lowered, the facility is expected to lose value at a near linear rate when deep in
the money and at a lower rate as the value moves further out of the money. This
behaviour is illustrated in Figure 2.12 which plots Vi(s) at (l, c) = (0.94, 1.90). It can
also be seen from the plot that, across all s ∈ [0, 10] ¢/gallon, the point (l, c) remains
in the hysteresis zone. The distance between the two values remains less than the
switching cost V1(l, c)− V0(l, c) < D01, a characteristic feature of the hysteresis zone.
2.4.4 NPV Positivity and the Value of Waiting to Invest
Since both increasing ρ and decreasing the subsidy have the effect of reducing the
value of the income option, it is natural to expect that the value of waiting to invest,
P , is also reduced. If the value is reduced, it is expected that the optimal price
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Figure 2.11: The second-order sensitivity ∂
2V1
∂t∂ρ
as a function of t. Note that V0 becomes
more sensitive to changes in ρ as t increases. All parameters are as in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.12: V1(l, c) and V0(l, c) as a function of s. The value is increasing in s. All
other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.13: NPV positivity regions at ρ = 0.9 and ρ = −0.9. The boundaries denote
the area over which projects are NPV positive. It is largest when ρ approaches −1
and smallest when ρ approaches +1. The area bounded between the two regions
indicates how the boundary (NPV positive set) decreases as ρ increases which implies
that fewer projects are NPV positive. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
levels to begin the project, ∂S, should be closer to the NPV positive region2. This
reflects the lowered optimism of entry into the investment. This is illustrated with
exaggeration in Figures 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15.
As is apparent from Figure 2.15, the subsidy policy results in some otherwise
economically unattractive projects being initiated. The net effect of this is to reduce
the productive activity of firms contemplating entry into the investment project.
2.4.5 Retrospective Analysis without Subsidy
The investigation closes with a retrospective look at the performance of the optimal
operating schedule without a subsidy; this gives an indication of the kind of per-
formance one might expect in the future given many ethanol subsidies have been
discontinued. Due to high realized ethanol prices, even a non-subsidized facility has
a productive run and is nearly always in operation.
Contrast that operating result with Figure 2.16 which indicates when the facility
is operating at a profit, 1, or at a loss, 0. That is, Figure 2.16 is a graph of 1f1(l,c)>0
2The NPV positive region is given by the set at t = 0 {(l, c) : (max[V1, V0]−B) > 0} over 10
years including liquidation proceeds.
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Figure 2.14: The entry boundary ∂S as ρ increases. Note that the region over which
we wait to invest, H, decreases as ρ increases. Compared with Figure 2.13, the
distance between deciding to invest and the region of NPV positivity shrinks as ρ
increases. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.15: The entry set boundary ∂S as K1 increases. Note that the region over
which we wait to invest, H, increases as K1 increases. All other parameters are as in
Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.16: 1f1(l,c)>0 with and without subsidy. Note that despite that there are
moments when the facility is operating at a loss, the presence of switching costs
filters the operating signal to be almost always on.
with and without subsidy. In the absence of a subsidy, it is still optimal to always
remain in operation given the historical time series; despite the fact that on several
occasions the profits become negative. The presence of switching costs acts like a
low pass filter on the zero-cost switching signal and accordingly switching occurs less
frequently.
Historical information regarding the operating status of about 215 plants across
the United States is available from [42]. Figure 2.17 shows the number of plants
that were historically idled in the 5 years 2008–2012. There is an increase in idled
plants consistent with the decrease in profitability observed in 2011–2012 apparent in
Figures 2.16 and 2.1. The decrease in profitability is not only due to a tightening in
the crush spread but also the loss of subsidy in 2012 which partly explains the sudden
rise in idle plants observed in 2012. Note that the tightening of the spreads and loss
in profitability does not immediately equate in plants idling which is consistent with
our model predictions. This is due to the cost of ramping down production which
acts as a filter inducing managers to continue operating until prices revert or crush
spreads become too tight or negative.
It may appear that the facility is profitable even in the absence of subsidy, but
part of the story is missing. Figure 2.18 indicates when it is optimal to enter into
the investment over the 10 year horizon. As can be seen, for most of the time it is
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Figure 2.17: Historical count of idled plants in the 5 years from 2008–2012 inclusive
of a sample population with approximately 215 plants. Note the increase in idled
plants beginning 2011 and sharp rise in 2012. Source: [42].
in fact not optimal to initiate the project even though the retrospective operating
status advises to be in production. This means that while the operator of an existing
facility would produce from it, the resulting profits would not be so large as to entice
the development of a new facility. It is in fact optimal to wait nearly 2 years before
initiating the project even in spite of low corn prices and the otherwise continuous
production signal. In addition, it is apparent that the presence of the subsidy does
not greatly influence the historical decision to enter into the project.
The assumption that the facility is able to easily market and sell its distillers dried
grains may not always hold. An investigation of the historical operating status given
A¯t = 0 is shown in Figure 2.19. The upper indicator assumes the state is initially
on, V1, i = 1; the lower status assumes it begins in the off state V0, i = 0. The
investigation shows that the economic viability of an existing facility is sensitive to
its ability to market its byproducts in addition to ethanol.
2.4.6 Future Risk Profile
In the next few figures, the distribution of profits, 95% value-at-risk (VaR) and condi-
tional value-at-risk (CVaR) are provided followed by an investigation of the amount
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Figure 2.18: Retrospective decision status whether to enter into the investment with
and without subsidy. Note that it is optimal to wait nearly 2 years before initiating
the projects. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.19: Retrospective operating status of a facility with no marketable grains,
A¯t = 0. Note that it is only optimal to be in production for roughly 60% of the time
over the 10 year period. All other parameters are as in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.20: Monte Carlo simulations of Z given i = 1 following the optimal operating
strategy. (Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02) and all parameters are as in Table 2.2 with 100, 000
simulations.
of time spent idle and operating at a loss. The V aRα of a project at given confi-
dence level α ∈ (0, 1) is the smallest number γ such that the probability that the
loss Γ exceeds γ is at most (1 − α). The CV aRα is the expectation of this tail,
i.e. CV aRα = E[X|X ≤ V aRα]. The subsidy is taken to be zero, s = 0, for the
investigation as it aims to investigate the cash flows going forward on a 10 year
horizon.
The probability density function (PDF) of income assuming the project is imme-
diately started,
Z =
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIsds−
T∑
k=0
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk , (2.28)
is shown in Figures 2.20 and 2.21. The investigation is performed at the Dec/11 price
(Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02).
The large peaks in the distributions of incomes indicate that many simulated
project outcomes remain idle for extended periods of time.
The simulated cumulative distribution function (CDF) of income and capitalized
costs assuming the site is available on a 10 year horizon given the operator must first
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Figure 2.21: Monte Carlo simulations of Z given i = 0 following the optimal operating
strategy. (Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02) and all parameters are as in Table 2.2 with 100, 000
simulations.
decide to initiate the project at optimal time τ ,
M =
{
−e−r(τ−t)B +
∫ T
τ
e−r(s−t)fIsds−
T∑
k=0
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk +Qe
−r(T−t)
}
1{τ<T},
(2.29)
is shown in Figure 2.22. The jump in the CDF Prob(M ≤ m) at zero indicates that
a large number of simulated outcomes where projects are never optimally initiated.
The large point mass at zero in Figures 2.20–2.22 show that many projects wait a
very long time to begin or are in fact never initiated.
The section concludes by investigating how increased correlation affects the follow-
ing factors: V aR0.05, CV aR0.05, fraction of time spent idle tidle, the fraction of time
spent operating at a loss top loss, and the fraction time spent waiting to enter into
the project τ/T . These are summarized in Figures 2.23 and 2.24 given the project is
initiated optimally from a green field site.
It can be observed from Figures 2.23 and 2.24 that, as ρ increases, the value
at risk of the project typically decreases. However, the project value also decreases
supporting our earlier assertion that the optimal operating strategy becomes “less
optimistic” in that the investor waits longer to enter. The amount of time spent
idle or operating at a loss tends to decrease. This is expected since the investor
has already waited until prices were more favourable before initially entering into
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Figure 2.22: Experimental CDF of M following the optimal operating strategy. Note
the large point mass of projects which are never started or begin very late in the
cycle. (Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02) and all parameters are as in Table 2.2 with 100, 000
simulations.
Figure 2.23: Left: Expected value of investment P . Right: 5% VaR and CVaR of
investment as a function of ρ. (Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02) and all parameters are as in
Table 2.2 with 50, 000 simulations. Error bars indicate 3 standard deviations of the
estimator.
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Figure 2.24: Time spent idle, operating at a loss and waiting for entry as a function
of ρ. (Lt, Ct) = (2.49, 6.02) and all parameters are as in Table 2.2 with 50, 000
simulations. Error bars indicate 3 standard deviations of the estimator.
the project. Increasing ρ reduces the standard distribution of Z and M (reduced
volatility). There is more certainty in the project, but this comes at a cost to option
value.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our paper investigated the economic viability of a corn ethanol production facility
using real option models. The results indicate that the viability of the project is
sensitive to changes in correlation and subsidy policy along with the ability to market
its byproducts.
Correlation
The investigations with the Margrabe exchange options showed that the option can
lose over 70% of its value as the correlation increases from uncorrelated to nearly
perfectly correlated, ρ ≈ 0.9 (Figure 2.3). Further the complete model showed that
given the deep in the money initial price at Jan/02, the facility can lose over 50%
of its value as the prices become more correlated (Figure 2.9). The contour plot of
∂V
∂ρ
(Figure 2.10) showed that in the hysteresis zone, the facility is most sensitive to
changes in correlation.
Our investigations using the infinite time horizon model indicated that as the
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correlation increased, the size of the hysteresis zone shrank (Figure 2.5). This may
indicate more certainty in the income cash flows but also indicates lowered expectation
for value or prices rebounding favourably for the operator (Figure 2.23). Addition-
ally, our risk profile analysis indicated that in most cases, as correlation increases,
the fraction of time spent waiting to start the project increases resulting in lowered
productivity (Figure 2.24).
From our investigation it is clear that, as correlation increases, the number of
projects that are economically viable decrease. That is, the sets of initial prices for
which the project is NPV positive shrinks as the prices become more correlated (Fig-
ures 2.13–2.14). Thus fewer projects may be NPV positive, and hence not initiated,
at any given time and price environment. Perhaps counterintuitively, the optimal
price trigger at which to enter the project is in fact lowered as correlation increases
but again this reflects lowered expectations for the project. The value of waiting to
invest is reduced since the optimal entry price trigger is moving closer to the region
at which it is first NPV positive.
The risk profile investigation also yielded additional insight about the viability of
the project. In particular, many of the projects are not NPV positive if the entry
decision is made suboptimally. The PDF of potential realized profits shows that there
is a large mass of risk-adjusted realizations that do not exceed the initial capitalized
costs of construction. However if the option to enter the project is exercised optimally,
the risk of losses is greatly reduced (Figures 2.20–2.22).
Subsidy Policy
As the Margrabe exchange option predicted, the value of the facility is semilinearly
decreasing in s, the subsidy policy. Thus, for example, when the investment is deep in
the money, the value of subsidy has a term proportional to s(T − t) in the absence of
discounting. When the subsidy is removed, our investigation showed that the number
of projects which were economically viable was reduced (Figures 2.12 and 2.15). This
was evidenced by a reduction in the set of prices for which the project was NPV
positive.
Our retrospective analysis revealed an interesting fact about the optimal operating
strategy for the facility: The subsidy had a minimal effect on the operating decisions
regarding when to pause/resume production and to enter into the investment. With
or without the subsidy, the decisions were nearly identical. Thus tax dollars are
subsidizing a project that may in any case have been economically attractive, and
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investment capital is misappropriated from other possible projects. These numerical
results indicate that the recent idling of many ethanol plants in 2013 may be the
result of market factors as opposed to subsidy policy.
On the other hand, the subsidy may be successful in inducing ethanol produc-
tion investment where none would otherwise exist. Although without the subsidy the
facility would have historically been in production, the subsidy also reduces the oper-
ating risk. This has the effect of smoothing the distribution of income over the life of
the project, reducing the presence of the distributional spike of simulated outcomes
which are never initiated. Thus a primary effect of the subsidy, and arguably a main
goal, is to ameliorate the apparent risk profile of entering into the ethanol business;
rather than to increase the value of the project or to influence operating decisions.
Efficiency of the Facility
In the retrospective analysis, our paper showed that the success of the facility is con-
tingent on its ability to market and sell its byproduct grains. It is possible that the
facility may have difficulty collecting and marketing its distillers dried grain byprod-
ucts due to factors including its proximity to principle markets, its ability to collect
and store the byproducts, and the grade or quality of the distillers dried grain byprod-
ucts. All of these factors will affect the price the operator can get and subsequently
the value of the facility is strongly linked to the firm’s ability to market its byprod-
ucts. In particular, the retrospective analysis showed that the facility would only be
in production approximately 60% of the time if it were unable to market its grain.
Our investigation with simple Margrabe options showed that the loss in value is
approximately semilinear in κ. Thus facility yield is also a key component to success
for an ethanol facility; particularly in the presence of high corn prices.
Conclusion
Our paper provided an in-depth investigation of the retrospective and future economic
viability of a typical North American corn ethanol production facility. It investigated
the effects of ethanol policy manifested as increased price correlation due to increased
demand for corn ethanol, as well as the direct effects of the subsidy on firms’ operating
decisions. Our results show that the future viability of these facilities without the
subsidy is still positive although with the subsidy, the effects of these risk factors are
greatly reduced.
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2.6 Appendix A: Abandonment and Hedging
Abandonment
In the above analysis the option to abandon was not considered. In this appendix
we present a formalism for incorporating the option to abandon. We show that this
omission is not material, at least in the parameter regimes considered in the current
paper. Empirically abandonments are rarely observed in reality compared to the
frequency of idling [42].
First, we observe that the option to abandon the facility can be considered an
effective floor on the income of the facility. Consider for example an idle facility in
the presence of very unfavourable ethanol and corn prices. It has the option to either
idle at a loss for the foreseeable future or cut its losses and abandon, assuming the
salvage value exceeds the expected accrued running costs or potential profits over the
remaining facility life.
A facility can be abandoned from idle in which case the operator gets a salvage
value F , or it can (in principle at least) be abandoned from the running state in which
case a cost D somewhat less than D10 will be incurred. The total expected earnings
over the life of the facility is
Vi(l, c, t) = sup
τ,u,θ
E
[∫ θ
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ls, Cs)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk
+ 1{θ<T}e−r(θ−t)(F − 1{un=1}D) + 1{θ≮T}e−r(T−t)Q
∣∣∣∣∣(Lt, Ct, u0) = (l, c, i)
]
where all notation is as previously defined. Here θ is the optimal time to abandon
whereupon the abandonment value is received. Given the facility is not abandoned
before T , i.e. θ /∈ [t, T ), the salvage value Q is received at the end of the lease.
Dynamic programming reduces the problem to that of finding τ
Vi(l, c, t) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)fi(Ls, Cs)ds
+ e−r(τ−t) max
{
(Vj(Lτ , Cτ , τ)−Dij) , F − 1{i=1}D
}∣∣∣∣∣(Lt, Ct) = (l, c)
]
where τ < T . The associated free boundary system is
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Figure 2.25: V1(l, c, t) with and without the option to abandon as a function of
the spread κl − c. Near the lower limit value of NPV positive entry, V1 = B, the
difference is small. All parameters are as in Table 2.2 along with an abandonment
value of F = 0.5Q and D = 0.75D10.
max
[
∂V1
∂t
+ L[V1] + f1(l, c, t)− rV1, max {(V0 −D10)− V1, (F −D)− V1}
]
= 0,
max
[
∂V0
∂t
+ L[V0] + f0(l, c, t)− rV0, max {(V1 −D01)− V0, F − V0}
]
= 0
with final conditions V1(l, c, T ) = V0(l, c, T ) = Q. Note that Q need not be the same
as F , and in general will be larger, as Q incorporates the fact that the facility at the
end of the lease may potentially be renovated and then continue to operate as a going
concern. Accordingly it may have more value than just the scrapping and liquidation
of its constituent parts.
The capitalized construction cost is much larger than the abandonment value,
B > F , and thus the option to abandon does not materially affect the decision point
to enter ∂S. In particular, since P ≥ 0 and F −B < 0, the decision to enter is never
made at a point where abandonment would have occurred as per Equation 2.18. For
the parameters considered, at the lowest bound where entry to the investment may be
considered (i.e. where V1 = B), the difference between the values V1(l, c, t) with and
without abandonment is very small. Figure 2.25 numerically illustrates this feature.
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The Possibility of Hedging
In some cases it may be desirable to hedge the real option associated with the ethanol
facility. This could be achieved by trading in the front month future contract for
example as a proxy for spot ethanol and corn prices. These contracts trade on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange [29]. An advantage of hedging is that the project value
becomes “certain” in that all the market risk can be hedged away. A disadvantage is
that the rate of return on the investment r is reduced to the risk free rate.
If the owner is very risk averse, he may hedge the facility income. On the other
hand, a risk-loving investor in search of higher returns may opt to leave the project
unhedged. A large agricultural, energy, or investment firm might be sufficiently di-
versified that hedging the option is not necessary. Some private equity or alternative
investment funds may use this option in combination with other energy trades as part
of a strategic fund. In practice, management may choose the middle ground, partially
hedging some of the risk.
We briefly point out how this affects the option pricing free boundary PDE. Say
FL(t, T ) and FC(t, T ) are the ethanol and corn future contract prices at time t expiring
at T . If there is no cost of carry or convenience yield, the forward/future price of X
is given by
FX(t, T ) = Xe
r(T−t)
where r the risk free rate is constant. If X has risk neutral dynamics dX = rXdt +
ηXdWt, the dynamics of FX(t, T ) is then
dFX(t, T ) = ηFX(t, T )dWt.
The governing free boundary PDE can then be derived for corn and ethanol
max
[
∂Vi
∂t
+ L[Vi] + fi(l, c, t)− rVi, (Vj −Dij)− Vi
]
= 0
where now
L = 1
2
F 2Lσ
2 ∂
2
∂F 2L
+ ρσbFLFC
∂2
∂FL∂FC
+
1
2
F 2Cb
2 ∂
2
∂F 2C
.
Note that the form of the equation effectively reduces to physical measure case since
a = µ = 0 (however here r is the risk free rate).
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Chapter 3
Real Options with Regulatory
Policy Uncertainty
Chapter Summary:
Energy Finance as a field is particularly bedeviled by regulatory uncertainty.
This is notably the case for the real option analysis of long-lived energy infrastruc-
ture. How can one decide optimal build times on a 50 year project horizon when
regulations regarding pricing and costs change on a much shorter time scale? In
this paper we present a quantitative framework for modelling and interpreting
regulatory changes for energy real options as a Poisson jump process, in a context
where other relevant prices follow diffusion processes. We illustrate this concep-
tual framework with a case study involving the US corn ethanol market for which
subsidy levels have experienced frequent changes. Subsidy levels have an easily
quantified impact on operations and profitability, making this a nice arena to
introduce ideas which might later be extended to less easily quantified regulatory
changes. Numerical techniques are presented to solve the resulting partial inte-
gro differential variational inequalities. These solution techniques are deployed to
solve instructive numerical examples, and conclusions for public policy are drawn.
Accepted: Christian Maxwell and Matt Davison, Real Options with Regulatory Pol-
icy Uncertainty, Fields Special Volume on Commodity Risk and Energy Finance,
2014.
3.1 Introduction
All large energy and natural resource projects are subject to government policy or
regulation of some kind. These regulations are intended to achieve public policy
59
goals and their effects should be taken into account by firms planning to enter into
energy or resource investments. Energy and resource projects often have long project
horizons and operating life spans on the order of decades. Consider the example of a
firm deciding to enter into a 50 year energy production investment. Policy in terms
of taxation, environmental regulations and other laws may materially affect project
cash flows. These policies have been known to change at various time scales. Some
policy amendments are well broadcast and announced while others are not. Although
policy changes may appear “predictable” in the short term, forecasting onto a 50 year
project horizon renders the policy changes apparently random, and hence requiring
models of policy uncertainty.
Policy uncertainty is characterized by changes in taxation, legal and other reg-
ulatory policies that affect a business’ operations and profitability. The uncertainty
derives from the inability to predict policy in the long term; uncertainty about forth-
coming policy or announcements of policy changes; or sudden and abrupt changes in
policy. Some anecdotal examples of policy uncertainty in energy and resource markets
from recent North American news headlines follow:
Ontario looks set to cut green energy subsidies: Solar rates expected to
be cut substantially. Industry has six weeks to provide input. [87]
Ontario drops plan for TransCanada power plant: Ontario cancels planned
TransCanada power plant with province to discuss compensation with TransCanada.
Costs may exceed $1 billion CAD and affect off peak pricing. [80, 86]
Ivanhoe ‘surprised’ by new Mongolian windfall tax: Mongolia sets surprise
windfall tax on (among possibly others) Ivanhoe’s Oyu Tolgoi mine of 68% when gold
hits $500 per ounce. [62]
This does not by any means represent an exhaustive list. Attempts have been
made to quantify and measure policy uncertainty (e.g. [58]). In [58] and [72] the
authors also note that policy uncertainty can make firms hesitate or delay to enter
into long term projects as they wait for more policy certainty before making decisions.
This has caught the eye of Canadian and American macroeconomic policy makers
noting both that firms appear to accumulate cash and hesitate to make business
decisions amid regulatory uncertainty [71, 91].
In this paper we present a quantitative framework for modeling and interpreting
regulatory changes for energy real options as a jump diffusion process, in a context
where other relevant prices follow pure diffusion processes. Policy uncertainty by its
nature is very difficult to hedge, at best, and leads to market incompleteness even if
the remaining underlying prices could otherwise be traded.
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This real option method of modeling resource project management decisions was
introduced by [61] in a seminal paper that considered the problem of optimally start-
ing and stopping production to maximize the profits of a natural resource project.
The optimal entry and exit from investment projects was also considered by [66] in
another classical real option paper. A collection of illustrative real option papers can
be found in [67].
In particular, we consider a firm contemplating the option to invest in an ethanol
from corn production plant. We build on the analysis of our past work [79] which
intended to quantify the impact (both intended and unintended consequences) of
ethanol policy on production. This current work adds the complication of policy
uncertainty deriving from a volumetric production tax subsidy which has changed
several times over the past 35 years. We aim to understand the effects of ethanol
policy uncertainty on production from the producer’s perspective. An example of
the application of real option analysis to understand the effects of windfall taxes on
mining operations can be found in [89]. A complementary and interesting analysis
on policy uncertainty and real options can be found in [72]. The authors of [72]
use empirical data to determine how regulatory uncertainty in American electricity
markets affects start up and shut down decisions for power plants; their evidence
supports the anecdotal claims mentioned above that uncertainty leads management
to defer decision making. Our real option model sets out to design a framework
to quantitatively model this added uncertainty and capture its effects on decision
making.
3.1.1 Corn Ethanol Production and Subsidy Policy
The ethanol market in the US is large, estimated at 13.3 billion gallons produced in
2012 by over 209 plants [88]. Efforts to promote US energy independence and initia-
tives to obtain fuel from environmentally friendly sources have led to the subsidization
of the production of ethanol biofuel from corn. Subsidies have historically been pro-
vided to ethanol producers by means of a volumetric ethanol excise tax credit for
blenders and a small ethanol producer tax credit. The subsidy amount has changed
from $0.40/gallon at its introduction in 1978 (Energy Tax Act) and been adjusted
several times until its final level $0.45/gallon in the 2008 Farm Bill followed by ter-
mination (by non-renewal) at the end of 2012 [68, 70]. Table 3.1 shows the history of
ethanol subsidy policy changes and amendments since its inception.
A year following the lapse of many of the energy subsidies, about one quarter
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Act Year Subsidy ($/gallon)
Energy Tax Act 1978 0.40
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 1983 0.50
Tax Reform Act 1984 0.60
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1990 0.54
1998 policy adjustment effective 2001 2001 0.53
1998 policy adjustment effective 2003 2003 0.52
Extension of policy with adjustment 2005 0.51
Farm Bill 2008 0.45
Expiration of tax credit 2012 –
Table 3.1: Historical ethanol subsidies. Source: [70]
of Nebraska’s ethanol plants were in idle status [83]. The loss of the subsidy was
a possible contributing factor to the shut downs as [77] note that without subsidies
ethanol plants may lose their economic viability.
3.1.2 Outline
Our paper uses a crush spread analysis to value a facility which produces ethanol
from corn using a real options analysis following our framework in [79]. The outline
is as follows: Section 3.2 specifies the plant characteristics, management decisions,
and associated costs and profits. Section 3.3 derives the stochastic optimal control
problem for the optimal plant operating rule. Section 3.4 illustrates the numerical
results. Finally Section 3.5 draws conclusions about policy uncertainty and its effects
on ethanol production, closing off with some policy recommendations.
3.2 The Real Option Model
Management contemplating the decision to invest in an ethanol production plant
has the flexibility to enter or defer the project given price conditions and expected
future profitability [67]. After initiating and building the ethanol plant, management
again has the flexibility to switch production on (1) and off (0) given prevailing
economic conditions. The goal of this paper is to examine how ethanol price and policy
uncertainty affects a producer’s business entry and subsequent operating decisions
given price conditions, subsidy policy expectations, and the remaining project life.
Following our analysis [79], throughout this paper all currency is in United States
dollars (USD); liquid volume is in gallons; solid volume is in bushels; weight is in
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tons; and interest is percent per year appropriate to USD deposits continuously com-
pounded.
3.2.1 Plant Specification and Operating Costs
The following costs are scaled in terms of gallon of production capacity per year
and were estimated by [90]. The model is based on our detailed ethanol real option
analysis in [79].
The capitalized construction cost B is estimated at $1.40/gallon for a “typical”
sized facility with nameplate capacity of 40,000,000 gallons/year. The plant salvage
value Q is estimated at 10% of capitalized cost. The switching cost D01 to resume
production from an idle state is estimated at 10% of capitalized cost per gallon of
annual production capacity. Similarly, the switching cost D10 to pause production
from an active operating state is estimated at 5% of capitalized cost per gallon of
annual production capacity.
3.2.2 Running Profits
The plant produces ethanol Lt (priced in USD/gallon) from corn Ct (priced in USD/bushel).
The running profit from the corn ethanol crush spread is developed in [79] on a per
bushel per year basis assuming the popular dry grind process for producing ethanol
[59].
corn→ ethanol + by-products (3.1)
The profit function while operating, f1, is given by
f1(Lt, Ct, Zt) = κ(Lt + Zt −K1)− Ct (3.2)
where Zt is the government volumetric subsidy (USD/gallon). The conversion factor
κ = 2.8 is the yield in terms of gallons of ethanol produced per bushel of corn [59]
and is consistent with the CME Group’s references on trading ethanol crush spreads
[63].
The net running cost while on can be decomposed in terms of the fixed running
cost p of $0.68/gallon, less the average by-product distillers dried grains G (USD/ton)
produced per bushel of corn [77, 79, 90]
K1 = p− ω
κ
G. (3.3)
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The process produces 17 lbs of by-product per bushel and hence the yield factor
ω = 17/20001.
While production is idle, [90] estimated that fixed running costs K0 are roughly
1% of capitalized construction costs per gallon of production capacity or 20% of fixed
running cost while in production (note that, while idle, no ethanol is produced and
consequently no subsidy is applied). The profit function while off, f0, is
f0(Lt, Ct, Zt) = −κK0 (3.4)
where the midpoint between the two estimates is used [79]
K0 =
0.01B + 0.20p
2
. (3.5)
Finally, the interest rate r is taken to be a target return of 8% per annum contin-
uously compounded to account for the risk associated with the ethanol project cash
flows [79, 90]. Our analysis uses only the physical measure for the stochastic assets.
We note however that the price risk associated with corn and ethanol can be hedged
using futures and the arbitrage free return can be determined by assuming that the
jumps are not correlated with the market following an argument popularized in [81].
3.2.3 Stochastic Price Models
Following our analysis in [79], ethanol Lt and corn Ct are modelled by a joint geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) diffusion
dLt = µLtdt+ σLtdW1t (3.6)
dCt = aCtdt+ bCtdW2t (3.7)
Corr[W1t,W2t] = ρ (3.8)
where (W1t,W2t) is a 2-dimensional Brownian motion defined on a filtered probability
space (Ω,Ft, P ) which satisfies the usual conditions [84].
The econometric model parameters are estimated by ordinary least-squares re-
gression of the log time series ln Xt
Xt−1
using the 10 year monthly historical price series
from Dec/02-Jan/11 capitalizing on earlier work in [79]. Prices for no. 2 yellow corn
Omaha, NE underlying the CME corn futures contract were obtained from [92]. Av-
erage rack prices freight on board for ethanol were obtained from [82]. The correlation
1There are 2000 lbs in a ton.
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Parameter estimate Value t-test
µˆ 0 P
(
µˆ−µ
s.e.
> t
∣∣µ = 0) = 0.409
σˆ 0.156 -
aˆ 0 P
(
aˆ−a
s.e.
> t
∣∣µ = 0) = 0.202
bˆ 0.123 -
ρˆ 0.105 -
Gˆ $115.6 G ∈ [108.4, 122.8]a
Table 3.2: Regression estimation results. abased on 95% confidence interval Student-t
with 119 degrees of freedom.
estimate ρ was obtained via the sample correlation of the residuals. Parameter esti-
mation results are in Table 3.2. Note that both ethanol and corn were found not to
reject the null hypothesis of zero drift the 95% confidence interval. The estimate for
the average distillers dried grains price Gˆ was estimated by regressing the time series
against a constant.
The stochastic subsidy Zt is modeled as a pure Poisson arrival time jump process
with arrival rate λ with jumps of size J .
dZt = (J − Zt−)dNt (3.9)
where dNt, defined on the probability space, is a continuous-time counting process
{Nt, t ≥ 0} that counts the number of jumps over time dt and
dNt =
1 with probability λdt0 otherwise. (3.10)
It is assumed in our model that J and Nt are independent of each other, and inde-
pendent of W1t and W2t (which are correlated by ρ).
The times between jumps ti− ti−1 are seen to be quite well modelled by indepen-
dently exponentially distributed Poisson arrivals (see Figure 3.1). The jumps J are
assumed to be drawn from a lognormal distribution with parameters LogN(α, β2).
The parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood using the data in Table 3.1.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 3.3.
Goodness of Fit of Subsidy Model The sample set for the subsidy policy is
small (8 observations) and requires a test of the goodness of fit. By our model
choice, the time between arrivals ∆t of subsidy changes is exponentially distributed
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Parameter estimate Estimator Value 95% confidence interval
λˆ
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ti − ti−1
)−1
0.24 [0.10, 0.42]
αˆ 1
n
∑n
i=1 lnxi -0.69 [−0.79,−0.58]
βˆ2 1
n−1
∑n
i=1(lnxi − αˆ)2 0.015a [0.0066, 0.062]
Table 3.3: Maximum likelihood estimation results. aCorrected unbiased estimator.
with parameter λ (Exp(λ)) and the series lnZt−αˆ
βˆ
is a Student’s t-distribution with
n = 8 − 1 = 7 degrees of freedom (t7) since lnZt ∼ N(α, β2). The plots of the
estimated theoretical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) versus the empirical
distributions are included in Figure 3.1 along with the QQ plots. By visual inspection,
both data appear to be reasonably suited to the proposed subsidy model.
Lilliefors tests (a nonparametric variant of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test) were
applied to test for normality in the log subsidy series and exponentiality in the subsidy
arrival times using Matlab’s lilliefors.m function. Both samples accepted the
null hypothesis of normality and exponentiality at the 5% significance level. This
statistical evidence further supports our proposed model. We note however that this
result is based on a small sample size.
3.2.4 Policy Uncertainty “at its Worst”
Since the policy uncertainty cannot be hedged and is presumably not strongly cor-
related with any market assets, there is cause for concern in terms of how to price
this ethanol real option. Not only is there risk in the randomness of the process, but
there is an added complexity of risk in the choice of model since it is truly uncertain,
so-called “Knightian” uncertainty. To account for this model risk, uncertainty around
the jump process parameters is included.
There are several possible ways to deal with model uncertainty and market incom-
pleteness including: (1) cautiously deploying assumptions to simplify the problem; (2)
utility indifference pricing with model uncertainty [75, 78]; and (3) best/worst case
pricing (similar to the idea of good deal bounds and super-replication) [57]. Our
analysis follows alternative (3) due to its financial intuition, transparency, and lack of
subjectivity around economic aversion parameters or choice utility functions associ-
ated with utility-based pricing (which produce a subjective “personal price”). There
is a connection between (2) and (3) however in that as the risk aversion parameter
tends to infinity, the utility indifference price tends to the worst-case price. Manage-
ment buying into an ethanol project can be considered “long” the real option. The
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Figure 3.1: The empirical CDF (solid black) vs the theoretical CDF (grey dashed)
of the time between arrivals ∆t ∼ Exp(λˆ) (upper left). The QQ plot of the time
between arrivals (upper right). The empirical CDF (solid black) vs the theoretical
CDF (grey dashed) of the normalized subsidy series lnZt−αˆ
βˆ
∼ t7 (lower left). The QQ
plot of the subsidy series (lower right).
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worst case price is what a strongly risk averse buyer may consider when purchasing
an option.
Management contemplating investment in an ethanol project may ask the ques-
tion: Given the uncertainty around subsidy policy over the past 35 years, what is the
expected case and worst case project value? To answer this question, the reference pol-
icy uncertainty distribution is adjusted within the following heuristically determined
parameter bounds to form best and worst case bounds for the project value.
Bounds on α Suppose management assumes V aR05 style bounds on α.
2 In order
to choose a lower bound for α, management chooses a parameter αmin such that the
probability of observing a subsidy level J lower than the lowest historical subsidy
Zmin = 0.40 is 95%, i.e. P (J < Zmin) = 0.95. For a lognormal distribution with
variance β2 = 0.015, αmin = −1.118. An upper bound can be chosen as αmax such
that the probability of observing a lower subsidy J than the historical maximum
Zmax = 0.60 is also less than 5%, i.e. P (J < Zmax) = 0.05. In this case, the upper
bound is αmax = −0.309.3
Bounds on λ Similarly, the average arrival time of subsidy changes is bounded by
infinity (i.e. no changes at all) where λmin = 0. Reasoning that the US Farm Bill is
the primary means by which ethanol subsidy policies are amended and that a new
omnibus bill is passed every 5 years or so, λmax can be chosen such that the probability
of observing at least one jump in a 5 year cycle is at least 95%. Thus management
seeks λmax such that P (k = 0;λmax, t = 5) ≤ 0.05 (i.e. the probability of observing
zero jumps is at most 5%) where the probability of exactly k jumps occurring over
t is P (k;λ, t) = (λt)
n
n!
e−λt. This is given by e−λmax5 ≤ 0.05 ⇒ λmax = ln(0.05)5 or
λmax = 0.60.
The Best and Worst Case Bounds The best and worst case bounds can be
summarized by the following:
α ∈ [αmin, αmax] = [−1.118,−0.309] (3.11)
λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] = [0, 0.60]. (3.12)
2We note that management could use another technique to choose bounds such as the 95%
confidence intervals on the mean estimate for example in Table 3.3.
3We note that these bounds were chosen heuristically based on ethanol policy history and with
reference to political precedent of the subsidy level. They do not represent a rigourous mathematical
treatment of the small sample population time series.
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3.3 The Stochastic Control Problem
In this section, we develop the jump diffusion counterpart of our model in [79] which
leads to a system of interconnected obstacle problems, i.e. partial integro differential
(PID) variational inequalities.
The total expected earnings Vi over the life of the project is given by the sum of
its profits, plus the sum of any switching costs incurred over its operating life
Vi(l, c, z, t) = sup
τ,u
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ls, Cs, Zs)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk∣∣∣∣∣(Lt, Ct, Zt, u0) = (l, c, z, i)
]
(3.13)
The pair (τ, u) is the control that the manager has over the facility in his ability to
toggle production on and off. It consists of a set of switching times τk and states to be
switched into uk with It = uk, t ∈ [τk, τk+1). Thus τk is an increasing set of switching
times with τk ∈ [t, T ] and τk < τk+1 given the initial operating state u0 = i.
If management assumes a worst case pricing scenario for the policy parameters
(λ, α), then
Vi(l, c, z, t) = sup
τ,u
inf
λ,α
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ls, Cs, Zs)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk∣∣∣∣∣(Lt, Ct, Zt, u0) = (l, c, z, i)
]
(3.14)
where λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] and α ∈ [αmin, αmax]. The limits on λ and α prevent the
optimization argument from growing unbounded and becoming singular [85]. The
controls (u, τ, α, λ) come from an admissible set of non-anticipating controls (i.e. Ft-
measurable and Markovian).
3.3.1 An Intuition Building 1-dimensional Simplified Model
To make the full model exposition easier and to develop intuition, consider for the
time being a simplified 1-dimensional approximation of the spread less fixed running
costs
Xt = κLt − Ct −K (3.15)
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where Xt follows a simple Brownian stochastic differential equation
dXt = adt+ bdWt (3.16)
where a and b are naively chosen to fit the model. To further simplify the process,
assume now that Zt has normally distributed jumps such that
dZt = JdNt (3.17)
where J ∼ N(α, β2). The two (Xt+Zt) can be combined into a jump diffusion process
Yt
dYt = adt+ bdWt + JdNt (3.18)
with solution
Yt = Y0 + at+ bWt +
Nt∑
k=1
Jk (3.19)
where
∑n
k=1 Jk ∼ N(nα, nβ2).
The expected income of the facility over its lifespan is
Vi(y, t) = sup
τ,u
inf
λ,α
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ys)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk
∣∣∣∣∣ (Yt, u0) = (y, i)
]
(3.20)
By application of dynamic programming (see [60] or [85]) for optimal switching prob-
lems, the value function can be written as
Vi(y, t) = sup
τ
inf
λ,α
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)fi(Ys)ds+ e−r(τ−t) {Vj(Yτ , τ)−Dij}
]
(3.21)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1} and τ is the first time it is optimal to switch production regimes.
Now the problem consists of finding the optimal sets of prices and times to either
• hold production in its current state i, denoting this continuation or (hold) set
as Hi, or
• switch production into the other state j, denoting this switching set as Sij.
By another application of dynamic programming and Ito’s lemma for jump diffusions,
this equation leads to a coupled system of free boundary PID equations (PIDEs). The
free boundary problem can be written in complementary form by noting that either
it is optimal to switch and Vi = Vj − Dij or it is optimal to hold and Vi satisfies a
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PIDE subject to Vi ≥ Vj −Dij. Thus the equation extends on the whole space easing
the need to track the switching boundary as a PID variational inequality (see [84] for
an excellent reference on controlled jump diffusions). Thus the system of equations
may be expressed as
max
∂Vi∂t + L[Vi] + infλ,α I[Vi] + fi − rVi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hi
, (Vj −Dij)− Vi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sij
 = 0. (3.22)
where the spatial differential part of the generator is
L[V ] = a∂V
∂y
+
1
2
b2
∂2V
∂y2
(3.23)
and the integro part is
I[V ] = λ(E[V (y + J)]− V (y)). (3.24)
The expectation E is taken with respect to a normal N(α, β2) kernel gN
E[V (y + J)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
V (y + J)gN(J)dJ. (3.25)
Theorem 1 (Worst Case Price). The minimal optimal control is given by
α = αmin, λ =
λmin if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) ≥ 0,λmax if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) < 0 (3.26)
Theorem 2 (Best Case Price). The maximal optimal control is given by
α = αmax, λ =
λmax if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) ≥ 0,λmin if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) < 0 (3.27)
Theorem 3 (Worst and Best Case Price if α = 0). The minimal optimal control is
given by
λ = λmin, (3.28)
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and the maximal optimal control is given by
λ = λmax, (3.29)
if α = 0 for all y.
See Appendix B for proofs of the above.
An interpretation of the maximal (respectively minimal) optimal control is as
follows: (1) If the expected value post-jump E[V (y+J)] is better than its current value
V (y), assume that the jump arrives as (in)frequently as possible 1/λmax (1/λmin). (2)
Assume that the jumps are in general as (un)favourable as possible αmax (αmin).
Lessons from Merton
In the simplification where (1) the policy parameters (λ, α) are constant and (2)
switching costs Dij are zero, the problem reduces to a PIDE which yields the option
price
∂V
∂t
+ a
∂V
∂y
+
1
2
b2
∂2V
∂y2
+ λ(E[V (y + J)]− V (y))− rV + f(y) = 0 (3.30)
where f(y) = y+ = max(y, 0).
Using the Feynman-Kac Formula [84] and following Merton’s classical paper on
jump diffusions [81], the solution to the PIDE is
V (y, t) = E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)f(Ys)ds
∣∣∣∣Yt = y] . (3.31)
Theorem 4 (Constant Coefficient Option Price). The option price V (y, t) satisfies
V (y, t) =
∞∑
n=0
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)
(
As,nΦ(d) +
Bs,n√
2pi
e−
d2
2
)
ds (3.32)
where As,n = y+ a(s− t) +nα, B2s,n = b2(s− t) +nβ2, d = As,n/Bs,n and Φ(x) is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function.
See Appendix B for the derivation of the governing PIDE and option price.
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3.3.2 The Complete Problem
Return now to the stochastic control problem for the real option
Vi(l, c, z, t) = sup
τ,u
inf
λ,α
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)fIs(Ls, Cs, Zs)ds+
n∑
k=1
e−r(τk−t)Duk−1,uk∣∣∣∣∣(Lt, Ct, Zt, u0) = (l, c, z, i)
]
(3.33)
where λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] and α ∈ [αmin, αmax]. We follow a similar argument as before
using dynamic programming reducing the switching problem to a single decision τ
Vi(l, c, z, t) = sup
τ
inf
λ,α
E
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)fi(Ls, Cs, Zs)ds+ e−r(τ−t){Vj(Lτ , Cτ , Zτ , τ)−Dij}
]
.
(3.34)
Using Ito’s lemma for jump diffusions and noting as in [60, 85, 93] that the problem
can be written in complementary form as a variational inequality
max
∂Vi∂t + L[Vi] + infλ,α I[Vi] + fi − rVi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hi
, (Vj −Dij)− Vi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sij
 = 0. (3.35)
where the spatial differential part of the generator is
L[V ] = µl∂V
∂l
+ ac
∂V
∂c
+
1
2
σ2l2
∂2V
∂l2
+ ρσlbc
∂2V
∂l∂c
+
1
2
b2c2
∂2V
∂c2
(3.36)
and the integro part is
I[V ] = λ(E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z)). (3.37)
Theorem 5 (Worst Case Price). The minimal optimal control is given by
α = αmin, λ =
λmin if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) ≥ 0,λmax if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) < 0 (3.38)
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Theorem 6 (Best Case Price). The maximal optimal control is given by
α = αmax, λ =
λmax if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) ≥ 0,λmin if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) < 0 (3.39)
See Appendix B for proofs of the above.
3.3.3 The Decision to Enter
Management’s optimal decision time to enter into the business τ maximizes the ex-
pected value
V (l, c, z, t) = sup
τ
inf
λ,α
E
[
e−r(τ−t) max{V1, V0}(Lτ , Cτ , Zτ , τ)−B
∣∣ (Lt, Ct, Zt) = (l, c, z)]
(3.40)
and is a classical “American” style exercise call option. By dynamic programming,
the optimal stopping problem satisfies the PID variational inequality
max
∂V∂t + L[V ] + infλ,α I[V ]− rV︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, (max(V1, V0)−B)− V︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
 = 0. (3.41)
This completes the jump diffusion analogue of [79] and represents the optimal entry
strategy for investment into a corn-ethanol biofuel production plant.
3.4 Numerical Results
This section begins with a numerical investigation of the behaviour of the constant
coefficient analytical model. The section then proceeds with an investigation of the
effects of policy uncertainty on the 1-dimensional model including (i) the loss in value
and (ii) the effects on switching decisions (which is also a proxy investigation of the
effects on the entry decision). Finally, the section concludes with an investigation of
the change in value between the full model with both policy uncertainty and model
certainty or uncertainty.
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Figure 3.2: The option value V (y, t) at various levels of α (expected jump level)
given standard parameters of λ = 1 (Poisson arrival rate of jumps), β = 1 (volatility
of jump distribution), a = 0 and b = 1 (drift and volatility of diffusion), r = 0.01
(discount rate), and T − t = 1 (remaining option tenor).
3.4.1 The Constant Coefficient Model
Consider V (y, t) in Equation 3.32. Its behaviour is monotone increasing in y. Figure
3.2 shows that the function is increasing in α. This is as expected since if the jumps
tend to be more positive (α > 0), the spread tends to jump non-locally to a higher
value of y (recall the option is monotone increasing in y), and vice versa if α tends to
be more negative.
Figure 3.3 indicates V is an increasing function of λ (although it is generally in-
sensitive to λ). This makes sense intuitively since as the frequency of jumps increases,
more volatility is added to the option in terms of Bs,n, and Black-Scholes style options
are increasing functions in volatility.
Figure 3.4 shows that V is sensitive to λ when there is an expected direction with
the jumps (i.e. α 6= 0).
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Figure 3.3: The option value V (y, t) at various levels of λ (Poisson arrival rate of
jumps) given standard parameters of α = 0 (expected jump level), β = 1 (volatility
of jump distribution), a = 0 and b = 1 (drift and volatility of diffusion), r = 0.01
(discount rate), and T − t = 1 (remaining option tenor).
Figure 3.4: The option value V (y, t) at various levels of λ (Poisson arrival rate of
jumps) and α (expected jump level) given standard parameters of β = 1 (volatility
of jump distribution), a = 0 and b = 1 (drift and volatility of diffusion), r = 0.01
(discount rate), and T − t = 1 (remaining option tenor). On the left, α = 1 and on
the right α = −1.
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Impact on Value The parameters λ and α can be interpreted as measures of how
infrequently policy changes occur and where management expects the subsidy to level
move to, respectively. If the subsidy is expected to move up in value α > 0, the jumps
make the project more favourable. The opposite occurs if α < 0: The future policy
outlook is negative, and the project/option loses value.
As λ increases, policy changes occur more frequently which adds project/option
value by means of the increased volatility associated with each jump. As the option
to switch production off mitigates downside jumps on value V , the upside value of the
jump volatility disproportionately increases the option’s value. Figure 3.3 also reveals
that the option is very insensitive to λ when there is no expected “directionality” in
the jumps, i.e. when α = 0.
3.4.2 The 1-dimensional Model
We now turn to an investigation of the effects of model uncertainty for a risk averse
investor into the real option ethanol project. In this analysis, f1(y) = y and f0(y) = 0
while D01 = 0.2 and D10 = 0.1.
Figure 3.5 shows the project valuation results for the expected price with policy
uncertainty, best and worst case prices given policy uncertainty where α = 0 is fixed
and λ ∈ [0, 1]. The underlay shows the switching boundaries Sij in y. Figure 3.6
shows the same information as Figure 3.5 but in this case there is model uncertainty
α ∈ [−0.2, 0.2] with expected parameter α = 0.
Impact on Value The gap between the best and worst case prices can be signifi-
cantly large if α is allowed to vary as indicated in Figure 3.6; otherwise the difference
is small (Figure 3.5) as expected from our results with the constant coefficient model.
Since this function is convex, the integral operator is single-signed and the parameter
λ assumes either λmin in the worst case or λmax in the best case when α = 0 in the
example in Figure 3.5 by Jensen’s inequality. The constant coefficient expected case
model will always be bounded by the best and worst case project prices. In these
examples, the expected case is nearer to the worst case since λ = 0.1 is closer to
λmin = 0 than λmax = 1.
Impact on Switching Decision Although the effects are not very pronounced on
the 1 year time horizon, model uncertainty has an impact on switching decisions. The
lower charts in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 represent the switching boundaries
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Figure 3.5: The option value V (y, t) at an “expected case” of λ = 0.1 (Poisson arrival
rate of jumps) and (λmin, λmax) = (0, 1) (parameter boundaries), α = 0 and β
2 = 0.1
(mean and variance of jump distribution), a = 0 and b = 1 (drift and volatility of
diffusion), r = 0.01 (disount rate), and T − t = 1 (option tenor). Switching costs are
D01 = 0.2 and D10 = 0.1.
Figure 3.6: The option value V (y, t) at an “expected case” of λ = 0.1 (Poisson
arrival rate of jumps) and α = 0 (expected mean jump size), but where λ ∈ [0, 1]
and α ∈ [−0.2, 0.2] (parameter boundaries). The remaining parameters are β2 = 0.1
(variance of jump distribution), a = 0 and b = 1 (drift and volatility of diffusion),
r = 0.01 (disount rate), and T − t = 1 (option tenor). Switching costs are D01 = 0.2
and D10 = 0.1.
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• S01 = {y : V0(y, 0) = V1(y, 0) − D01}, the set of prices where the operating
status is optimally switched on from idle, and
• S10 = {y : V1(y, 0) = V0(y, 0) − D10}, the set of prices where the operating
status is optimally switched off from running.
It can be seen that in the...
...worst case scenario: The operator switches production on later than in the ex-
pected case (i.e. at y > y∗ if y∗ is where the operator would switch production
on in the expected case). Similarly, the operator switches production off earlier
compared to the expected case (i.e. at y < y∗ if y∗ is where the operator would
switch production off in the expected case).
...best case scenario: The operator switches production on earlier and switches
production off later compared to the expected case.
In the example where α = 0 is fixed, the differences in switching boundaries between
the best, worst and expected cases are almost negligible (Figure 3.5). However in the
other example where −0.2 ≤ α ≤ 0.2 can vary, the differences in switching boundaries
between the best, worst and expected cases can deviate a great deal. Thus it is not
so much when management thinks a change in policy might occur (i.e. λ-driven) but
rather how management expects that policy to change with respect to its current
policy conditions—that is, α-driven.
3.4.3 The Complete Model
This section concludes with a numerical investigation of the ethanol plant value in
the presence or absence of policy uncertainty and model uncertainty. The ethanol
plant is assumed to have a 10 year investment horizon, T − t = 10.
With and without Policy Uncertainty
We compare the real option project valuation of the ethanol plant in two cases where:
• Management ignores the uncertainty in the ethanol subsidy policy and assumes
Zt = Z (constant) to take its Jan/2011 value (Table 3.1),
– in this case, f1(Ls, Cs, Z) = κ(Ls −K1 + Z)− Cs where Z = $0.45/gallon
is constant (also λ = 0); and
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Figure 3.7: V (Lt, Ct, Z, t) without policy uncertainty vs V (Lt, Ct, Zt, t) with policy
uncertainty. Parameters (from Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and σ = 0.156 (drift
and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and b = 0.123 (drift and volatility of corn), Z = 0.45
without policy uncertainty and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and β2 = 0.015
(arrival rate, mean and variance of jumps) with policy uncertainty.
• Management considers the uncertainty in the ethanol subsidy policy with known
parameters (model certainty) and assumes the model parameters in Table 3.3
subject to the initial subsidy level being its Jan/2011 value as above,
– in this case, f1(Ls, Cs, Zs) = κ(Ls−K1 +Zs)−Cs where Zt = $0.45/gallon.
Figure 3.7 shows the value functions at various levels of Ct in the presence and
absence of policy uncertainty. Figure 3.8 shows the switching boundaries in both
cases.
Impact of Policy Uncertainty on Value As inferred from our 1-dimensional
analysis in Section 3.3.1, policy uncertainty adds more value to the real option due
to two distinct factors: (1) Given Zt = 0.45 < 0.51 = e
α+ 1
2
β2 = E[J ], it is likely
that the subsidy policy will jump to a higher level giving the option more value in
the presence of policy uncertainty. (2) The extra volatility provided by the jump
process adds volatility value to the option. The downside of policy switches on an
ethanol plant can be mitigated by switching production off, while the upside value is
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Figure 3.8: The switching boundaries ∂S01 and ∂S10 in the presence and absence of
policy uncertainty. Parameters (from Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and σ = 0.156
(drift and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and b = 0.123 (drift and volatility of corn),
Z = 0.45 without policy uncertainty and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and
β2 = 0.015 (arrival rate, mean and variance of jumps) with policy uncertainty.
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maintained by keeping (or switching) production on when prices favourably allow for
it. The capitalized cost of construction on a per bushel basis κB is also included in
Figure 3.8.
Impact of Policy Uncertainty on Switching Decisions The boundary at which
production is switched on from an idle state is ∂S01 and the boundary at which pro-
duction is turned off from a running state is ∂S10. In this case, the initial subsidy level
Zt is less than the long run average E[J ] = e
α+ 1
2
β2 , Zt = 0.45 < 0.51 = e
−0.69+ 1
2
0.015.
Thus, the operator generally waits longer before turning production off, due to a
positive outlook that the subsidy might jump up to its long term average. Similarly,
the operator generally turns production on sooner in hope that the subsidy might
again jump to its (higher) long run average. More precisely, given a point (c, l) on
∂S01 in the absence of policy uncertainty, if (c, l
∗) is on ∂S∗01 in the presence of policy
uncertainty, then l∗ < l (respectively l∗ > l) when production is shut down earlier
(later).
Changes in z shift value and switching decisions up or down non-locally as Zt
jumps. The general direction of the jumps is illustrated in Figure 3.8 by the arrow
Zt
J−→ Zt+dt.
It should be noted that if management were expecting the subsidy to jump to
a lower level, the opposite situation as described above would occur. Management
would switch production off earlier and turn production on later for fear that the
subsidy might fall.
Policy Uncertainty with Model Uncertainty
In the likely event that the distribution and parameters of the regulatory uncertainty
process are unknown, management may choose a worst case valuation for the ethanol
plant project value. The assumed boundaries for policy change arrival rate are λ ∈
[0, 0.60] and expected mean subsidy policy α ∈ [−1.118,−0.309].
Figure 3.9 illustrates the worst case value compared to the expected case given by
the model parameters in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The switching boundaries are illustrated
in Figure 3.10 comparing the worst case operating decisions to the expected case.
For completeness, Figure 3.11 shows the envelope of best case, worst case and
expected project values in the presence of policy and model uncertainty. The bounds
can be quite large between the best and worst project values even for “seemingly
small” parameter boundaries. The switching boundaries are illustrated in Figure
3.12 comparing the best case operating decisions to the expected case.
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Figure 3.9: V (Lt, Ct, Zt, t) vs infλ,α V (Lt, Ct, Zt, t) with policy (and model) uncer-
tainty. Constant parameters (from Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and σ = 0.156
(drift and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and b = 0.123 (drift and volatility of corn),
and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and β2 = 0.015 (arrival rate, mean and variance
of jumps). Non-constant parameters for model uncertainty are α ∈ [−1.118,−0.309]
and λ ∈ [0, 0.60].
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Figure 3.10: The switching boundaries ∂S01 and ∂S10 in the presence of policy uncer-
tainty and model uncertainty in the worst case. Constant parameters (from Tables
3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and σ = 0.156 (drift and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and
b = 0.123 (drift and volatility of corn), and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and
β2 = 0.015 (arrival rate, mean and variance of jumps). Non-constant parameters for
model uncertainty are α ∈ [−1.118,−0.309] and λ ∈ [0, 0.60].
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Figure 3.11: V1(Lt, Ct, Zt, t) vs infλ,α V1(Lt, Ct, Zt, t) vs supλ,α V1(Lt, Ct, Zt, t) with
policy uncertainty. Constant parameters (from Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and
σ = 0.156 (drift and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and b = 0.123 (drift and volatility
of corn), and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and β2 = 0.015 (arrival rate, mean
and variance of jumps). Non-constant parameters for model uncertainty are α ∈
[−1.118,−0.309] and λ ∈ [0, 0.60].
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Figure 3.12: The switching boundaries ∂S01 and ∂S10 in the presence of policy un-
certainty and model uncertainty in the best case. Constant parameters (from Tables
3.2 and 3.3) are µ = 0 and σ = 0.156 (drift and volatility of ethanol), a = 0 and
b = 0.123 (drift and volatility of corn), and Zt = 0.45, λ = 0.24, α = −0.69 and
β2 = 0.015 (arrival rate, mean and variance of jumps). Non-constant parameters for
model uncertainty are α ∈ [−1.118,−0.309] and λ ∈ [0, 0.60].
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Impact of Worst Case Model Uncertainty on Value The worst case real
option ethanol plant value represents a lower bound in project value. Figure 3.9 also
includes the capitalized cost of construction on a per bushel of capacity basis κB.
As expected, fewer projects are net present value positive in the worst case project
value compared to the expected case. That is, given the two sets of prices at a time
t the set of prices that are “Net Present Value (NPV) positive” for entering into the
project are
NPV = {(l, c) : max(V1, V0)−B > 0} and NPV ∗ = {(l, c) : inf
λ,α
max(V1, V0)−B > 0},
(3.42)
then
NPV ∗ ⊆ NPV (3.43)
This means that fewer investments are entered into during times of high policy
uncertainty if management is risk averse.
The converse to the above statement is that firms that are risk-loving may prefer a
project with more policy uncertainty. These types of options tend to increase in value
with volatility which may be more appealing to investors with a higher risk appetite.
Further, risk-loving investors may tend to weight the better case model parameters
higher than the worse case model parameters again resulting in higher valuations.
In certain cases, the integral operator may be I[V ] = E[V (l, c, J)]−V (l, c, 0.45) >
0 and accordingly λ = λmin = 0 in the minimization. This is similar to the case with
zero policy uncertainty. Thus, the worst case option value may at times approach the
option value in the absence of policy uncertainty.
Impact of Worst Case Model Uncertainty on Operating Decisions The
possible subsidy outcomes in the worst case scenario have a much more negative
outlook than the expected case. Thus in the worst case scenario, the optimal strategy
tends to be conservative when making switching decisions (Figure 3.10). The net
result is that management switches production on much later and switches production
off much earlier compared to the expected case operating strategy.
Comments on the Best Case Model Figure 3.11 shows that the gap between
the best and worst case prices can be quite large. This is an artifact of the stochastic
optimization problem that leads to very large arbitrage free price good deal bounds
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in practice with financial derivatives. Similar to before, management switches pro-
duction on earlier and switches production off later compared to the expected case
operating strategy (Figure 3.12).
3.5 Conclusions
The goal of our paper is to develop a quantitative model for managing and pricing
regulatory risk. The accomplishments and overall theme of our paper are summarized
in what follows.
3.5.1 Summary
Our paper laid out several research goals to contribute to the existing real options
literature and the less developed body of research in policy uncertainty.
We presented a real option model to attempt to quantitatively model policy un-
certainty using a jump diffusion process. This model allows for the valuation of long
term energy projects in the presence of policy uncertainty. For a corn-ethanol case
study (following [79]), we presented a real option model involving both standard price
uncertainty modelled using a simplified one dimensional jump diffusion process for
the relevant price spread and stochastic subsidy. We followed this with a more so-
phisticated multivariate model which independently modeled both the input and the
output price. In addition, this model included the impact of policy uncertainty using
a randomly fluctuating subsidy level. This fluctuating subsidy was quantified using a
pure jump process. Given that there may be model uncertainty for the subsidy policy
process, our proposed model includes a “worst case” (modelled using a V aR level)
policy uncertainty scenario which allows the project investor to quantify and manage
his worst case regulatory downside risk. This work allowed us to draw some general
conclusions with policy level implications, as summarized and described in the next
section.
3.5.2 Policy Conclusions
We outline the policy effects and numerical conclusions from our analysis in Section
3.4.
Policy Uncertainty In the case of policy certainty versus uncertainty, for the
convex (or “long vol”) real options considered here, the effects of policy uncertainty
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always increase the value of the option when there is no directionality in the subsidy
jumps.
More generally, the effects of policy uncertainty may be positive or negative for
the project valuation. For example, if the subsidy is currently low and the future
subsidy level is expected to be higher, the possibility of a jump in policy increases
the overall value of the option. The opposite holds when the subsidy is high and the
future subsidy is expected to be lower than today.
Model Uncertainty Typically, the effect of ambiguity in policy uncertainty models
on project valuation is negative: A strongly risk averse manager taking a long position
in the option should price the project using the worst case of possible parameters.
The optimal operating strategy in terms of the sets of prices, times, and sub-
sidy levels to switch production vary based on the scenario. The strategy however
generally obeys the following rules: (1) If the scenario is a worst case (respectively
best case), then production is switched off earlier (later) compared to the constant
parameter expected case, and production is switched on later (earlier) compared to
the expected case. This represents an pessimistic (optimistic) outlook on regulatory
policy changes. (2) If the scenario is a constant parameter case with policy uncer-
tainty, then production is switched on earlier (later) if the current policy regime is
lower (higher) than the expected long run trend. Similarly production is switched off
later (earlier) if the current policy regime is lower (higher) than the expected long
run trend.
The anecdotal evidence that suggests businesses delay investment longer in peri-
ods of high policy uncertainty is seen to be consistent with our model, supporting
those claims [58, 72, 91]. In particular, given the tendency is generally to delay
during periods of policy uncertainty suggests that investors use pessimistic model
outlooks when making investment decisions. Given that fewer projects were net
present value positive in the model uncertainty case versus the policy uncertainty
with known parameters case, our model supports the claim that fewer investments
are entered into during periods of high policy uncertainty.
3.5.3 Possible Extensions
The lognormal distribution for the policy subsidy jump process was chosen for several
reasons: (1) subsidies cannot become negative; (2) model familiarity since geometric
Brownian motion itself leads to a lognormal distribution and Merton’s seminal jump
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Figure 3.13: The probability distribution functions dP (J) of the jumps J of
the expected case LogN(−0.69, 0.015), worst case LogN(−1.118, 0.015), best case
LogN(−0.309, 0.015), and a referece case LogN(−0.7, 0.1) highlight the skew.
diffusion paper [81]; (3) analytical tractability; and (4) its second moments exist. The
distribution however has large positive skew with a fat tail. This choice of distribution
can lead to results which are relatively indifferent toward downside risk in the subsidy
process, as the probability of observing very low subsidies is much smaller than the
probability of observing very high subsidies. For reference, plots of the expected,
worst and best case subsidy jump probability distribution functions are shown in
Figure 3.13 along with a reference case to better illustrate the positive skew and fat
tail.
To improve the model, more classes of jump distributions or non-constant Poisson
arrival rates could be considered for future work. Another possible improvement to
the expected subsidy jump model would be to incorporate management’s views on the
probability of possible policy outcomes or cases, each with an associated probability
determined by management (an idea motivated by [76] but here simplified). This is
both easier to justify to industry practitioners and greatly simplifies the analysis as
it effectively removes the continuous variable J and replaces it with a discrete vari-
able Ji. This reduces the dimensionality of the PID variational inequality system,
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which greatly reduces the computational time by reducing the problem to solving
discrete weighted probabilities for each outcome Ji. For completeness, the integro
operator would be replaced with I[V ] = λ(∑i ViPi − V ) and a PID variational in-
equality solved for each outcome i with associated value function Vi and management
probability estimate Pi. This method can be particularly helpful in situations where
little historical time series information is available regarding policy uncertainty. The
modeler can defer to management’s views and experience.
3.6 Appendix A: Numerical Method
A brief exposition of the numerical method used to solve this PID variational in-
equality system is presented below. We refer the reader to [64, 69, 73, 84] for a more
detailed analysis of the finite difference solutions to stochastic control problems and
PIDEs.
The general PID variational inequality is of the form
max
[
∂V
∂t
+ L[V ] + I[V ] + f − rV, h− V
]
= 0.
where the differential operator is (occasionally suppressing any l, c, z dependence of
µ, σ, a, b)
L[V ] = µ∂V
∂l
+ a
∂V
∂c
+
1
2
σ2
∂2V
∂l2
+ ρσb
∂2V
∂l∂c
+
1
2
b2
∂2V
∂c2
and the integro operator is
I[V ] = λ(E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z))
and the constraint is
h = Vu −Du
The numerical solution is obtained via finite differences at grid points V (li, cj, zp, tk) =
V ki,j,p usually using second order centred differences except possibly at the boundary
conditions. The stencils are chosen to ensure the discretization matrix retains the
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M -matrix property for stability [74]. The grid points are
tk = t0 + k∆t
li = l0 + i∆l
cj = c0 + j∆c
zp = z0 + p∆z
where the increments ∆ need not necessarily be uniform. Divided differences are used
to approximate the derivatives. Two are shown below for reference
∂V
∂l
≈ V
k
i+1,j,p − V ki−1,j,p
2∆l
∂V
∂t
≈ V
k+1
i,j,p − V ki,j,p
∆t
The integral E[V (l, c, J)] is simply truncated and approximated along a grid as well
E[V (l, c, J)] ≈
∫ Jmax
0
V (l, c, J)P (J)dJ ≈
P∑
p=0
V ki,j,pg(zp)∆z
where the expectation is truncated by a point Jmax = zP at which the error in the
approximation is small. Note any kind of quadrature rule can be used along with
non-uniform grid spacing besides the rule shown above.
A fitted scheme is used to write out a system of equations for V ki,j,p at the grid
points
V k+1 − V k
∆t
+ θLV k+1 + (1− θ)LV k + φIV k+1 + (1− φ)IV k + f ≤ 0
where L is the differentiation matrix associated with the partial differential operator
L including the source term −rV and I is the integration matrix associated with the
integro operator I. The parameters θ and φ blend averages of the discretized PIDE at
time steps k and k+ 1 (e.g. θ = 0 is fully implicit and θ = 1
2
yields a Crank-Nicholson
scheme). A small abuse of notation V k refers to the entire collection of grid points
i, j, p at time step k. The running profit function at all grid points is simply f . The
differentiation matrix L tends to be stiff whereas the integration matrix I tends to be
non-stiff allowing for the use of IMEX style time marching schemes.4 A fully implicit
scheme can be used in order to have a L-stable method. When the correlation ρ is
4We note that using a Crank-Nicholson scheme in both L and I appeared to deliver good results.
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small, centred differences may deliver a stable M -matrix. As ρ grows, however, care
must be taken to choose the stencils for the cross derivative term (e.g. 7-point stencils
[74]). For nonuniform grid points, one-sided differences may be required for the first
order derivatives to maintain stability [74].
For reference, L can be considered a tensor that operates on a square Vi,j at all p.
In tensor notation, at the interior points L is for example
Li,j,i,j = − 2
∆l2
1
2
σ2i,j −
2
∆c2
1
2
b2i,j − r
Li,j,i,j−1 = − 1
2∆c
ai,j +
1
∆c2
1
2
b2i,j
Li,j,i−1,j−1 =
1
4∆l∆c
ρσi,jbi,j
where Li,j,i+i∗,j+j∗ = 0 if |i∗|, |j∗| ≥ 2. Conditions must be applied along the boundary
(e.g. linearity at far field). The integration matrix I is applied to a column Vi,j,p across
all p at a point (i, j), like a matrix in p constant across all i, j. For example,
Ip,p = λ
[
1
2
g(zp)(zp+1 − zp)− 1
]
Ip,q = λ
1
2
g(zq)(zq+1 − zq−1).
using a trapezoidal quadrature rule.
The system is solved subject to a known final condition V (l, c, z, T ) = Q(l, c, z)
(being a backward Kolmogorov type equation). If there is no salvage value at the end
of the facility life V Ki,j,p = Qi,j,p = 0 (where T = t0 +K∆t) but in general the salvage
value should satisfy some inequalities around the switching costs Dij.
This is a complementary problem
MV k − b ≤ 0, h ≤ V k, (MV k − b)T (V k − h) = 0
where superscript T denotes the matrix transpose. The matrix M is an aggrega-
tion of the integration and differentiation matrix pre-multipliers of V k while b is
a vector of collected knowns at time k (from k + 1). This matrix system is then
solved using an value iteration fixed point method similar to projected successive
over-relaxation. Several iterative schemes for non-linear control problems are de-
scribed in [56, 65, 64, 69, 73, 84, 93]. The method is consistent following a Taylor
series and Riemann sum definition of the integral argument. If fully implicit methods
are used, the discretization is stable if M is itself an M -matrix as M -matrices have
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the monotone property. Following [64] this discretization converges to the viscosity
solution of the HJB PID variational inequality.
3.7 Appendix B: Optimal Control
The intuition behind the proofs of the theorems in Section 3.3 are presented in this
appendix.
Regarding the 1-dimensional Model Optimal Stochastic Con-
trol 3.3.1
Proof of Theorems 2 and 2. Consider the optimization with respect to λ
inf
λmin≤λ≤λmax
I[V ].
Due to the boundedness of λ, this problem is nonsingular. Since I[V ] = λ(E[V (y +
J)] − V (y)) is linear in λ, it achieves its critical values at the endpoints [λmin, λmax]
and the optimal λ satisfies
λ =
λmin if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) ≥ 0,λmax if E[V (y + J)]− V (y) < 0.
Turning now to the optimization with respect to α,
inf
αmin≤α≤αmax
λ(E[V (y + J)]− V (y))⇒ inf
α
E[V (y + J)]
where we drop the α bounds for notational brevity. The expectation can be written
as
inf
α
E[V (y + J)] = inf
α
∫ ∞
−∞
V (y + J)gN(J)dJ, gN is the normal kernel N(α, β
2)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
inf
α
{V (y + α + z)}g∗z(z)dz, g∗N is the kernel N(0, β2)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
V (y + αmin + z)g
∗
z(z)dz
if V (y) is monotone increasing in y which is true of the class of profit functions f(y)
considered in this analysis. (This result follows from the Feynman-Kac or Green’s
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formula for V (y) given f(y) is monotone increasing.)
A similar argument applies for deriving the maximal optimal control (Theorem 2)
but applied in the opposite direction.
Summarizing, the worst case project value is given by the minimal optimal control
and the best case is given by the maximal optimal control subject to certain regularity
conditions on V and f (namely monotonicity).
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that the integro operator I is single-signed almost every-
where if f is such that V (y) is convex and α = 0. The justification follows from
Jensen’s inequality V (E[y+ J ]) ≤ E[V (y+ J)] and that E[y+ J ] = y+α = y. Thus
E[V (y + J)]− V (E[y + J ]) =
E[V (y + J)]− V (y) = 1
λ
I[V ] ≥ 0
and accordingly λ = λmin for all y (and vice versa for the maximal control).
Regarding the Constant Coefficient Option Price 3.3.1
Proof of Theorem 4. For a function u(Yt = y, t), applying Itos lemma for jump diffu-
sions results in
u(YT , T )− u(y, t) =
∫ T
t
b
∂u
∂y
dWs +
∫ T
t
(
∂u
∂t
+ a
∂u
∂y
+
1
2
b2
∂2u
∂y2
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
[u(Ys + J, s)− u(Ys, s)]dNt.
Taking the expectation causes the Ito integral to become zero (since E[
∫ T
t
udWs|Ft] =
0 for smooth functions u). The expectation of the jump term becomes
E
[∫ T
t
[u(Ys + J, s)− u(Ys, s)]dNt
]
=
∫ T
t
EJ [u(Ys + J, s)− u(Ys, s)]λds
since the Poisson arrivals dNt and Brownian motion dWt are independent, and dNt =
1 with probability λds or 0 otherwise. Here EJ denotes an expectation with respect
to J only (recall J⊥Wt).
When u(·, T ) = 0, and the jumps J and Brownian motion are independent, the
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expectation is
E[u(YT , T )− u(y, t)] = −u(y, t) =
E
[∫ T
t
(
∂u
∂t
+ a
∂u
∂y
+
1
2
b2
∂2u
∂y2
+ λ(EJ [u(Ys + J, s)]− u(Ys, s))
)
ds
]
If u(y, t) satisfies the nonhomogeneous PIDE
∂u
∂t
+ a
∂u
∂y
+
1
2
b2
∂2u
∂y2
+ λ(EJ [u(y + J, t)]− u(y, t)) = −f(y),
the solution has the probabilistic (Feynman-Kac) representation
u(y, t) = E
[∫ T
t
f(Ys)ds
∣∣∣∣Yt = y]
The discounted value function V (Ys, s) = e
−r(s−t)u(Ys, s) satisfies the PIDE of
Theorem 4 and has probabilistic representation
V (y, t) = E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)f(Ys)ds
∣∣∣∣Yt = y] .
The key to solving this expectation is to condition Y on n, the number of jumps
so far, denoted Ys,n|n. Note that the probability of observing n Poisson jumps over a
time period s− t is P (n, s− t) = e−λ(s−t) λn(s−t)n
n!
. Thus
V = E
(
E
[∫ T
t
f(Ys,n)ds
∣∣∣∣n])
=
∞∑
n=0
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)y+s,n
1√
2piB2s,n
e
− (ys,n−As,n)
2
2B2s,n dsdys,n
where As,n = y + a(s− t) + nα and B2s,n = b2(s− t) + nβ2.
V =
∞∑
n=0
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)(As,n +Bs,nz)+
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dsdz
=
∞∑
n=0
∫ T
t
∫ ∞
−d
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)(As,n +Bs,nz)
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dzds
where d = As,n/Bs,n. Changing variables x = −z and flipping the limits of integration
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yields V =
∞∑
n=0
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)
(∫ d
−∞
As,n
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx−
∫ d
−∞
Bs,nx
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx
)
ds
and so
V (y, t) =
∞∑
n=0
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)
λn(s− t)n
n!
e−r(s−t)
(
As,nΦ(d) +
Bs,n√
2pi
e−
d2
2
)
ds
where Φ(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Regarding the Complete Stochastic Control Problem 3.3.2
Proof of Theorems 5 and 6. The argument for obtaining the optimal λ is identical to
the 1-dimensional case. Determining the optimal α is similar to the previous case,
but slightly more delicate. Again, it rests on the monotonicity of f . Recall
f1(l, c, z) = κ(l + z −K1)− c, f0(l, c, z) = −κK0
and thus f1 is monotone increasing in z and f0 is unaffected by z. By the Feynman-
Kac representation for V1 in Equation 3.34, V1 is monotone increasing in z. Similarly
V0, via the free boundary condition V0 = V1 − D01 in Equation 3.35, is monotone
increasing in z by virtue of the boundary condition and regularity results along the
free boundary [84, 85]. Now it remains to show that the expectation has a minimum
inf
α
E[V (l, c, J)] = inf
α
∫ ∞
0
V (l, c, J)gLN(J)dJ, gLN is the lognormal kernel LogN(α, β
2)
=
∫ ∞
0
inf
α
{V (l, c, xeα)}g∗LN(x)dx, gLN is the kernel LogN(0, β2)
=
∫ ∞
0
V (l, c, xeαmin)g∗LN(x)dx
Summarizing, the PID variational inequality yields the worst case project value
(minimal optimal control) when
α = αmin, λ =
λmin if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) ≥ 0,λmax if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) < 0
and following a similar argument as above yields the best case value (maximal optimal
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control) when
α = αmax, λ =
λmax if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) ≥ 0,λmin if E[V (l, c, J)]− V (l, c, z) < 0
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Chapter 4
Optimal Hedging in Illiquid
Markets
Chapter Summary:
In a complete market with zero market frictions, classical finance theory states
that there is a unique no arbitrage price for every derivative contract. However,
all markets are incomplete to some degree, if only because transaction costs and
market impact costs apply for all trades. We propose a model of market impact
and transaction costs to reflect order book liquidity. Using this model, we illus-
trate how liquidity impacts derivative value when hedging with the asset under
the proposed market frictions. We develop a mathematical formulation to com-
pute bid and ask prices along with optimal hedging strategies for market makers
in OTC derivative markets using a utility indifference framework. By numeri-
cally solving the associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equations, we develop some
market intuition from the resulting prices and hedge ratios.
Working Paper: Christian Maxwell and Matt Davison, Optimal Hedging in Illiquid
Markets, 2014.
4.1 Introduction
In a complete market with model certainty, a complete set of spanning assets, and
zero market frictions, classical finance theory states that there is a unique no arbitrage
price for every derivative contract [107]. In reality, nearly all markets are incomplete
to some extent. This is not necessarily a negative characteristic of financial markets:
Market incompleteness makes the world go ’round. If all risks were known and hedge-
able, there would be little incentive to do any trading at all since market makers could
101
not justify charging spreads, nor could buy side investors hope to make any profit
from instruments they deem mispriced. For an insightful treatment and overview of
market incompleteness, see [124].
A market maker in an incomplete over the counter (OTC) market seeks to es-
tablish reasonable bid and ask prices for derivative securities f based on a mar-
keted asset St. In a Black-Scholes complete market setting, there is a unique price
which is the discounted expected future payoff under a martingale measure Q, pBS =
EQ[e
−r(T−t)f(ST )]. With market incompleteness there exists a range of possible equiv-
alent martingale measures Q, and one candidate set of bid and ask prices are the
no-arbitrage bounds(
inf
Q∈Q
EQ[e
−r(T−t)f(ST )], sup
Q∈Q
EQ[e
−r(T−t)f(ST )]
)
(4.1)
inside of which no arbitrage is guaranteed. These bounds are generally too large to
act as useful bid-ask prices as observed in our earlier work [117], and noted by many
authors, e.g. [124].
Another alternative is quadratic or variance hedging where the market maker seeks
to minimize his expected hedging error. Strategies can be local such as described in
[94] or global where all strategies over a time interval are considered and an efficient
frontier of execution prices is developed as outlined in [121].
Another promising strategy, and the one considered in this paper, is to embed
the pricing and hedging problem within a portfolio optimization problem. We seek a
global strategy where the market maker tries to optimize the utility of his terminal
wealth with and without the derivative security, otherwise known as utility indiffer-
ence pricing [98, 101, 109]. He may hedge with several underlying assets in the utility
maximization. The utility ask price is the amount of cash the market maker would
need to accept at the outset to make him indifferent between his optimal terminal
wealth short the option and without the option, or the amount a trader may be willing
to pay to buy the derivative; and vice versa for the bid price. If his optimal terminal
utility value function is U , then with an initial endowment Bt the utility indifference
ask price pa is
E[U(BT )] = E[U(BT − f(ST ) + paer(T−t))].
The utility indifference bid and ask prices form a possible set of bid-ask prices for the
derivative security
(pb, pa).
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We prefer the utility indifference framework as it has a sound economic interpretation
as a personal replacement price at which the agent is indifferent between his feasible
alternative investments. We are aware that the “personal” nature of these prices, the
need to consider holistic portfolios (including initial endowment), and the specifica-
tions of a utility function and statistical probability measure to value any projects
have all been identified as possible shortcomings with this approach [99].
We consider the problem of hedging and pricing derivatives in incomplete markets
caused by market frictions or transaction costs. In a case where a market maker is
hedging a large option position, it is possible his hedging strategy may consume deep
into the order book and incur large bid ask spreads. If there is market illiquidity,
there may not only be a temporary price impact incurred from market orders going
deep into the order book, but a permanent price impact as well. This creates a
sort of feedback effect from hedging which almost always moves the value of the
underlying in a direction unfavourable to the derivative holder (as will be shown
later). Additionally, there is almost always some fixed cost associated with executing
any trade (including at the very least, the value of the trader’s time spent considering
and executing the trade decision). This is the case for all market making: The trader
must consider the trade-off between execution risk and market risk when deciding at
what rate to hedge his position or manage his inventory. Shares are traded by means
of an order book. Market makers post volumes of shares they are willing to sell (ask)
or buy (bid). When, say, a portfolio manager sends a market order to buy, he will
be transferred shares at the best ask price. If his order amount is sufficiently large, it
may exhaust all the shares available at the best ask price. His order is then cleared
at the second best ask price (which will be slightly more expensive) and so on as his
order “walks through the book.” It is also possible to trade more “slowly” at smaller
amounts via limit orders. A limit buy order placed at X dollars will only execute if
the best bid price is less than or equal to X. It is possible that this trade may not be
executed if the bid never reaches X, or if not enough volume is available at X, then
the order may only be partially filled. This is the trade-off between execution and
market risk. (An example order book is shown in Figure 4.1.)
Some early work on transaction cost modeling can be found in [113, 126]. These are
locally optimal models which consider proportional transaction costs (i.e. modeling
the bid-ask spread). The globally optimal utility indifference hedge in the presence
of proportional transaction costs was first introduced by [109] and then improved by
[101]. Our transaction cost model considers market impact from large trades and is
similar to the models presented in [95, 101, 104, 108, 116], which consist mostly of
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Volume Bid Ask Volume
100 14.99 15.01 150
200 14.98 15.02 250
350 14.97 15.03 400
500 14.96 15.04 600
Figure 4.1: A typical limit order book with bid-ask spreadss and a mid-price of
$15.00. At each price level there is a volume of shares available. This amount is not
cumulative (e.g. up to an ask price level of $15.02, there are 400 shares available for
sale).
portfolio optimization and optimal liquidation applications. We have translated these
models into the utility indifference pricing setting.
We will present a very general framework to model the depth, spread and liquidity
of the order book using simple functions meant to capture the temporary and per-
manent price impacts based on the intensity of trading, along with possibly a fixed
cost associated with each trade. The first contribution to the literature of this pa-
per is to present a general framework that can be easily adapted to various market
impact and transaction cost models which can transition between continuous trad-
ing rate controls and impulse control market orders. Our remaining contributions
are to incorporate this framework into the utility indifference hedging and pricing
approach and to present a numerical finite difference scheme to solve the associated
equations. We note our framework is sufficiently general that it can be applied not
only to hedging OTC derivatives but more daily aspects of market making such as
inventory management or inventory quantile risk for example.
The problem was originally motivated by market makers seeking to price Asian
style options in the presence of transaction costs, market impact or illiquidity. Asian
options are typically sold OTC and accordingly useful bid-ask prices need to be estab-
lished, and may be preferred in illiquid markets since average prices are more stable
than market prices. Another possible situation is if the market impact is introduced
by the hedger making large trades in an already relatively liquid market such as an
accelerated share repurchase agreement. In these Asian style equity derivatives, the
hedger may have to trade over short time horizons (days to weeks) and buy a signifi-
cant amount of shares relative to the number of shares outstanding (market impact)
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[111].
We discovered however that even simple European options in the presence of
market impact yield a sufficiently rich example against which to study our model.
This is the primary example of our paper which is outlined as follows: Section 4.2
presents our model of market impact and utility indifference pricing; Section 4.3
presents the utility indifference pricing equations for a simple European call option;
Section 4.4 contains our numerical investigation where the results which include some
very interesting intuition are also discussed; and finally in Section 4.5 we discuss other
possible applications of this model and extensions.
The Asian option application is discussed in Appendix A (4.6) along with our
numerical scheme in Appendix B (4.7).
4.2 The Model
This section begins with an exposition of the market impact model for the trader
with a large position in the underlying. The trader’s utility objective is introduced
and then we consider the utility indifference pricing problem. Following a dynamic
programming argument, the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) partial differential quasi
variational inequality (PDQVI) is derived.
4.2.1 Market Impact Model with Transaction Costs
We present a model of the market where the agent’s hedging decisions have an impact
on the market. The model aims to capture the effects of the trading rate x˙t on the
stock price St. There is no non-trivial hedging strategy for option pricing even with
much simpler transaction costs [123].
We aim to present a model that can transition smoothly from a continuous to a
discrete trading framework. While continuous trading is only an approximation to
reality, as trades are generally performed discretely, the continuous trading model
has the advantage of being able to straightforwardly map intuitive feedback laws into
the price impact. If any sort of fixed cost is incurred per trade, continuous trading
becomes obsolete, since at each instantaneous trade, a nonproportional fixed cost is
incurred. These accrued fixed costs become unbounded.
The derivative contract is hedged by holding a portfolio of the underlying shares.
The total number of shares held at time t is Xt and the trading rate may be denoted
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as dXt = x˙tdt, so
XT = X0 +
∫ t
0
x˙tdt. (4.2)
By definition, X0− = 0 (i.e. we begin with zero shares) and Xt ∈ R (i.e. the trader
can take long or short positions in the share).
The stock price is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with
drift that is affected by the trading rate
dSt = (µ+ g(x˙t))Stdt+ σStdWt (4.3)
where dWt is an increment of a standard Brownian motion satisfying the usual con-
ditions on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft, P ) [119]. (Of course, every traders’
actions have an effect on the stock price, which is another contributor to the apparent
randomness observed in market prices.) In the literature, g is the permanent price
impact function [95] which should be chosen so as to not admit round trip quasi-
arbitrage [104, 106, 110]. Thus in what follows we choose g to be symmetric such
that ∮ T
0
g(x˙t)dt = 0, if XT = X0
for any closed loop (i.e. round-trip trade). The presence of multiple agents in the
market place all seeking profit precludes the prospect of round trip quasi-arbitrage.
An intuitive form satisfying this condition is
g(x˙t) = γx˙t. (4.4)
Another advantage of this form is that it can also model discrete trading with the
choice x˙t = λδ(t) where δ is the Dirac delta function and λ = Xt − Xt− is the net
change in position. At these discrete trade times, a change in the price occurs of
St = St−eγλ. (4.5)
We note briefly that manipulating prices favourably is not possible. Round trip arbi-
trage trades are not profitable since the money earned pushing the price favourably
will generally be lost while attempting to take profits closing out the position. Fur-
ther if other market players became aware of a single player taking on a large enough
position to attempt the manipulate prices, they would trade against the player with
the large position. In this way, favourable manipulation is also generally not possible
for option positions. After writing a put option, it may appear desirable to run up
106
the share price so the put becomes worthless by purchasing a large position. This
one-side view overlooks that the put holder may attempt the opposite trade and that
other players in the market would trade against a player attempting to take on such
a large position.
While trading, a temporary price impact of h(x˙t) is experienced by the stock price.
This price impact reflects the bid-ask spread on the exchange order book. We assume
a form that is symmetric1 and simple
h(x˙t) = (1 + η tanh(kx˙t)) (4.6)
rather than the more traditional power forms (e.g. h(x˙t) = sgn(x˙)|x˙|k) as suggested
in [96]. Here k > 0 is a constant that reflects the rate at which continuous trading
approaches the market order bid-ask spread or in other words, the depth of the order
book. Small trading rates do not consume deep into (walk through) the order book
and can be interpreted as slower limit orders executed nearer the mid price. As the
trade rate become instantaneous and discrete, the temporary price impact function
approaches the standard proportional trading cost form as in [101]
lim
x˙t→±∞
h(x˙t) = (1 + η sgn(x˙t))
which is not the case with power forms which become unbounded. (We drop the k
above since k > 0.)
Slower trading rates minimize the temporary market impact, but leave the agent
exposed to more market risk. Faster trading rates quickly walk through the order
book, and therefore incur a higher spread (i.e. execution/liquidity risk), but reduce
the market risk. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 .
The trader hedging the option position also holds cash in a risk-free bank account
Bt earning a constant interest rate r such that
dBt = rBtdt− x˙tSth(x˙t)dt. (4.7)
1The assumption of symmetry simplifies the problem although it may not be reflective of reality.
For some market players it is easier to buy, and for others to sell. Thus the form h could depend
explicitly on the sign of x˙t, e.g. h(x˙t) = (1 + ξ(x˙t)) where ξ(x) = η+1x≥0−η−1x<0. The parameters
(η+, η−) could then be chosen to reflect the relative ease/difficulty of buying relative to selling.
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Volume Bid Ask Volume
100 14.99 15.01 0
200 14.98 15.02 200
350 14.97 15.03 400
500 14.96 15.04 600
Figure 4.2: The order book of Figure 4.1 after a market order to buy 200 shares. The
order has walked into the second layer of ask prices. A limit order with a smaller lot
could be placed nearer to the mid-price but would take time to fill. Limit orders rely
on the volatility of bid-ask prices in a sideway market to execute and may suffer from
execution risk in a trending market.
4.2.2 The Trader’s Utility Objective
The trader is aiming to maximize the utility of his terminal wealth at the end of
the time horizon T . In the classical Merton portfolio optimization problem [118], the
agent invests a proportion y of his total wealth in the stock St and the remainder
1− y in a risk free account Bt. His wealth process Rt evolves according to the SDE
dRt = yRt
dSt
St
+ (1− y)RtdBt
Bt
.
If the stock is a GBM with zero permanent or temporary price impact, using the
SDEs above for dSt and dBt, the wealth process is simply
dRt = (yµ+ (1− y)r)Rtdt+ yσRtdWt.
The wealth process is self-financing and the trader chooses a portfolio strategy to
optimize his terminal utility of wealth. The value function v is
v(R, t) = sup
y
E[U(RT )|Ft]
where Rt = R. By the dynamic programming principle and Ito’s lemma, the value
function satisfies the HJB equation
∂tv + sup
y
[
(yµ+ (1− y)r)R∂Rv + y2σ2R2∂RRv
]
= 0.
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Returning to our trader hedging an option in the presence of market impact, he
may choose to hold an option position that pays f(ST ) at expiry. His terminal wealth
with n units of the option position is given by Rn,T
Rn,T = BT + c(XT , ST , nf(ST )) (4.8)
where c(X,S, nf(S)) is the cost to liquidate the X shares of stock S net of receiving
his payout nf(S) from holding the options. (The number of contracts n can be in R
or restricted to market contract conventions.) For example, if he holds long one call
struck at K which expires in the money, his net liquidation position consists of X+ 1
shares with BT −K cash.2 His portfolio optimization problem in the absence of an
option position is simply
R0,T = BT + c(XT , ST , 0). (4.9)
Note if µ > r, it may be desirable to invest in the stock regardless of whether or not
the trader holds an option position.
It is important that if the trader’s net stock position at expiry is zero, there should
be no liquidation costs, i.e.
c(XT = 0, ST , 0) = 0 (4.10)
when no contracts are held; and
c(XT = X
∗, ST , nf(ST )) = 0 (4.11)
where X∗ is our stock position after fulfilling our obligations under the option con-
tract. For example X∗ = n if we hold n put options which expire in the money and we
are fully hedged. This condition ensures our pricing rule stands on solid foundations
as will be shown later.
The trader chooses a utility function U(·) satisfying the Inada conditions. (The
most important of which for us are that U is smooth, concave, and strictly increasing.)
He then considers the Merton style portfolio optimization problem with and without
the option position. Call v the value function from the portfolio optimization problem.
Then
vn(Bt, Xt, St, t) = vn(B,X, S, t) = sup
x˙t
E[U(Rn,T )|Ft] (4.12)
is the portfolio optimization where the trader holds n options with initial endowment
Bt = B, position Xt = X, and share price St = S. Similarly his portfolio problem in
2If he is hedged perfectly (no market frictions) then XT = −1 and BT −K = 0.
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the absence of an option position is
v0(B,X, S, t) = sup
x˙t
E[U(R0,T )|Ft]. (4.13)
The indifference price for the trader is the initial cash amount where he is indif-
ferent between entering the option position and simply optimizing his portfolio as is3
and has been proposed as early as [109] for models with trading costs and again in
[101]. See [98] for an excellent reference on indifference pricing.
The utility indifference bid price pbn (i.e. the price a trader would be willing to
pay) for n options is given by
vn(B − pbn, 0, S, t) = v0(B, 0, S, t) (4.14)
where the trader initially holds zero shares. Similarly the indifference ask price pan is
given by
v−n(B + pan, 0, S, t) = v0(B, 0, S, t). (4.15)
It can be inferred from the above that pbn = −pa−n.
The pricing pair [pbn, p
a
n] form a good deal bound for the trader and accordingly
induces a risk measure for pricing [112, 124]. Further, if psup and psub represent the
super and sub-hedging prices respectively (the no arbitrage bounds of Equation 4.1),
then
psub ≤ pbn ≤ pan ≤ psup (4.16)
with equivalence when markets are complete [98, 124].
Convergence to the Risk Neutral Price
The condition that there be no liquidation costs when our net stock position is zero
ensures that the utility indifference price reduces to the risk neutral price in the
absence of trading frictions. Following [101], suppose there is a replicating portfolio
x˙BS (the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing guarantees this under certain mild
conditions [107]) that results in XBS,T = −X∗ and BBS,T = −K where X∗ is our stock
position after fulfilling our obligations under the contract (i.e. the Black-Scholes ∆)
and K is the cash we obtain on termination. For example, K = K∗1{K∗>S} for the
case of a call option struck at K∗. Here 1{A} denotes the indicator variable that
3There is no need for the investment horizon to terminate at T coinciding with the option expiry.
Nor is the trader restricted to only trading in the underlying security of the derivative. These two
assumptions, however, greatly simplify the problem.
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event A has occurred. Suppose −pBS is the minimum endowment required to obtain
the replicating strategy given Xt = 0, and accordingly pBS is the Black-Scholes (risk
neutral) price. Suppose further that an arbitrary trading strategy x˙ is linear and can
be decomposed as x˙ = x˙BS + x˙q, attainable given B = −pBS + Bq and X = 0. Then
without loss of generality consider the case of holding one option
v1(Bq − pBS, 0, S, t) = sup
x˙
E[U(R1,T )]
= sup
x˙
E[U(BT + c(XT , ST , f(ST )))]
= sup
x˙q
E[U(Bq,T +BBS,T + c(Xq,T +XBS,T , ST , f(ST )))]
= sup
x˙q
E[U(Bq,T −K1{ST>K} + c(Xq,T +X∗, ST , f(ST )))]
= sup
x˙q
E[U(Bq,T + c(Xq,T , ST , 0))]
= v0(Bq, 0, S, t) (4.17)
which coincides with our definition of the utility bid price pbn = pBS. By multiplying
the relevant coefficients by −1, we could follow the same logic used above to show
that pan = pBS.
4.2.3 The HJB Equation
Following the definition of the value functions vn and v0, we use a dynamic program-
ming argument to derive the HJB PDQVIs for the portfolio optimization problem
associated with the indifference price. Since the partial differential equations for
both problems are equivalent except for the terminal conditions, in a slight abuse of
notation we use v to describe both variants.
Theorem 7. By the dynamic programming principle, the HJB equation for the port-
folio optimization problem is given by
∂tv + sup
x˙t∈A
{∂Bv (rB − x˙tSh(x˙t)) + x˙t∂Xv + g(x˙t)S∂Sv}+ L[v] = 0 (4.18)
where L = µS∂S + 12σ2S2∂SS and A is the set of non-anticipating (Markovian) ad-
missible controls.
The final form of the governing HJB equation rests largely on the specifications
of the market impact model and whether or not there are fixed costs for trading. We
derive the HJB equation for several special cases of the model presented in Section
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4.2.
Fixed short term price impact If the short term price impact function h(x˙) is
fixed at
h(x˙) = (1 + η sgn(x˙)) (4.19)
then the HJB equation becomes an HJB PDQVI in the limit that the set of admissible
controls becomes unbounded A→ [−∞,∞] [122].
If x˙min ≤ x˙ ≤ x˙max, then following similar arguments as in [101] the HJB equation
becomes
∂tv + sup
x˙min≤x˙t≤x˙max
x˙t {−S(1 + η sgn(x˙t))∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv}+ rB∂Bv + L[v] = 0.
(4.20)
Theorem 8. The optimal control is given by considering the following three cases:
• −S(1 + η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv ≥ 0 and −S(1− η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv > 0, then
the agent buys at x˙t = x˙max;
• −S(1 + η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv < 0 and −S(1− η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv ≤ 0, then
the agent sells at x˙t = x˙min; and
• −S(1 + η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv ≤ 0 and −S(1− η)∂Bv+ ∂Xv+ γS∂Sv ≥ 0, then
the agent does nothing and x˙t = 0.
Note that the 4th permutation of inequalities:
• −S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv > 0 and −S(1− η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv < 0
implies 2η∂Bv < 0 which is not possible as v is increasing in B (∂Bv ≥ 0) and η is
nonnegative.
Note that the block of terms maximized in Equation 4.20 can be grouped as H
(intuitively “H” for “HJB”)
H[v] = x˙t [−S(1 + η sgn(x˙t))∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv]
which gives the change in portfolio value arising from continuously trading shares at
rate x˙t. Then the first case corresponds to a situation where the incremental value
of the portfolio is increased by buying more shares. This incremental increase is
maximized by buying at the maximum rate x˙maxdt. The increase in value by adding
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to our share position ∂Xv overcomes the cost of purchasing shares in addition to
paying the ask spread −S(1 + η)∂Bv along with any permanent price impact effects
γS∂Sv. In the second case, selling at the bid price increases the value of the portfolio
−S(1 − η)∂Bv and overcomes any loss in value by lowering our share position ∂Xv
and driving down the stock price γS∂Sv. The third case is a situation where either
buying or selling decreases the overall portfolio value so it is optimal to do neither
(i.e. x˙t = 0).
There is another possible case where
∂Bv = ∂Xv = ∂Sv = 0.
In this situation any possible control x˙t can satisfy the conditions above for optimality
and therefore the optimal control becomes nonunique. By choosing any control at
that instant, the state space is pushed into a new region where a unique optimal
control is defined. The nonuniqueness can be removed by noting a financially intuitive
condition: If no net benefit occurs from trading, it is not worth the trader’s time and
effort to make a trade (i.e. x˙t = 0).
In the case that the trader can make impulse trades (i.e. x˙ → ±∞), then the
above equations reduce to an HJB PDQVI. See [120] for a helpful reference on impulse
control problems.
Theorem 9. The optimal trading policy follows from the HJB PDQVI
max
{
−S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy
, ∂tv + rB∂Bv + L[v]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wait
,
− (−S(1− η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sell
}
= 0 (4.21)
As before, there are three regions of space (B, S,X): One region where it is
optimal to buy shares via an impulse trade to push the state space vector onto the
border of the wait region; a second region where it is optimal to sell via an impulse
trade back to the border of the wait region; the wait region where the agent does not
need to rebalance his portfolio at all (until the diffusion vector (B, S,X) exits the
wait region) [101].
Following [101], if the solution at the wait boundary is known v∗(Bw, Sw, Xw, t),
the function in the buy or sell regions can be determined. At a point (B, S,X) outside
of the wait region (for example the buy region), the HJB PDQVI is governed by a
113
X
S
(X,S)
(Xw, Sw)
λ
buy
wait
Figure 4.3: In the buy region, we execute a trade of λ to bring us back to the border
of the wait region.
first-order PDE x˙t(−S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv). Taking the total derivative
dv
dt
=
dB
dt
∂Bv +
dx
dt
∂Xv +
dS
dt
∂Sv = 0
and solving yields
v(B − λSeγλ(1 + η), Seγλ, X + λ, t) = v∗(Bw, Sw, Xw, t) (4.22)
where x˙t = λδ(t) and λ = Xw−X. That is, an impulse trade of λ is made at time t. In
other words, at any (B, S,X) there is a characteristic impulse jump to (Bw, Sw, Xw),
or (B, S,X)
λ−→ (Bw, Sw, Xw). The intuition here is that, within the buy/sell region,
the solution v derives directly from the solution v∗ along the boundary of the wait
region at some characteristic point.4 This is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Continuous short term price impact If the short term price impact h is the
continuous function previously described in Section 4.2, then the control problem is
∂tv + sup
x˙t∈A
x˙t {−S(1 + η tanh(kx˙t))∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv}+ rB∂Bv +L[v] = 0. (4.23)
Theorem 10. If the set of admissible controls is unbounded, then the optimal control
4If the boundary surface can be written as a function Xw = f(Bw, Sw), then along with λ, any
point in space (B,S,X) can be spanned along these characteristic impulses.
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is as follows:
max
{
−S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy
, ∂tv +H[v] + rB∂Bv + L[v]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wait
,
− (−S(1− η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sell
}
= 0. (4.24)
The operator H is defined as
H[v] = x˙ {−S(1 + η tanh(kx˙))∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv} (4.25)
where x˙ is given by
H′[v] = 0 (4.26)
where H′ denotes differentiation with respect to x˙.
Remark 4.2.1. The optimal trade rate while in the continuous trading region is
satisfies the equation
H′[v] = 0
tanh(kx˙) + x˙ tanh(kx˙)′ =
∂Xv + γS∂Sv − S∂Bv
Sη∂Bv
and has a solution which is satisfied within the continuous trading region . Although
max
x˙
tanh(kx˙) + x˙ tanh(kx˙)′ = A ≈ 1.2 > 1
min
x˙
tanh(kx˙) + x˙ tanh(kx˙)′ = −A ≈ −1.2,−1
(which occurs where x˙ > 0 and x˙ < 0 respectively) is bounded, within the continuous
trading region −S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv ≤ 0 we have
∂Xv + γS∂Sv − S∂Bv
Sη∂Bv
≤ 1.
∂Xv + γS∂Sv − S∂Bv
Sη∂Bv
≥ −1.
Thus, there exists a solution x˙.
Moreover, there may exist two solutions to the problem of Equations 4.24–4.26,
particularly approaching the impulse region ∂Xv+γS∂Sv−S∂Bv
Sη∂Bv
→ 1. The optimal x˙ then
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follows from the second derivative condition
H′′ = −2 tanh(kx˙)′ − x˙ tanh(kx˙)′′ < 0.
Remark 4.2.2. It is interesting that the sign of second derivative is independent of
η. This is because the group H is almost linear in x except for one term
H[v] = −ηx˙ tanh(kx˙) + x˙ {−S∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv} .
Thus in the above all the curvature derives from the first term only. The η factors
out when considering the optimal trading rate for the points where multiple solutions
exist to the first derivative condition H′[v] = 0.
Furthermore, there exists a point at which it is no longer most economical to trade
continuously but rather to make impulse trades. Consider for example a point in the
buy region where it is not optimal to make an impulse trade 0 < x˙ < ∞. By the
inequalities above, there is an  = tanh(kx˙)
−S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv < 0
−S(1 + η)∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv ≥ 0 = 1
x˙
H[v]
where x˙ optimizes H. (A similar argument holds where −∞ < x˙ < 0.) After removing
the constant terms −S∂Bv + ∂Xv + γS∂Sv, scaling out the factor η∂Bv considered
along with the second derivative condition, we see that the point at which it becomes
optimal to impulse trade is dependent on k (the rate at which we consume into the
order book—i.e. depth) rather than η (the spread in the order book).
Where there are fixed costs associated with each trade If there is a fixed
cost D > 0 associated with each infinitesimal trade, then it is no longer optimal
to trade continuously. The trader must make impulse trades leading to a PDQVI.
Accordingly, the number of shares held becomes a jump process affected by an impulse
control strategy. Following [116], the trader must choose an optimal sequence of
impulse controls x˙ = (τn, λn) where τn is an increasing sequence of stopping (trading)
times and λn are the amount of shares to be bought or sold at each time. The set
of admissible controls is non-anticipating (Markovian), Fτn-measurable and is such
that the value function is bounded from below (e.g. finite number of trades, position
limits, etc.).
This control sequence can be interpreted as x˙t =
∑
n λnδ(t− τn), thus the state
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variable Xt becomes
Xt = Xτn , τn ≤ t < τn+1 (4.27)
Xt = Xτn + λn+1, t = τn+1. (4.28)
Specifically, dXt = 0 except at times t = τn.
As stated in Section 4.2, the permanent price impact after a trade occurs at t = τn
is
Sτn = Sτn−e
γλn
and evolves by the regular GBM SDE dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt otherwise, so
St = S0e
(µ− 1
2
σ2)t+γ
∑
n λn+σWt . (4.29)
The cash holdings evolve by the process
dBt = rBtdt, τn ≤ t < τn+1 (4.30)
Bt = Bt− − λn+1Steγλn+1(1 + η sgn(λn+1))−D, t = τn+1. (4.31)
The value function vn is as defined before
vn(B,X, S, t) = sup
x˙
E[U(Rn,T )|Ft].
Following a dynamic programming argument as in [116],
vn(B,X, S, t) = sup
τ,λ
E[vn(Bτ , Xτ , Sτ , τ)|Ft] (4.32)
which leads to a HJB PDQVI.
Theorem 11. The value function v and optimal control satisfy
max
∂tv + rB∂Bv + L[v]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wait
, H[v]− v︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade
 = 0 (4.33)
where
H[v] = sup
λ
v(B − λSeγλ(1 + η sgn(λ))−D,X + λ, Seγλ, t). (4.34)
As in the earlier model iterations (Theorems 8–10), there are three regions: A
trade region where it is optimal to buy (λ > 0); a second trade region where it is
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optimal to sell (λ < 0); and a final “wait” region where it is optimal to make no trades
at all (λ = 0) and the PDE evolves under the uncontrolled diffusion dSt. Intuitively,
the singular control problem described earlier is a special case of the impulse control
problem in that the limit as D → 0, Equation 4.33 reduces to 4.21.
The trade (buy/sell) and no-trade/wait regions are given by the sets
trade = {(B, S,X, t) : v(B, S,X, t) = H[v(B, S,X, t)]} (4.35)
wait = {(B, S,X, t) : v(B, S,X, t) > H[v(B, S,X, t)]}. (4.36)
In [116], it is shown that the control set is non-empty along with the wait region.
Uniqueness and continuity of the solution are also verified. Given the presence of
the permanent price impact, it is possible that net wealth can increase after exe-
cuting some transactions, however the solution is still shown to be bounded [116].
Boundedness of our solution follows from the imposition of position limits on the
trader.
4.2.4 Under Exponential Utility
Assume the trader has an exponential utility with risk aversion parameter β
U(R) = 1− e−βR. (4.37)
The parameter β is called the risk aversion because as β grows, the downside risk
is weighted much more heavily than the upside gains, hence more aversion to any
residual risk. As β → 0+, the agent tends to weight downside losses and upside gains
equally as U(R) ∼ βR. With the choice of exponential utility, the value function is
vn(B,X, S, t) = 1− inf
x˙
E
[
eβBT−βc(XT ,ST ,nf(ST ))
∣∣Ft] . (4.38)
Since BT has the integral form
BT = Be
r(T−t) −
∫ T
t
er(T−s)x˙sSsh(x˙s)ds, (4.39)
following a similar argument to [101] the value function can be rewritten as
vn(B,X, S, t) = 1− e−βBer(T−t)Gn(X,S, t) (4.40)
where Gn is convex decreasing in (X,S).
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The indifference bid and ask prices for n units of the option are given by the
nonlinear pricing rule
pbn = −
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
Gn(0, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
(4.41)
pan =
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
G−n(0, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
. (4.42)
Note that these prices are independent of initial wealth B.
The HJB equation for v becomes
∂tG+ inf
x˙t∈A
{
βer(T−t)x˙tSh(x˙t)G+ x˙t∂XG+ g(x˙t)S∂SG
}
+ L[G] = 0. (4.43)
This choice of utility has the advantage of reducing the dimensionality of the HJB
equation by one (removing ∂B). In fact, the initial wealth B factors out entirely
thereby eliminating the pricing dependence on initial cash. Depending on the agent’s
opinion, this may be a more attractive feature. Further, by using the impulse control
with fixed trading costs, the differential dimensionality is reduced yet again (effec-
tively removing ∂X from the differential equation yielding a relatively stable parabolic
PDE rather than a numerically more dangerous hyperbolic PDE).
4.2.5 The Simplified Deterministic Problem
To build some intuition around when trade decisions are made, we will take a slight
departure to consider the deterministic optimal control equivalent to the model above.
We consider the case of optimizing terminal wealth utility in the absence of holding
any derivative contracts. The stock price is assumed to follow an ordinary differential
equation
dSt
dt
= (µ+ γx˙t)St (4.44)
and so ST = Ste
µ(T−t)+γ ∫ Tt x˙sds.
We observe some facts about the deterministic control problem: If there is no
uncertainty, all our future decisions are known with certainty today. There is no value
in waiting or deferring decisions. The fixed trading cost D precludes any intermediate
trading between today and the end horizon. It would be suboptimal to accrue any
extra trading costs D since we know what the price and portfolio outcomes will be
at T . If we do in fact trade today (time t), our known gains must overcome any
liquidation costs at terminal time T .
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Under exponential utility as before, the optimal control is
v(B,X, S, t) = sup
x˙
1− exp [−β(BT + c(XT , ST ))] .
By the assumptions above, the solution is
v(B,X, S, t) =1− exp
[−β(Ber(T−t) + c(−X,ST ))] = no trade, if it is optimal not to trade
1− exp [−β(Ber(T−t) + c(−(X + λ), ST )) + c(λ, S)er(T−t)] = trade, otherwise
(4.45)
where λ maximizes the value of trading. At time t, the value function and associated
strategy is
v(B,X, S, t) = max(trade, no trade).
If it optimal to trade, then
1− exp [−β(Ber(T−t) + c(−X,ST ))] <
1− exp [−β(Ber(T−t) + c(−(X + λ), ST )) + c(λ, S)er(T−t)]
c(−X,ST ) < c(−(X + λ), ST )) + c(λ, S)er(T−t).
Using the temporary and permanent price impact and fixed cost model from earlier,
X(1+η sgn(−X))Seµ(T−t)−γX−D1X 6=0 < (X+λ)(1+η sgn(−(X+λ)))Seµ(T−t)−γX
−D1λ 6=−X − λ(1 + η sgn(λ))Seγλ+r(T−t) −Der(T−t)
noting that ST = Se
µ(T−t)−γ(X+λ)+γλ = Seµ(T−t)−γX reflects the cumulative perma-
nent trade impact if any trading occurs at t.
We now consider some simplifications to arrive at a special case which will use to
build some intuition. We also use this special case as a benchmark against which to
test our stochastic HJB numerical solutions. Assume γ = r = 0. Then the simplified
problem reduces to
X(1+η sgn(−X))Seµ(T−t)−D1X 6=0 < (X+λ)(1+η sgn(−(X+λ)))Seµ(T−t)−D1λ 6=−X
− λ(1 + η sgn(λ))S −D.
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It may be challenging to glean much information from the above, so consider the
assumption that markets are very liquid and η  1
XSeµ(T−t) −D1X 6=0 < (X + λ)Seµ(T−t) −D1λ6=−X − λS −D
−D1X 6=0 < λS
(
eµ(T−t) − 1)−D1λ 6=−X −D.
Two cases can occur: (1) X 6= 0 and so
D1λ 6=−X ≤ λS
(
eµ(T−t) − 1) (4.46)
or (2) X = 0 (noting that, if a trade in fact occurs, λ 6= −X) and so
2D ≤ λS (eµ(T−t) − 1) . (4.47)
That is, we must overcome two trades 2D without the counterbalance of liquidating
the portfolio D when X 6= 0; otherwise we need only overcome the cost of trading D
from our expected gains λS(er(T−t) − 1).
To determine the optimal λ, consider the case β  1 and accordingly
1− e−βy = 1− (1 +−βy +O(β2)) ≈ βy.
Including all our earlier simplifying assumptions, λ satisfies
max
λ
β
(
(X + λ)Seµ(T−t) −D1λ6=−X − λS −D
)
. (4.48)
Again, there are two cases: (1) If λ 6= −X, then ignoring β and collecting terms
max
λ
λS
(
eµ(T−t) − 1)+XSeµ(T−t) − 2D
which is linear in λ and so the maximum occurs at the endpoint
λ = Xmax −X (4.49)
where Xmax is the maximum allowed long position.
5 (2) It is also possible that
λ = −X where the earlier argument (4.48) reduces to simply XS −D. In this case,
5Here it is assumed that µ > 0 otherwise there would be no incentive at all to trade in the stock.
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it must be that
XS −D ≥ (Xmax −X)S
(
eµ(T−t) − 1)+XSeµ(T−t) − 2D
XS −D ≥ XmaxS
(
eµ(T−t) − 1)+XS − 2D
0 ≥ XmaxS
(
eµ(T−t) − 1)−D. (4.50)
That is, given our best terminal wealth after trading, we are still worse off than having
never traded.
This exercise allows us to develop some excellent intuition:
• If our risk aversion is small β  1, our optimal strategy is to buy as many
shares as possible.
• If the stock price is low, it may not be worth it to buy any additional shares given
the expected return may not overcome our additional fixed costs associated with
the trade.
• If we start in a position where we are already long the share, even with a high
stock price, the additional gains from taking a maximal long position may not
overcome the additional fixed trading costs.
• There is a tendency toward having a net zero position at the end horizon T
since there is zero transaction cost associated with closing out that position.
We must overcome the cost of two fixed costs when starting from a position of
X = 0. This is as opposed to when X 6= 0, where there is only one extra fixed
cost since a sunk costs already exists at T due to closing out the position.
These phenomena are illustrated in Figure 4.4.
4.3 A Call Option Example
As a first case study, we consider the optimal replication strategy for a European call
option in the presence of market impact. At expiry T , a call option struck at K pays
V (ST , T ) = (ST −K)+. In the complete (Black-Scholes) market model, the governing
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Figure 4.4: The optimal deterministic portfolio strategy. The colour map represents
the trade size λ. There are three regions: One where it is optimal not to trade; one
where it is optimal to trade to zero position; and a final where it is optimal to trade
to the maximum position Xmax = 1. Here η = 0.02, D = 1.0, µ = 0.30, T − t = 1.0.
We observe similar results in our finite difference code as we let σ, β → 0.
PDE is
∂tV + rS∂SV +
1
2
σ2S2∂SSV − rV = 0
V (S, T ) = (ST −K)+
lim
S→0
V (S, t) = 0
lim
S→∞
∂SV (S, t) = 1. (4.51)
The solution of this is
V (S, t) = SN(d+)−Ke−r(T−t)N(d−)
d± =
ln
(
S
K
)
+
(
r ± 1
2
σ2
)
(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
N(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
y2
2 dy. (4.52)
In the Black-Scholes setting, the optimal hedging strategy is the so-called ∆ hedge,
where at any time one should hold ∆ = ∂SV shares of the stock. In our notation,
this is λ(X = 0, S) = ∂SV = N(d+).
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When there is market impact as described in Section 4.2, we refer to our indiffer-
ence model. The value function under exponential utility satisfies
vn(B,X, S, t) = sup
x˙∈A
E
[
1− e−βRn,T ∣∣Ft] = 1− inf
x˙
E
[
e−βRn,T
∣∣Ft] .
Following a dynamic programming argument, we derive the HJB equation for the
personal valuation of the call option under exponential utility
vn(B,X, S, t) = 1− inf
x˙
E
[
e−βBe
r(T−t)+β
∫ T
t e
r(T−s)x˙sSsh(x˙s)ds−βc(XT ,ST ,nf(ST ))
∣∣∣Ft]
= 1− e−βBer(T−t)G(X,S, t)
G(X,S, t) = inf
λ,τ
E
[
eβe
r(T−τ)(λ(1+η sgn(λ))Sτ eγλ+D)G(Xτ , Sτ , τ)
∣∣∣Ft] . (4.53)
The associated HJB equation to the dynamic programming problem follows from Ito’s
lemma.
Theorem 12. The optimal terminal portfolio utility and trading strategy satisfy
min {∂tG+ L[G], H[G]−G} = 0 (4.54)
where the operator H is given by
H[G] = inf
λ
eβe
r(T−t)(λ(1+η sgn(λ))Seγλ+D)G(X + λ, Seγλ, t). (4.55)
The final condition is given by the cost to liquidate the portfolio at T
Gn(XT , ST , T ) = exp [−βc(XT , ST , nf(ST ))] .
In the case of holding (shorting) n options, when the option expires in the money,
we receive (sell) n stocks and pay (receive) the strike nK. We must close out our
position of X + n shares (λ = −(X + n)). Thus, the final condition is
Gn(X,S, T ) =exp
[−β (X(1 + η sgn(−X))Se−γX −D1{X 6=0})] if S ≤ K
exp
[−β ((X + n)(1 + η sgn[−(X + n)])Se−γ(X+n) −D1{X 6=−n} − nK)] if S > K.
(4.56)
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The associated boundary conditions are
lim
S→0
∂tGn(X,S, t) = 0 (4.57)
lim
S→∞
∂SGn(X,S, t)
Gn(X,S, t)
= β(X + n)(1 + sgn(−(X + n)))e−γ(X+n) (4.58)
For completeness, the optimization problem in the absence of holding the option
is given by
min {∂tG0 + L[G0], H[G0]−G0} = 0
where the operator H is given by
H[G0] = inf
λ
eβe
r(T−t)(λ(1+η sgn(λ))Seγλ+D)G0(X + λ, Se
γλ, t).
subject to final condition
G0(X,S, T ) = exp
[−β [X(1 + η sgn(−X))Se−γX −D1{X 6=0}]] (4.59)
with similar boundary conditions as above (i.e. n = 0).
The indifference bid and ask prices for n units of the call option are given by
pbn = −
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
Gn(0, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
pan =
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
G−n(0, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
.
4.4 Results
The numerical investigation is split into three subsections: The first is a thorough
numerical investigation into the effects of transaction costs and liquidity on the hedg-
ing and pricing of a European call. The second subsection illustrates how this model
yields some financially intuitive but atypical results. The third subsection discusses
the results in more depth and explains the effects in financial terms. We summarize
the pricing results in Table 4.1.
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Associated Figure Parameter Investigated Bid Ask
4.6 β = 0.5 0.34 0.45
β = 2.0 0.26 0.47
4.8 D = 0.05 0.32 0.47
D = 0.50 0.11 0.89
4.10 η = 0.01 0.29 0.53
η = 0.05 0.19 0.70
4.12 γ = 0.01 0.22 0.68
γ = 0.05 0.12 0.85
Table 4.1: At the money bid and ask prices ($) for various parameter regimes. The
Black-Scholes price is $0.42.
4.4.1 The Effects of Temporary and Permanent Price Impact
and Transaction Costs
We begin by investigating the effects of fixed transaction costs D (e.g. brokerage
costs), temporary price impact η (e.g. bid-ask spread, order book depth and liquidity),
and permanent price impact γ (e.g. feedback effects). Unless stated otherwise, the
risk aversion parameter is β = 1.0. The risk free interest rate is r = 1% per annum
on dollar deposits. The expected return and volatility of the stock are µ = 1.5% and
σ = 20% annualized respectively. The option tenor and investment time horizon are
T − t = 1.
Exponential Utility and Risk Aversion β We begin with a numerical illustra-
tion of the effects of risk aversion β on the price and hedging strategy, often referred
to as ∆. In our notation, ∆ = λ at X = 0. The results are displayed in Figures
4.5–4.6.
Fixed Costs D We begin the investigation of the market impact parameters with
a numerical illustration of the effects of fixed transaction costs D on the price and
hedging strategy. The results are displayed in Figures 4.7–4.8.
Bid-Ask Spread η We follow with a numerical illustration of the effects of bid-ask
spread or temporary price impact η on the price and hedging strategy. The results
are displayed in Figures 4.9–4.10.
Permanent Impact γ We follow with a numerical illustration of the effects of
liquidity or permanent price impact γ on the price and hedging strategy. The results
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Figure 4.5: The optimal hedging strategy for a long and short European call. The
solid black line is the Black-Scholes strategy (delta ∆). The solid grey (dashed black)
line is with risk aversion β = 0.5 (β = 2.0). The fixed cost is D = 0.05 while
the temporary and permanent price impacts are zero (η = γ = 0). The remaining
parameters are T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
are displayed in Figures 4.11–4.12.
Incentives to Break up the Order Some very interesting behaviour occurs as
the magnitude of the permanent price impact γ increases relative to the fixed costs
D and spread η. There is an incentive to break up the hedging order into several
smaller subtrades. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figures 4.13–4.14. As S grows,
the fully long hedge first moves to one half (1/2) then, as S increases further, to one
third (1/3).
4.4.2 Discussion
We explain and discuss the effects of each parameter in what follows. First, note
the strategies in Figures 4.5–4.14 show the optimal trading/hedging strategy λ as a
function of S along the line X = 0 at t. The policy λ is dependent on both S and
X as is apparent in Figure 4.4. Thus for example in Figure 4.7, the strategy does
not suffer from “pin risk” where any time the stock is greater than the strike K we
fully hedge and as soon as S dips below K, we fully divest the share. This would
result in very high transaction costs. The strategy is contingent on the entire space
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Figure 4.6: The Black-Scholes and utility indifference bid and ask prices for the
European call. The solid black line is the Black-Scholes price. The solid grey (dashed
black) line is with risk aversion β = 0.5 (β = 2.0). The fixed cost is D = 0.05 with
temporary impact (bid-ask spread) η = 0.005. The permanent price impact is zero
(γ = 0). The remaining parameters are T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
(X,S). Thus once S exceeds K (say S = K+ ) and we have fully hedged λ = ∆ = 1
(assuming we are short the call), we are at a new state X = 1. The trading strategy
λ at S = K −  and X = 1 is not to sell the stock λ = −1 but rather to do nothing
at all λ = 0. We wait until we are deeper out of the money before accruing the extra
trading cost. This eliminates the “pin risk” or rapidly repeated rebalancing.
Exponential Utility and Risk Aversion β In all the hedging strategies (Figures
4.5–4.14), it is always optimal to hedge sooner (i.e. at lower S) due to the asymmetry
of the payoff. When short the option, our downside risk is unlimited, whereas long the
option, our downside risk is limited. The choice of exponential utility U(x) = 1−e−βx
weights downside losses more heavily than upside gains. Hence, the higher residual
downside risk at terminal wealth from the short call is more likely to be hedged away.
This effect is illustrated clearly in Figure 4.5. As risk aversion β grows (c.f. the
β = 0.5 result to the corresponding β = 2.0 result), the hedging strategy becomes
more symmetric between the long and short call positions. In fact, we tend to hedge
more closely to the Black-Scholes hedge regardless of the extra trading costs we are
accruing. This is because the Black-Scholes ∆ eliminates all the residual risk with
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Figure 4.7: The optimal hedging strategy for a long and short European call. The
solid black line is the Black-Scholes strategy (delta ∆). The grey solid (black dashed)
line is with fixed cost D = 0.05 (D = 0.50). The temporary and permanent price
impacts are zero (η = γ = 0). The remaining parameters are T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%,
σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
the option, hence the higher the risk aversion, the closer we tend to track the Black-
Scholes hedge.
This result is also reflected in the pricing (Figure 4.6). The extra transaction costs
accrued by tracking the Black-Scholes hedge more closely (which relies on continuous,
i.e. frequent, trading) result in larger bid-ask spreads in the utility indifference price
as β, and hence the risk aversion, increases.
Fixed Costs D The effect of fixed transaction costs is to reduce the number of
rehedges. As apparent in Figure 4.7, the fixed costs D filter out some of the early and
late stage intermediate hedges relative to the Black-Scholes ∆. It appears like a step
function moving into and away from at the money S = K = $5. In the relatively low
cost case that D = 0.05, there is an intermediate area at the money where the optimal
hedge follows the Black-Scholes ∆. As we move deeper into (out of) the money with
the long call position, we become more certain of how the option will expire. Because
there is an additional transaction cost D at expiry if X 6= −1 (X 6= 0) when we
are in (out of) the money, it becomes optimal to just become fully short (divested
from) the stock. In the intermediate zone where the optimal trade tracks the ∆, the
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Figure 4.8: The Black-Scholes and utility indifference bid and ask prices for the
European call. The solid black line is the Black-Scholes price. The grey solid (black
dashed) line is with fixed cost D = 0.05 (D = 0.50). The temporary and permanent
price impacts are zero (η = γ = 0). The remaining parameters are T − t = 1,
µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
exposure to market risk outweighs the potential (double) fixed trading costs, so the
trader makes an intermediate hedge immediately to avoid exposing himself to further
market risk.
At the high cost value of D = 0.50, the optimal hedging strategy becomes a binary
step function. The costs associated with additional intermediate trading far outweigh
any foreseeable market risk (volatility) and so the trader either goes fully short in
the stock when in the money, or fully divested from the stock when out of the money
(i.e. no position X = 0).
The behaviour is also as expected in Figure 4.8, which shows the price as a function
of S. Deep out of the money, the option approaches zero. There is no need to buy/sell
any stock to hedge as it is known the stock will expire worthless and thus no fixed
costs are accrued. Deep into the money, the story is similar. The spread between the
Black-Scholes price approaches D as the optimal hedge indicates that one should go
fully long/short the stock to cover the near certain obligations at expiry. Since only
one trade occurs (the settlement precludes any additional trades or fixed costs from
being incurred), the differences in price approach the singular fixed cost.
The “bulge” in the spread between the Black-Scholes and indifference prices at
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Figure 4.9: The optimal hedging strategy for a long and short European call. The
solid black line is the Black-Scholes strategy (delta ∆). The solid grey (black dashed)
line is with temporary impact η = 0.01 (η = 0.05). The permanent price impacts is
zero (γ = 0) with fixed cost D = 0.05. The remaining parameters are T − t = 1,
µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
the money follow from the uncertainty. In the case where D is small and intermediate
trading occurs, two fixed costs are accrued. However, the expected gains in the upside
of the option cancel out some of the accrued fixed costs on average and so the spread
does not necessarily approach 2D. Similarly as D grows large and the optimal hedge
becomes a binary long/short or zero strategy, there is also a bulge. This is caused by
the tracking error in the hedge when the option expires in the wrong direction from
the hedge. Additional trading costs are accrued to rebalance the hedge at expiry.
Bid-ask Spread η The effects of η are more subtle (Figure 4.9). Since η is a
temporary impact, in some ways increasing the spread cost is akin to increasing D.
Thus as η increases, the optimal hedge approaches the binary decision.
On the other hand, since the costs scale with the stock price, there is a possibility
and an incentive to minimize the hedging costs. In the long call hedge, we make our
money from shorting the call. We make the most money from our hedge by shorting
at the highest price and hence there is a longer delay between when we hedge the
long call compared to the short call case or the case where η = 0 but with larger D.
We cannot affect the magnitude of the fixed costs but we can affect the magnitude
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Figure 4.10: The Black-Scholes and utility indifference bid and ask prices for the
European call. The solid black line is the Black-Scholes price. The solid grey (black
dashed) line is with temporary impact η = 0.01 (η = 0.05). The permanent price
impacts is zero (γ = 0) with fixed cost D = 0.05. The remaining parameters are
T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
of the spread costs. Similarly with the short call, we spend our option premium by
hedging the stock long. It is less costly to acquire the stock due to the transaction
spreads when it is cheaper. Hence, we tend to hedge earlier compared to the long
call hedge. In both the long or short call case, there is an incentive to wait before
hedging compared to the Black-Scholes hedge. For example if the short call is out of
the money, hedging by buying the stock with a spread premium to only close it out
in a sideway market guarantees a loss. Hence it is expedient to delay before making
any hedging decisions while out of the money.
In terms of pricing (Figure 4.10), the spread between the Black-Scholes price and
the indifference price grows with S since the transaction costs are proportional to the
stock price, unlike with increased D which tends to a constant spread.
Permanent Impact γ The effects of permanent impact γ are more complex (Figure
4.11). There still exists a band where it is optimal to track the Black-Scholes hedge
∆. In fact in the short call position, it is optimal to begin hedging earlier as γ grows
since the effect of hedging tends to push the stock against your favour deeper into
the money, creating yet more downside risk. There is a tendency to track the Black-
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Figure 4.11: The optimal hedging strategy for a long and short European call. The
solid black line is the Black-Scholes strategy (delta ∆). The solid grey (black dashed)
line is with permanent impact γ = 0.01 (γ = 0.05). The temporary price impacts
is zero (η = 0) with fixed cost D = 0.20. The remaining parameters are T − t = 1,
µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
Scholes hedge longer however since that is a smaller trade than going fully long the
stock. The larger the trade, the more likely the option is to be pushed into the money
and so there is an incentive to reduce the magnitude of the hedge. A similar strategy
occurs in the long call hedge. As γ increases, there is a tendency to delay hedging
as it is likely to push the stock out of the money. Further, there is a band where it
is optimal to track the Black-Scholes hedge and engage in some intermediate trading
when there is large γ, unlike the small γ case. The effects of γ compared to the fixed
cost D tend to make intermediate hedging not as appealing when γ is smaller. Again,
we tend to hedge later and differently between the long-short call position cases due
to the asymmetry of the exponential utility in terms of how much more strongly it
penalizes downside risk.
The effects of permanent impact on price are similar to the effects of temporary
impact (Figure 4.12) in that both scale with the stock price. The spread is asymmetric
since the scaling factor eγλ is asymmetric in λ.
Minimum Impact Trading: Breaking up the Order A very interesting phe-
nomenon occurs as γ grows in relation to the fixed cost D and spread η. We see
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Figure 4.12: The Black-Scholes and utility indifference bid and ask prices for the
European call. The solid black line is the Black-Scholes price. The solid grey (black
dashed) line is with permanent impact γ = 0.01 (γ = 0.05). The temporary price
impacts is zero (η = 0) with fixed cost D = 0.20. The remaining parameters are
T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
that an unusual hedging strategy arises from Figures 4.13–4.14. There exists a point
at which we appear to break away from the Black-Scholes hedge and approach some
midpoint hedge |λ(X = 0, S)| = 1/2. The reality is slightly different. The option is
still being fully hedged, i.e. |∆| = 1, but it is now optimal to break the hedge into
two subtrades to minimize the costs of the permanent price impact.
Recall from Figure 4.4 that the policy λ is a function of both X and S (and t).
Thus in the 1/2 case deep in the money while short the call, λ(X = 0, S) = 1
2
while
λ(X = 1
2
, S) = 1
2
. The net effect of this strategy is to hedge fully to X = 1 by X ⇒
0 → 1
2
→ 1. Similarly when λ(0, S) = 1
3
, then λ(1
3
, S) = λ(2
3
, S) = 1
3
. The combined
effect of this strategy is to hedge to X = 1 via three suborders X ⇒ 0→ 1
3
→ 2
3
→ 1.
An apparent geometric symmetry arises from this phenomenon.
To see why this is optimal, consider the accrued costs from trading. Say we are
deep in the money on a short call and wish to reach a position of X = 1 from initially
holding zero shares X = 0. Our accrued trading costs are
−λ(1 + η sgn(λ))Seγλ −D
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Figure 4.13: The optimal hedging strategy for a long and short European call. The
solid black line is the Black-Scholes strategy (delta ∆). The solid grey (black dashed)
line is with fixed cost D = 0.10 (D = 0.05). The temporary price impacts is zero
(η = 0) with permanent impact γ = 0.05. The remaining parameters are T − t = 1,
µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
where λ = 1. If the permanent price impact costs begin to outweigh the additional
fixed costs D, there is an incentive to break the order into two or more possible subor-
ders. This could be accomplished by sending the suborders serially to the exchange,
or in parallel via multiple desks or brokers. The optimal subtrades minimize the
accrued trading costs
min
λi,N
N∑
i=1
[
λi(1 + η sgn(λi))Se
γ
∑i
j=1 λj −D
]
. (4.60)
In the single trade, we incur one fixed cost and λ = 1. With two trades, we incur two
fixed costs while the trades are 0 < λ1 < 1 and λ2 = 1 − λ1. If it optimal to make
three trades, then 0 < λ1 < 1, 0 < λ2 < 1− λ1 and λ3 = 1− λ1 − λ2. This problem
looks nearly symmetric and so one would expect the optimal strategy is to divide the
trades evenly (e.g. 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, etc.). That is,
λi ≈ 1
N
. (4.61)
We verify this numerically for some typical parameters in the two and three subtrade
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Figure 4.14: The Black-Scholes and utility indifference bid and ask prices for the
European call. The solid black line is the Black-Scholes price. The solid grey (black
dashed) line is with fixed cost D = 0.10 (D = 0.10). The temporary price impacts
is zero (η = 0) with permanent impact γ = 0.05. The remaining parameters are
T − t = 1, µ = 1.5%, σ = 20%, and r = 1%.
cases in Figures 4.15 and 4.16.
In effect, a point exists where the permanent impact savings of splitting up the
order overcome the fixed costs associated with each order. We then move from one
trade to two subtrades to three subtrades and so on. This is why the hedging strategy
in Figure 4.13 has a step function appearance.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a framework to determine bid-ask prices for hedging
OTC equity derivatives with market frictions (e.g. transaction costs, bid-ask spreads,
illiquidity, etc.). The functional forms of the temporary and permanent impacts and
fixed costs can be customized according to the market scenario in which the trader will
be hedging. Further, the methodology can accommodate other forms of aversion or
hedging targets such as quadratic hedging, which may be more popular in industrial
applications.
We obtained some intuitive results from the bid-ask spread, along with some
intriguing hedging strategies following from the permanent price impact. Our model
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Figure 4.15: The total trading costs from two subtrades along with the optimal trade
(1/2) taken at typical parameters with stock price S = 15, fixed costs D = 0.05,
spread η = 0 and permanent impact γ = 0.05.
Figure 4.16: The total trading costs from three subtrades along with the optimal
trade (1/3) taken at typical parameters with stock price S = 15, fixed costs D = 0.05,
spread η = 0 and permanent impact γ = 0.05.
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recovers many of the strategies one may expect to employ in a situation with liquidity
risk. The fixed costs and spreads induce us to limit our total number of trades, which
creates a playoff between residual risk and accrued transaction costs. Further, as
the liquidity dries up, our model lets us know when it is optimal to begin breaking
down our hedging decisions into smaller subtrades to avoid moving the market too
unfavourably against our derivative position.
Areas for Further Investigation, i.e. price manipulation We would like to
investigate whether the presence of permanent price impact may allow the market
maker to manipulate the price and to what extent price manipulation may be possible
with share repurchase agreement style options. This investigation could be completed
by pricing the option with and without γ and examining the extent to which the price
changes. Is favourable price manipulation possible with certain product structures in
the presence of permanent price impact?
We identify the study of Asian options as another area of research interest. Al-
though the volume or time weighted average prices (VWAP or TWAP) are less af-
fected by the temporary price impact and fixed trading costs, it is still affected by
the permanent price impact. The average is unaffected immediately but eventually
the effects are felt as time progresses. If a trade of size λ is executed at time τ , then
ZT = S0 +
∫ τ−
0
Stdt+
∫ T
τ
eγλStdt
dZt = Stdt1{τ 6=t} + Steγλdt1{τ=t}
and so limt→τ− Zt = Zτ . Accordingly our trading decisions may impact the average
nonlinearly and there may be interesting strategies to “manipulate” the average. Of
course, it is much harder to manipulate the average in this setting than to manipulate
the spot price.
Applications in Stressed Markets Our market impact model has useful ap-
plications, especially when hedging in distressed markets. For example, during the
financial crisis of 2007, the 1987 market crash or the 1997 Asian financial crisis, liq-
uidity in the markets dried up dramatically. This resulted in large bid-ask spreads
and transaction costs. Derivative positions in equity and credit instruments for large
institutions however still had to be hedged. Our model provides a globally optimal
hedging strategy during times of market stress and illiquidity.
At other times, it is possible a single institution might take a derivative position so
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large that their hedging strategies end up moving the market, such as the infamous
“London Whale” [114] or, worse still, a combination of a market crash and large
positions as with Long Term Capital Management [115]. It is possible a derivative
may be written on an underlying that was originally liquid but later becomes illiquid.
Perhaps it becomes undesirable after some regulatory or market change like an on the
run Government of Canada bond losing liquidity after a new debt issue. Our model
allows us to account for illiquidity in terms of bid-ask spreads and permanent price
impact, which again is very useful for situations such as these.
Rather than building the impact parameters (η, γ,D) on a single current snapshot
in time, to reflect future liquidity risk, one might use a “term structure of illiquidity.”
This could be based on an index, futures, or analyst estimates. The parameters could
be time varying and stochastic such as the Hull-White model, fitted to some forward
curve or deterministic and fitted similarly to a local volatility style model based on
some liquidity index.
Applications in Market Microstructure It is possible to choose impact func-
tions (particularly the bid-ask spread η) that better reflect the order book structure.
The magnitude of the bid-ask spread could grow with the size of the order to reflect
how market order consume deeper into the order book. A buy order for example first
consumes all the order lots at the best price level (nearest the mid price), then all the
order at the next best price level and so on. Thus the larger the order the larger the
average (effective) weighted bid-ask spread.
Inventory Risk Management and Optimal Liquidation Our framework is
sufficiently general that by adjusting the utility function and goal from say terminal
wealth, it can be incorporated into a more general market making framework such as
managing inventory risk or optimal liquidation.
Extensions to American Style Exercise It is possible to price American style
options within our framework. In the model with no fixed trading costs, it is a simple
question of adding an additional obstacle besides the hyperbolic exercise obstacle in
Section 4.2. The pricing equation is similar to [102]. For the impulse control model
with fixed costs, there is a new constraint. In the case of a put option, after exercising
n puts, we then have zero positions in any put options. We can use the same notation
as before, and state the exercise constraint
vn(B,X, S, t) ≥ v0(B + nK,X − n, S, t) (4.62)
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since no trade occurs in the transfer of the stocks from the settlement of the call (from
the perspective of the agent). Thus the HJB equation for holding n options becomes
max {∂tvn + rB∂Bvn + L[vn],H[vn]− vn, I[vn]− vn} = 0 (4.63)
where
I[vn] = v0(B + nK,X − n, S, t). (4.64)
We note it is possible to also exercise the option while simultaneously making a trade.
In this case, I becomes
I[vn] = sup
λ
v0(B + nK + λ(1 + η sgn(λ))Se
γλ, X − n+ λ, Seγλ, t) (4.65)
or alternatively I[vn] = H[v0(B + nK,X − n, S, t)].
Multiple Assets and Opportunity Cost Lastly we suggest the relatively simple
extension of multi-asset options, which is a straightforward extension of the HJB
equation. Additionally, we believe a sound pricing framework should better account
for opportunity cost in the indifference price. We suggest for future research the
consideration that the agent in his portfolio optimization without the option may
also be allowed to hedge with some sort of market index ETF. This would possibly
cause the agent to be less willing to buy or sell the option since his opportunity cost
of investing with the stock and ETF alone becomes higher. It is also possible the
agent may wish to use the ETF in his option hedge as it may be correlated to the
stock and have lower transaction costs due to the general liquidity advantage of ETFs
over some single name stocks.
4.6 Appendix A: Asian Options with Market Im-
pact
Options based on averaging are referred to as “Asian.” The advantage of Asian
options in the context of equity derivatives with market impact is that the average
over time is harder to manipulate than a single price (at expiry for example). The
volatility of the average is lower than the volatility of the stock, which also results in
a lower up front option premium. Basing the payout on the average price has appeal
to firms with continuous predictable exposure to the underlying (i.e. a firm buying
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back a large amount of shares). Asian options may be based on TWAP or VWAP
and we denote both generally by S¯.
As a case study, we consider the optimal replication strategy for an average strike
Asian call, which at maturity T pays
f(ST , S¯T ) = (ST − S¯T )+ (4.66)
to the buyer. In this structure, the holder may possibly have an incentive to drive
the share price down early and run it back up later, if liquidity and residual risk
conditions allow.
4.6.1 Asian Options in the Risk Neutral Framework
In the risk neutral framework with no market frictions, the pricing PDE for an Asian
option is a 2-dimensional (plus time) hyperbolic PDE. To simplify the problem, we
assume the option is calculated on the arithmetic TWAP S¯ where
S¯T =
1
T
∫ T
0
Stdt. (4.67)
The option price p is
p = E[f(ST , S¯T )|Ft] (4.68)
with initial conditions St = S and S¯t = S¯ = S. It is easier however to consider the
state variable ZT where
ZT =
∫ T
0
Stdt (4.69)
and hence S¯T =
1
T
ZT .
By Ito’s lemma and the Feynman-Kac theorem, the pricing PDE with correspond-
ing terminal and boundary conditions are
∂tp+ S∂Zp+ rS∂Sp+
1
2
σ2S2∂SSp− rp = 0
V (S,Z, T ) = f
(
S,
Z
T
)
=
(
ST − Z
T
)+
lim
S→0
V (S,Z, t) = 0
lim
S→∞
∂SSV (S,Z, t) = 0
lim
Z→∞
V (S,Z, t) = 0 (4.70)
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This problem admits a change of variables reduction of the form
y =
S
Z
. (4.71)
The final condition becomes
Z
(
S
Z
− 1
T
)+
= Zf
(
y,
1
T
)
(4.72)
and hence we write a new function
p(S,Z, t) = Zq(y, t) (4.73)
The PDE is reduced to a single spatial variable (plus time) and becomes
∂tq + y(r − y)∂yq + 1
2
σ2y2∂yyq + (y − r)q = 0, q(y, T ) =
(
y − 1
T
)+
. (4.74)
4.6.2 Asian Options in the Indifference Framework
In the presence of transaction costs, we resort to a utility-based framework. The
utility valuation HJB equation can become cumbersome as it is in 4 variables (plus
time)
∂tv + sup
x˙t∈A
{∂Bv (rB − x˙tSh(x˙t)) + x˙t∂Xv + g(x˙t)S∂Sv}+ S∂Zv + L[v] = 0. (4.75)
This HJB equation is both nonlinear and hyperbolic. Accordingly, numerical solutions
should be very careful to avoid instability. We can reduce the PDE by one variable
B by using exponential utility. Further, when trading incurs fixed costs, the trading
strategy reduces to an impulse problem which reduces the differential component in
X. At this point, the differential component is in only 2 dimensions (Z and S) and
admits a greatly simplified numerical solution.
The value function under exponential utility satisfies
vn(B,X, S, Z, t) = sup
x˙∈A
E
[
1− e−βRn,T ∣∣Ft] = 1− inf
x˙
E
[
e−βRn,T
∣∣Ft] . (4.76)
Following a dynamic programming argument, we derive the HJB equation for the
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personal valuation of an Asian option under exponential utility
vn(B,X, S, Z, t) = 1− inf
x˙
E
[
e−βBe
r(T−t)+β
∫ T
t e
r(T−s)x˙sSsh(x˙s)ds−βc(XT ,ST ,nf(ST ,ZT ))
∣∣∣Ft]
= 1− e−βBer(T−t)G(X,S, Z, t)
G(X,S, Z, t) = inf
λ,τ
E
[
eβe
r(T−τ)(λ(1+η sgn(λ))Sτ eγλ+D)G(Xτ , Sτ , Zτ , τ)
∣∣∣Ft] . (4.77)
The associated HJB equation to the dynamic programming problem follows from Ito’s
lemma.
Theorem 13. The optimal terminal portfolio utility and trading strategy satisfy
min
∂tG+ S∂ZG+ L[G]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wait
, H[G]−G︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade
 = 0 (4.78)
where the operator H is given by
H[G] = inf
λ
eβe
r(T−t)(λ(1+η sgn(λ))Seγλ+D)G(X + λ, Seγλ, Z, t). (4.79)
The final condition is given by the cost to liquidate the portfolio at T
Gn(XT , ST , ZT , T ) = exp [−βc(XT , ST , ZT , nf(ST , ZT ))] .
In the case of the Asian call described earlier, this is given by
Gn(X,S, Z, T ) =exp
[−β (X(1 + η sgn(−X))Se−γX −D1{X 6=0})] if S ≤ ZT
exp
[−β ((X + n)(1 + η sgn[−(X + n)])Se−γ(X+n) −D1{X 6=−n} − nZT )] if S > ZT
(4.80)
where we recall the average strike payoff (Equation 4.66).
The boundary conditions are
lim
S→0
∂tGn(X,S, Z, t) = 0 (4.81)
lim
S→∞
∂SGn(X,S, Z, t)
Gn(X,S, Z, t)
= β(X + n)(1 + sgn(−(X + n)))e−γ(X+n) (4.82)
lim
Z→∞
G(X,S, Z, t) = G0(X,S, t) (4.83)
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where G0 is the utility value function with zero options. Since the call is so far out
of the money, its value is near zero.
For completeness, the optimization problem in the absence of holding the Asian
option is independent of Z and given by
min {∂tG0 + L[G0], H[G0]−G0} = 0
with similar terminal and boundary conditions as in Section 4.3.
The indifference bid and ask prices for n units of the Asian option are given by
pbn = −
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
Gn(0, S, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
(4.84)
pan =
e−r(T−t)
β
ln
(
G−n(0, S, S, t)
G0(0, S, t)
)
(4.85)
since Zt = S¯t = S.
4.7 Appendix B: Numerical Method
We utilize an implicit finite difference scheme to solve the PDE component within
the wait region, along with an explicit projected successive over-relaxation (PSOR)
technique to determine the optimal impulse trade region. Particularly, an IMEX
scheme is used to solve the HJB PDQVI. The method used is very similar to the
numerical scheme used by the authors to solve a multidimensional impulse control
problem in a real option context [117]. We refer the reader to [103, 105] for a more
detailed analysis of the finite difference solutions to stochastic control problems in
finance.
4.7.1 The Main HJB Equation
The PD QVI is of the form
min {∂tG+ L[G], H[G]−G} = 0 (4.86)
where the differential operator L is in S only
L = µS∂S + 1
2
σ2S2∂SS (4.87)
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so X can be interpreted like a parameter.
The constraint H is itself an optimization problem
H[G] = inf
λ
eβe
r(T−t)(λ(1+ sgn(λ))Seγλ+D)G(X + λ, Seγλ, t) (4.88)
which adds significant non-locality to the problem. However, the nonlocality does not
affect the solution within the wait region (the partial differential component) since it
is distinct, non-empty, and evolves under the uncontrolled diffusion as discussed in
Section 4.2 and [101, 116].
The numerical solution is obtained via finite differences at (possibly nonuniform)
grid points G(Xi, Sj, tk) = G
k
i,j using second order centred differences except at the
boundary conditions where one-sided differences are used. To retain the M -matrix
property, one-sided differences may occasionally be used. The grid is truncated be-
tween [Smin, Smax] and [Xmin, Xmax] where Xmin, Xmax can be interpreted financially
as the trader’s position limits. The grid points increase such that Sj+1 > Sj and
S0 = Smin, as goes for Xi. The derivatives are approximated by divided differences;
two are shown below for reference
∂SG ≈
Gki,j+1 −Gki,j−1
Sj+1 − Sj−1 (4.89)
∂tG ≈
Gk+1i,j −Gki,j
tk+1 − tk . (4.90)
Using a stable implicit time stepping scheme, the finite difference method leads to a
matrix system of equations
Gk+1i −Gki
tk+1 − tk + LG
k
i ≥ 0, ∀i (4.91)
where L is the differentiation matrix associated with the partial differential operator
L and Gki refers to the whole vector of values G in Sj at a given k, i. It is possible to
take differently fitted schemes (e.g. Crank Nicholson or explicit).
The trading constraint H is nonstiff and can be handled explicitly using the func-
tion vector Gk+1 at all points i, j from a time step earlier than k. The constraint in
discrete form is
H[Gki,j] = min
λ=Xi∗−Xi
exp[βer(T−tk)(λ(1 + η sgn(λ))Sjeγλ +D)]G(Xi + λ, Sjeγλ, tk+1)
(4.92)
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where G(Xi+λ, Sje
γλ, tk+1) is approximated by interpolation. Note that Xi∗ = Xi+λ
and
G(Xi + λ, Sje
γλ, tk+1) = θG
k+1
i∗,Sj∗
+ (1− θ)Gk+1i∗,Sj∗ (4.93)
where Sj∗ ≤ Sjeγλ ≤ Sj∗ are two adjacent nodes and θ is the appropriate interpo-
lating weight. The constraint H[G] is maximized by a brute force search in order to
guarantee a global optimum is achieved along the grid points Xi. This is required for
convergence of the solution.
In the limit that maxi |Xi+1−Xi|,maxj |Sj+1−Sj|,maxk |tk+1− tk| → 0, a Taylor
series argument shows that this formulation is consistent.
By using an explicit formulation for the constraint (that is, using Gk+1), we can
treat it as an arbitrary function h(X,S). It is possible to use a penalization technique
to enforce the constraint [105], however we use the PSOR technique and cast the
matrix system as a complementary problem [127]:
MGk − b ≥ 0, Gk ≤ h, (MGk − b)T (Gk − h) = 0 (4.94)
where superscript T denotes the matrix transpose. The matrix M is an aggregation
of the differentiation and boundary condition matrix pre-multipliers of Gk while b
is a vector of collected solution values known at time k (from k + 1). This matrix
system is then solved using a fixed point value iteration (projected successive over-
relaxation). Several iterative schemes for non-linear control problems are described
in [97, 100, 103, 105, 120, 127]. Following the criteria in [105, 127], our scheme is
consistent, monotone (given uniform grid points) and stable (L-stability from the
implicit time marching scheme). Therefore the discrete approximation converges to
the (viscosity) solution of the HJB equation.
4.7.2 The Asian HJB Equation
The Asian option HJB equation is of the form
min {∂tG+ S∂ZG+ L[G], H[G]−G} = 0 (4.95)
which has a multidimensional differential component. The solution is approximated
along a grid via finite differences G(Xi, Sj, Zc, tk) = G
k
i,j,c. We name the differential
operator in Z as
LZ = S∂G (4.96)
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which has an associated differential matrix LZ,j which operates on G
k
i,j the vector of
values G in all Zc at time tk and Sj. We suggest a stable and consistent scheme using
operator splitting
∂tG+ L[G] ≥ 0, ∂tG+ LZ [G] ≥ 0 (4.97)
as illustrated in [103]. This reduces the multidimensional problem into a series of
one dimensional problems with familiar vector-matrix techniques. The matrix L is
as defined before but operates on a vector of values Gki,c at constant Xi, Zc in all Sj.
The scheme is simple and robust but incurs a splitting error as a cost
Gk+1i,c −Gk+1/2i,c
tk+1 − tk + LG
k+1/2
i,c ≥ 0, ∀i, c (4.98)
G
k+1/2
i,j −Gki,j
tk+1 − tk + LZ,iG
k
i,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (4.99)
For numerical stability and simplicity, we suggest a simple upwinding scheme
Sj∂ZG(Xi, Sj, Zc, tk) ≈ Sj
Gki,j,c+1 −Gki,j,c
zc+1 − zc . (4.100)
At each step in the operator splitting scheme, we apply the PSOR algorithm as before
to enforce the constraintH[Gki,j,c] which is defined as before using Gk+1 following [125].
In effect,
MSG
k+1/2
i,c − bk+1 ≥ 0, Gk+1/2i,c ≤ h,
(
MG
k+1/2
i,c − b
)T
(G
k+1/2
i,c − h) = 0 (4.101)
MZG
k
i,j − bk+1/2 ≥ 0, Gki,j ≤ h,
(
MGki,j − b
)T
(Gki,j − h) = 0 (4.102)
where MS,MZ are the aggregated matrix premultipliers from the L,LZ,j steps with
associated boundary conditions and bk+1, bk+1/2 are the collected knowns at time k.
We note it is possible to use symmetric operator (Strang) splitting
Gk+1i,j −Gk+3/4i,j
1
2
(tk+1 − tk) + LZ,jG
k+3/4
i,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j (4.103)
G
k+3/4
i,c −Gk+1/4i,c
tk+1 − tk + LG
k+1/4
i,c ≥ 0, ∀i, c (4.104)
G
k+1/4
i,j −Gki,j
1
2
(tk+1 − tk) + LZ,jG
k
i,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j (4.105)
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and to update the constraint H[G] at each fractional step to achieve added accuracy
nearly O(∆t2) versus O(∆t) [125].
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Stochastic optimal control is a powerful tool. We have seen how it can provide insight,
guidance and solutions to many problems encountered in finance and engineering. Our
applications have shown how many complex problems in real life can be modeled by
a simple equation
value today = expected future profits + terminal project value
|given our information today
or, in integral form,
V (x, 0) = E
[∫ T
0
f(Xt, t)dt+ g(XT )
∣∣∣∣X0 = x] .
Decisions must be made and values computed in the face of future uncertainty
from multiple sources (e.g. price uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty, execution risk,
etc.). Whether one is
• seeking a profit maximizing operating and entry strategy for a biofuel produc-
tion plant in Chapter 2,
• attempting to account for regulatory and taxation uncertainty in an energy
project in Chapter 3, or
• trading to minimize the market impact and transaction costs of the hedging
strategy for an OTC equity derivative in Chapter 4,
the tools are identical. In these seemingly disparate examples (particularly Chapters
2–3 contrasted with Chapter 4), the key to solving these problems is stochastic control
and dynamic programming.
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In each article (Chapters 2–4) the strategy was the same:
1. Identify a problem of interest in engineering or finance,
2. Generate a mathematical model of the income or payoffs using stochastic pro-
cesses,
3. State the associated HJB equation for the problem using stochastic control and
the dynamic programming principle,
4. Where possible seek closed-form solutions or more generally employ robust finite
difference methods to reach the solution, and
5. Analyze and comment on the results.
5.1 Contributions to the Literature
In Chapter 2, we presented a detailed real option model to value the entry decision
and optimal operating strategy for an ethanol biofuel facility. In addition to the
numerical solutions, we also derived analytical solutions to the switching problem.
We investigated the effects of stronger correlation between corn and ethanol possibly
resulting from increased firm competition in the corn-ethanol market. Given our
optimal operating strategy, we considered the retrospective value of an ethanol project
given the historical prices of corn and ethanol. Finally, we investigated the effects
of the subsidy policy on the future profitability of ethanol projects along with its
risk profile via the profit distribution, value at risk, and expected shortfall via Monte
Carlo analysis. We derived interesting policy conclusions from our very complete and
in-depth green energy case study.
In Chapter 3, we presented a novel framework for studying and quantifying regu-
latory uncertainty and policy risk. We took as a case study the ethanol production
plant of Chapter 2. Looking back at the past 35 years of ethanol subsidy history
and noting how frequently it had changed, we developed a stochastic jump process to
model the subsidy level. Although in the near term, regulatory changes may appear
predictable, when planning for a long term energy infrastructure project, the inability
to forecast regulations 50 years out renders it apparently random. This is a topic of
much research interest at present, and our model is one of the only applications we are
aware of that treats regulatory uncertainty in this stochastic PIDE framework. This
technique may allow firms to better understand their future regulatory risk exposure
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and to value long-lived projects in infrastructure, energy, resources and elsewhere.
We developed a stochastic control PIDE model that accounts for model uncertainty
in the regulatory stochastic process and other economic considerations such as the
proper choice of discount rate. We also discussed alternative methods of addressing
model uncertainty and, as a possible remedy, developed a worst case valuation sce-
nario. We presented a detailed numerical method to solve the HJB PID QVI system
along with analytical solutions to the jump diffusion switching model. Based on our
results, we developed policy conclusions and investigated the effects of uncertainty on
project value and the firm’s entry and operational decisions. We also use our model
to support anecdotal and empirical evidence that increased uncertainty may result in
firms delaying investment.
In Chapter 4, we presented a general but novel framework for hedging equity
derivatives in the presence of market impact. We used a utility indifference approach
to develop bid and ask prices. Our framework can incorporate general market impact
models and can transition mathematically consistently from continuous to impulse
trading controls. We developed the HJB equations associated with several different
kinds of market impact structure subject to fairly general utility functions. We verified
our model framework was consistent with risk neutral pricing to ensure our bid and
ask prices stood on a sound theoretical footing. For our analysis, we chose the most
general case of market impact that included fixed transaction costs in addition to any
temporary or permanent price impact and then specialized our pricing results to the
case of exponential utility. In addition, we presented a convergent finite difference
method to calculate solutions. Our model solution produced prices and hedging
strategies that balanced the trade-off between execution and market risk. We also
discovered some interesting phenomena resulting from the permanent price impact
including incentives to split the trade orders to reduce market impact costs.
5.2 Future Work
My thesis (and the associated tools) naturally builds on itself as the chapters progress.
This is because each subsequent article was an extension of the previous. In Chapter
2, we identified regulatory and subsidy policy uncertainty as a primary area of future
research. This was the subject of our second article in Chapter 3. In the second
article, we identified the bandwidth of the best and worst case prices as being too
large and that perhaps utility indifference may be a better tool to address model
uncertainty. In our next article in Chapter 4, already aware of the shortcomings of
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the superhedging and subhedging prices, we employed a utility indifference approach
to generate the bid-ask prices. In Chapter 4, we also identify areas of future research
for ourselves and interested readers.
Our model in Chapter 3 can be extended on several fronts. To improve the model,
more classes of jump distributions or non-constant (in fact, possibly stochastic) Pois-
son arrival rates could be considered for future work. Another possible improvement
to the expected subsidy jump model would be to incorporate management’s views on
the probability of possible policy outcomes or cases, each with an associated proba-
bility determined by management. Beyond the worst case pricing scenario, we could
consider the whole space of equivalent martingale measures and seek a pricing measure
following the ambiguity aversion methods v(x, 0) = supα infQE[U(XT , T )+κh(Q|P )]
where U is the utility of terminal wealth XT , P is the estimated jump diffusion mea-
sure, Q is another possible measure from our uncertain parameter bounds, and h is a
penalty function that penalizes choices Q different from P , with associated ambigu-
ity aversion parameter κ. We note that the worst case measure and pricing equation
associated with our method follows from the aversion parameter approaching zero
κ = 0 and the risk neutral utility function U(X) = X. This would be an application
of utility based pricing. Further still, one could try to hedge the policy risk factor with
some sort of correlated asset using a utility indifference pricing approach. Different
possible hedging targets could be chosen such as exponential utility or a global mean
variance technique.
In Chapter 4, we identified many possible extensions and additional applications
of our model. One could investigate whether the presence of permanent price impact
may allow the market maker to manipulate the derivative price and to what extent
price manipulation may be mitigated with Asian style options. Our market impact
model can be used when hedging in distressed markets like, for example, during the
financial crisis of 2007 where liquidity in the markets dried up dramatically. Rather
than building the impact parameters on a single current snapshot in time, to reflect
future liquidity risk, one might use a “term structure of illiquidity.” This could be
based on an index, futures, or analyst estimates and the parameters could be time
varying and possibly stochastic. The model can also be applied in daily market mak-
ing such as market microstructure models. It is possible to choose impact functions
that better reflect the limit order book structure on exchanges or electronic broker-
dealer networks. Our framework is sufficiently general that it can be incorporated into
a more general market making framework such as managing inventory risk or optimal
liquidation. It is possible to price American style options within our framework and
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we presented the associated HJB equations for future research. Lastly we suggest the
relatively simple extension of multi-asset options, which is a straightforward exten-
sion of the HJB equation. Additionally, we believe a sound pricing framework should
better account for opportunity cost in the indifference price. We suggest for future
research the consideration that the agent in his portfolio optimization may also be
allowed to hedge with some sort of market index ETF.
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